|
Readers are reminded that this work is protected by copyright. While they are free to use the ideas expressed in it, they may not copy, distribute or publish the work or part of it, in any form, printed, electronic or otherwise, except for reasonable quoting, clearly indicating the source. Readers are permitted to make copies, electronically or printed, for personal and classroom use.
is as much phenomenon in
the world as problem. It is a force in the
world.’** 1 Introduction Law
is omnipresent in modern society and legal institutions have a major place in
the structure of Western societies. Law and legal process are increasing
enormously. `Law seems to be a kind of replacement, a substitute for traditional
authority.’[1] The
same goes for the Netherlands: there is a great deal of litigation. However, we
should not exaggerate: we cannot say that a litigation explosion is taking
place in the Netherlands.[2] That does
not alter the fact that the courts have to decide many cases, often with
respect to immensely complex and interwoven problems. Sometimes the legitimacy of a court
decision is questioned because a decision in a (criminal) case runs contrary to
public opinion, which, however, is often quite superficially informed by the
media. Another problem is that legal procedures may take a long time, whereas
the `substance of individual consent to a process of decision-making, that may
initially attach to and legitimate outcomes, thins as the process expands in
scope and lengthens in time.’[3] Furthermore,
the Supreme Court is frequently criticized by the legal profession for not
paying due respect to the Court’s function of developing the law.[4]
In this way, we notice a difference between the authority and legitimacy
attributed to the judiciary by citizens, on the one hand, and by jurists, on
the other. One cause of this difference may also be the fact that values shared
by jurists may differ from those shared by non-jurists. Which one should be
taken into account when judging the claim of objectivity?[5]
However, these problems do not constitute a legitimation crisis of the
judiciary. The judiciary fulfils a special role in
the state under the rule of law. `As the guarantor of justice, a fundamental
value in a law-governed State, it must enjoy public confidence if it is to be
successful in carrying out its duties.’[6]
This confidence cannot be based on the judiciary’s power to decide conflicts
alone. Authority means more than power; it means legitimate power. Therefore,
the judiciary has to honour (legal) values and principles like consistency,
coherence, legal certainty, predictability, and not the least justice and
objectivity. Respect for the more general principles of proper administration
of justice attributes to the legitimacy of the judiciary.[7]
These general principles of proper administration of justice are part of the
general principles of law. Therefore, the legitimacy of the judiciary is
closely connected to the legitimacy of the law. In the next sections, I will
discuss the concept of legitimacy and its relation to legal principles. I will
use some recent Dutch theses to illustrate the importance and the use of
principles for the legitimacy of law in general and for the legitimacy of the
judiciary in particular and to add a Dutch touch to the international debate.
However, I will start with some characteristics of the judiciary, followed by
an analysis of the concepts of legality and legitimacy. 2 Some characteristics of the
judiciary The
function of a court is to respond to a situation. Therefore, it has a passive
nature. Judges do not choose their own agenda. Furthermore, principal
limitations derive from the way in which cases get to the courts and the way in
which issues are framed and reasons adduced and from the provisions for
effectuating court decisions. Judicial action therefore tends to be
unsystematic and uneven. Moreover, judicial decisions stand a good chance of
being ineffective or effective in ways not intended. The courts decisions are
only binding on the case and cannot bring an unwilling administrator or private
actor to a change of policy that would profit other people than the individual
litigants who have enough resources, initiative, and foresight to take legal
action.[8]
So institutional factors raise questions about the power of judicial review in
general. Nevertheless, people often go to court, because they want to resolve
their conflicts. In providing a solution to a given
problem, the decisions of the courts contribute to the law in one way or
another by the interpretation, the clarification, and, sometimes, the
development of the law. Especially, in the development of law, courts are
active in framing the law. However, since the competing interests of the
parties involved are necessarily at stake the resolution of the conflict
according to the law is another purpose why courts exist.[9]
The way in which the courts perform these two functions, conflict resolution
and law-making, can contribute to their and the law’s legitimacy. The judiciary is multifaceted: supreme
courts, courts of appeal, courts of first instance, etc. These courts may be
divided into several divisions (or even separate courts), concerning, e.g.,
civil law, administrative law, criminal law, tax law cases. Therefore, the
balance between the objectives of the applicable law and the function of the
court will differ. For example, in administrative law for lower courts,
establishing the facts of the case at hand and the legal protection of the
citizen against the authorities may be more important than the court’s function
of developing the law or guaranteeing the unity of the law. The legitimacy of the judiciary cannot
be assessed without taking in account the performance of the other law-making
institutions. Here we have to pay attention to the deficit of the regulative
capacity of the normative structure of the general law, which seems no longer
able to express or transmit precise normative contents. Legislation with its
formal characteristics of limited flexibility and reduced capacity for
adaptation and self-correction seems ill-suited to the exercise of effective
and timely control of the growing variety and variability of the cases which
emerge from a complex society. Despite the flood of legislation, the normative
`sovereignty’ assigned to the parliamentary legislator is usurped by the interpreters:
the administration and the judiciary (which has to control the administration).[10]
No wonder the courts have to decide many
cases, often with respect to immensely complex and interwoven problems. An
important reason is that politics has been increasingly judicialized: there has
been a substantial transfer of decision-making from the legislature, the
cabinet, and the civil service to the courts.[11]
In recent years, the Dutch Supreme Court has given new interpretations to
existing statutes or formulated new rules for unforeseen problems in many
decisions, making new legislation unnecessary. But also on issues on which
Parliament was unable to pass legislation, such as the right to strike,
euthanasia, and abortion, the Court has produced case law.[12]
More generally, compromise – an important characteristic of Dutch politics – is
often to be found in the content of legislation: conflicting coalition opinions
are assimilated in the text of new laws. Such a diffuse and vague statute often
needs extensive interpretation before it can be applied in practice, which
opens up the opportunity for the judiciary to play an important role in many
controversial matters.[13]
Furthermore, in public law, the judiciary has become more actively involved in
the legal protection of the citizen. This is all the more important, because
the legislator often adopts the perspective of the administration and assigns
discretionary powers to the administration, whereas democratic control by
parliament is diminishing. More generally, the diminishing authority of other
law-making institutions may contribute to the comparatively high legitimacy of
the courts, e.g., as a result of general disenchantment with the political
branches of government. 3 Legality and legitimacy `Power
is a negative thing, authority a positive.’[14]
In the law, power and authority are related to legality and legitimacy,
respectively. The `meta-legal’ issue of legitimacy cannot be solved in terms of
positive law alone. `Legitimacy’ is sometimes used to describe in general terms
the criteria for the `validity’ of power, i.e., its `title’ for giving
commands and demanding obedience from those who, in turn, are themselves under
the obligation to obey.[15] The problem
of legitimacy is thus closely related to political obligation because obedience
is owed only to the commands of legitimate power. In this sense, legitimacy
presupposes legality, the existence of a legal system and of a power issuing
orders according to its rules. But legitimacy also provides the justification
of legality, by surrounding power with an aura of authority. It is a kind of a
special qualification, a surplus to the (pure) force which the state exercises
in the name of the law. A legitimate system of law is distinct from a system of
mere commands coercively enforced. According to Weber, nowadays, the most
usual basis of legitimacy is `the belief in legality, the readiness to conform
with rules which are formally correct and have been imposed by accepted
procedures.’[16]
Observing that modern societies are ruled by rational law, Weber identifies
rational legitimacy with legality. This is the rule of law, not of men:
commands or rational rules are issued in the name of an impersonal norm rather
than in the name of a personal authority.[17]
In turn, the issuing of a command constitutes obedience to a norm rather than
an arbitrary decision. Power is legitimate in so far as it corresponds with
rational norms. In this way, obedience is given to the norms rather than to the
persons who issue the norms.[18] The principle of legality is thus
closely connected to the modern conception of the state under the rule of law.
However, what kind of legitimation does this rational legality offer? Which
values are assured by this `notion of power as force exercised according to,
and in the name of law’?[19] Posing this
question means leaving the strictly formal approach, because it cannot be
answered in purely descriptive terms. We commit ourselves to a particular view
about the end, the content of law itself, about the end pursued through norms
and that justifies their existence.[20]
For legality to provide legitimacy, on top of the `normalization’ of force, it
must necessarily refer not only to the formal structure of power but to its
intrinsic nature. An important issue in classical
political theory is the evaluative distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate power. The general argument is that power must be supported by
some ethical justification – a legal foundation – in order to survive.
Therefore, legitimacy is regarded as a necessary condition for effectiveness.
The fact that (supreme) power must have an ethical justification has given rise
to several evaluative principles of legitimacy.[21]
However, the `arrival’ of legal positivism seemed to do away with this kind of
justification which power needed in order to survive. According to Kelsen, one
of the most eminent supporters of positivist theory, a legal norm is not valid
because it has a certain content, but because it is created in a certain way.[22]
Here, we should keep in mind that, for Kelsen, law is a system of norms; the –
presupposed – basic norm (Grundnorm) is at the top of this normative
hierarchy. For this reason alone, the validity of each norm within the system,
what makes it belong to the legal order or system, is determined not by an
evaluation of its content, but by the specific process it is created by. The
only criterion is whether that norm was produced or posited in accordance with
the criteria of validity of a higher norm.[23]
`Therefore any kind of content might be law.’[24]
To Kelsen, the principle of legitimacy
means that `a norm of a legal order is valid until its validity is terminated
in a way determined by this legal order or replaced by the validity of another
norm of this order.’[25] This
Kelsenian principle of legitimacy is limited by the principle of effectiveness.
Although, according to Kelsen, the validity of a legal norm is not identical
with its effectiveness, effectiveness is the condition (but not the reason) for
validity `in the sense that a legal order as a whole, and a single legal norm,
can no longer be regarded as valid when they cease to be effective’.[26]
For norms to be effective, they must be executed. A constitution or legal order
is effective if the norms created in conformity with it are by and large
applied and obeyed. So, from the positivist point of view, legitimacy is purely
and simply a matter of fact; legitimacy derives no longer from evaluative
criteria but from the reasons of efficacy. Furthermore, legality is identical with
legitimacy. For, in the positivist conception, law is considered law only if
made by authorities appointed by the system itself and enforced by other
authorities also appointed by the system. This means, according to Kelsen, that
the principle of legitimacy can be restated as the `principle that a norm may
be created only by the competent organ, that is, the organ authorized for this
purpose by a valid legal norm.’[27] Therefore,
`the question of the legality [Gesetzm In conclusion, to the positivist, law is
considered law only if created by competent authorities. However, as Spinoza
already observed, the power and the right of a government depends on the way it
uses its competencies.[29] Therefore,
to judge the legitimacy of a legal order, and more specifically of a judicial
decision, we should abandon the strictly formal and descriptive approach. To
evaluate law, e.g., legal rules and judicial decisions, in terms of `good law’,
which should be obeyed, we have to look at the content of law and the end of
the legal norms. `A value-clause must be inserted somewhere in the legal
system’. Otherwise, we cannot assume that the judge is the holder not only of
power, but of legitimate power.[30] Thus, legitimacy concerns evaluative
criteria for the obligation to obey the law. Directives, rules, or decisions
can generate a legitimate obligation to obey: they give good reasons for acting
in accordance with their content. According to Lucy, the `legitimacy condition
of law’ holds that `judicial decisions and other sources of law can in some
circumstances be authoritative’.[31] The legitimacy
of the judiciary thus means the recognition of the authority of the judiciary
and its decisions. The litigant party who is ordered recognizes the judge who
orders as a positive guidance. The judge should do more than exercise legal
power; he is to inspire initiative and willing obedience in the name of law.
Law, and its voice, the judge, is to evoke initiative and willing obedience.[32]
With Habermas, we can name legality and legitimacy the two dimensions of legal
validity. The dimension of legitimacy concerns rational procedures for making
and applying law which promise to legitimate the expectations that are
stabilized in this way. Law-abiding behaviour, based on respect for the law
(`the norms deserve legal obedience’), involves more than mere compliance.
In this way, according to Habermas, the legal order can fulfil a socially
integrative function.[33] In order to
fulfil this function and the legitimacy claim of law, court rulings must be
capable if being consistently rendered within the framework of the existing
legal order and they should be rationally grounded so that all parties involved
can accept them as rational decisions.[34] Below, I will discuss the importance of
principles which serve the law’s aim of justice. Principles are evaluative
criteria for the law and therefore for the law’s claim to legitimacy. There, I
will return to these conditions (meta principles) of consistent decision-making
and rational acceptability. Respect for general principles of law contributes
to the consistency and rationality of judicial decisions, and, therefore, to
their legitimacy. 4 Legitimacy based on mutual trust Klein
Kranenberg sets out to provide an original justification of legal authority by
analyzing the relation between the authority of law and legal interpretation.[35]
It is often said that legal interpretation undermines the authority of law,
because the person (or institution) who interprets the law really determines
what ought to be done. Since it is also generally accepted that the law never
speaks for itself but always stands in need of interpretation, scepticism about
the possibility of `a government of laws, not of men’ is never far off in
discussions about judicial interpretation. Klein Kranenberg defends the thesis
that the authority of law is made possible by mutual trust between the
legislator and its citizens and that judicial interpretation, rather than
disrupting this trust, is an indispensable means to preserve it. An analysis of
some important contemporary debates in legal philosophy leads her to the
conclusion that law does not claim authority after, but before its meaning can
be known. In order to get a better grasp of the
moral dilemma created by the law’s claim to blind obedience, i.e., to accept
the authority of law even when nothing about its content can be known, she
draws an analogy between friendship and respect for law. Both friendship and a
legal system are founded on mutual trust. This foundation of trust
distinguishes a system of rules from a set of orders and, al though itself
unjustified by anything other than one’s willingness to put one’s faith in the
law, it justifies one’s acceptance of law’s authority ex ante. The judge, the representative par
excellence of the legal point of view, is as bound by the law’s blind
promise of justice as if he had made it himself. That means that he is bound to
a promise of justice, which is attributed to him by the `other’ to whom he
applies the law. For only if this `other’ finds his own sense of justice
respected by the law can he be expected to accept law’s claim to authority.
Hence, we find that anyone who appeals to the law as requiring a particular
decision is by that act bound to a promise of justice, the content of which is
determined by precisely the `other’ whose obedience to law he claims.[36]
The continuous back-and-forth between
the legal point of view and the moral point of view of the `other’ to which the
legal point of view is accountable provides the judge with an opportunity for
interpretation. For adjudication is interpretation. `Adjudication is the
process by which a judge comes to understand the meaning of an authoritative
legal text and the values in that text.’[37]
Klein Kranenberg, inspired by Raz, then uses the concept of `detached point of
view’, which defines law as an effective power with an intelligible claim to
practical authority. In detached statements, `law’s authority is relativized to
a point of view, but still explained as de jure, not as de facto.’[38] Interpretation, as seen from this
`detached point of view’, is the decision to improve, or to make an exception
to, the rule if respect for the other so requires. The more a judge has
confidence in the moral standards of the other (and thus of himself before he
adopted the legal point of view), the larger his interpretive space will be;
the less he has confidence in the other (and thus in himself), the more formal
he will be. Thus, interpretation is presented as only an instrument to repair
law, which itself is an instrument of justice, and not as an authority-claiming
decision that creates an exception to an authority-claiming rule. The way
interpretation works according to the internal point of view, is by determining
the meaning of law as the legislator really meant it, so that law will
again be able to produce justice on its own. Hence, the internal point of view
operates by transforming conflicts between the legal and the moral points of
view into disagreements about the meaning of words. The internal point of view
declares itself indispensable to authoritatively ending these disagreements. Thus, Klein Kranenberg explains what
makes it is possible for the law to exist as a normative phenomenon which is
binding upon judges. The analogy between friendship and respect for law is
instructive but seems a little far-fetched, because abstract respect for law is
not based on a personal, symmetrical, in important aspects emotional,
`reciprocal’ relationship.[39] Pessers
elaborates on this fundamental notion of mutuality.[40]
She defends the thesis that the principle of mutuality refers not only to the
simple retributive justice of do ut des, or the complementarity of
rights and obligations (both elements of reciprocity), but also to solidarity.
In homogeneous social groups mutuality takes the form of the exchange of
services according to each other’s needs in the confidence of a rough balancing
out in the long run. Parties take alternating positions as creditor and debtor.
In her view, modern law forces human beings – being strangers in large,
heterogeneous societies – to recognize the other at least as a co-member of the
community of law. `In this way law functions as a symbolic order through which
in the other the own legal subjectivity is reflected.’[41]
However, a co-member of the community of law will not acquire any solidarity –
in the sense of mutuality – until this symbolic legal order (as a kind of
intermediary) reflects more than just a common legal subjectivity. According to
Pessers, the growing influence of the norm of mutuality is the essence of the
`socializing of law’ (including protection of a weaker contracting party, etc.) Legal order constitutes mutuality
between strangers. Klein Kranenberg is right in that mutual trust is a
necessary condition for a legal order. The legislator, judges and citizens all
need to have faith in law, before they know the content of concrete legal
regulations and decisions. But mutual trust is not a sufficient condition for
legitimacy of legal decisions. What is missing in her theory is any view about
the content of law, a particular view on the aim of law. The judge is bound by
law’s blind promise of justice, but she does not offer us any criterion or
standard for justice. In particular, she does not mention legal principles
(especially principles which do not originate from the competent legal
authorities). 5 Legal principles as the normative
core of law[42] Positivists
certainly have a point in insisting that law needs to be made by competent
lawmakers. However, they are wrong in maintaining that these lawmakers are not
bound by any other norm than the legal norms issued by higher legal
authorities. Their theory does not account for legal values and principles, as
a basis for criticizing legislation and legal decisions like judicial
decisions, for lawmakers are bound by legal principles. Therefore, besides the
concept of legality we need the concept of legitimacy to explain the authority
of law and the citizens’ duty of obedience to the law. The law itself aims to realise a value,
i.e., justice, which is the specific constitutive value of law.[43]
As such, it is a system which embodies values which are `essential determinants
of the law’s content.’[44] Some of
these more specific legal values are legality, equality, predictability,
transparency, (judicial) impartiality, a fair opportunity to be heard.
Principles can be considered as expressions of legal values, and constitute the
normative core of law in a modern democratic state. Law is connected to the
fundamental norms and values prevalent in a society of free and equal citizens
by means of general legal principles. Dworkin defines a principle as a
standard which is to be observed because it is `a requirement of justice or
fairness or some other dimension of morality’.[45]
However, we should distinguish between legal principles, which serve legal
values, and moral principles, which serve moral values. Therefore, a legal
principle is to be observed as a standard because it is a requirement of the
internal morality of law, not so much the external, non-legal, dimension of
morality.[46]
Legal principles are standards which are specific for the law (they are not
purely moral principles). The development and actual meaning of legal
principles is coloured by extra-legal influences, like the prevailing (moral)
norms in a society or the practice which the law aims to regulate. These
internal standards are generated and developed by the legal system itself
(although they are influenced by morality). These principles are not the
product of the will of some law-making institution: the origin of legal
principles does not lie in a particular decision of some legislator or court.
Their origin lies `in a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession
and the public over time’.[47] Principles are concretisations of legal
values in the legal system. Legal principles may specify legal values as a
whole: these general legal principles are common denominators of the various
sections of the legal system. Legal principles may also specify legal values in
a specific part of the legal system, e.g., public or private law, or even a
more specific subdivision of law, tort law or tax law. They exist at varying
levels of generality in the legal system. Principles are intermediaries between
legal values and positive law, i.e., legal rules. Rules in the form of general
and established laws, form the basis for government interference with the
liberties of the citizen. Government of laws and not of men is rule governance.
Legal rules are made by weighing principles. Rule-making implies the
determination of the actual content of principles and the balancing of
principles.[48]
Principles are the basis for the creation of rules. The validity of these
principles cannot be derived from the authority or power of a specific person
or institution. These principles are to be considered as vehicles in the
movement back and forth between values and legal rules. Rules are to be seen as
operationalisations of principles. Consequently, rules have a more concrete
and `technical’ character than principles and are normally less value-laden.
Law-making institutions concretise principles into rules which are directly
applicable (`in an all-or-nothing fashion’[49]).
Formulation by law-making institutions
gives rules an `imperative’ quality. In this respect, they are commands
formulated by authorized institutions. Principles do not have this `imperative’
quality: they only have a normative quality.[50]
Concretising principles into rules also presupposes power to enforce these
rules. This imperative quality promotes legal certainty and legal equality. Law
therefore needs the imperative quality. However, law ultimately cannot be
regarded as a command. Since general legal principles constitute the legal
translations of certain basic values of a society, law-making should conform to
legal principles. Therefore, the normative quality as well as the imperative
quality are necessary requirements of law. In sum, the body of law – statute law,
case law, the decisions and regulations of the administration, and judicial
decisions – should be `consistent in principle’.[51]
This implies that law is not only legitimised because it is established and
enacted by authorized institutions. Rather, legal principles function as
essential criteria of evaluation, in the sense that the legislator who seeks to
implement policies by means of law is bound by legal principles. Even so, the
judiciary is not only bound by the law promulgated by the legislature
(principle of legality) but also by legal principles (unwritten law). In this way, principles perform an
important function in ensuring the legitimacy of the legal order and the –
living – law. Under the rule of law, power is turned into legal competence
(legality). However, the way authority is exercised should be compatible with
an overall framework of basic values of the legal order (legitimacy).
Legitimacy requires a substantive evaluation as to whether rules agree with the
principles of law. Legality and legitimacy are both
necessary properties of law.[52] Legal rules
should be created by authoritative bodies. At the same time, however, they
ought to be consonant with the integrated whole of legal principles. Legitimacy
of positive law is guaranteed by its conformity to general legal principles.
The procedural dimension – legality – and the substantive dimension – legitimacy
– are intrinsically connected.[53] Law is not
only a normative order, it is also command in the sense that law should be
enforced and accompanied by sanctions. In rightly insisting on legitimacy, one
could be inclined to try to eliminate power. That would be a mistake, because
law cannot do without power. The tension between legality and legitimacy is the
tension between the law of power and the power of law.[54] In the next sections, I will discuss
three issues related to legitimacy in the sense of respect for principles: the
determination of the ends and principles which underpin ambiguous law, the
rationality of principled decision-making, and the relation between principles,
rules, and facts of the case at hand. 6 The determination of the aim of ambiguous
law Legitimate
judicial decisions have to account for the purpose or meaning of the law, which
finds its expression in principles. This is may be a difficult task, especially
when the law is ambiguous. The daily practice of judicial procedures raises a
number of legal questions. A judge can routinely answer many legal questions on
the basis of statutes, precedents, and his own practical training. In certain
cases, however, a judge is confronted with hard cases, which cannot be solved
in the usual ways. This is particularly so when legal questions are not
answered unambiguously in statutes or case law. It may also concern questions
which, according to the letter of statutes or precedents, must be answered in a
standard way, but which, due to changed circumstances or changed points of
view, can no longer be resolved with such standard answers. On
the basis of the theories of Scholten, Dworkin, and Rawls, a method can be
constructed, which enables the judge to solve these hard cases.[55]
This constructivism is based on the analysis of the problems of legal
interpretation: how do hard cases arise?[56]
Reasons include: the open texture of law, our relative ignorance of the facts
and our relative indeterminacy of aim. Statutes and precedents are formulated
in ambiguous language by people with limited knowledge of social reality. One
of the consequences of these problems of legal interpretation is that in the
course of time several authorities have to formulate again and again, new
solutions for unforeseen hard cases. This means that the law is not an unambiguous
system of rules promulgated at a particular moment by one authority, but a
collection of diverse rules and decisions which have been devised by several
authorities over time.[57]
Constructivism attempts to find solutions to hard cases by constructing a
normative unity in the diversity of rules and precedents. Thus, a
constructivist account tries to establish intersubjective agreement on a
coherent theory. Whoever attempts to answer a hard legal question can interpret
the law with a constructive scheme of goals, interests, and principles. A
constructive scheme can bring order in the diversity of sources of law (human
rights treaties, the Constitution, statutes and regulations, administrative and
judicial decisions). With a constructive scheme it is possible to establish the
purpose or meaning of the law, and to state the consistency of a diversity of
treaty texts, constitutional and statutory rules, judicial decisions, etc. This
constructive scheme formulates the purpose or meaning of the applicable law in
terms of objectives which are pursued. These goals can be further explained in
terms of the interests which are at issue. These interests can be ordered with
normative principles.[58] This scheme
of goals, interests, and principles can be used as an interpretative theory. According to the constructivist theory
which Rozemond uses, there are two requirements for an interpretative theory:
the fit requirement and the justification requirement.[59]
These dimensions of fit and justification guide the judge to find the most
coherent interpretation of the law; coherence being a criterion of
legitimation. The fit requirement means that an interpretative theory must fit
the positive substance of the applicable law. This positive substance consists
of paradigms of law, which are recognized by everyone as part of the applicable
law. The justification requirement means that an interpretative theory must be
able provide a justification of the various constituent parts of the law. The
justification can be formulated with goals, interests, and principles which
underpin the applicable law. Legislation and human rights treaties can be seen
as the expression of normative theories on, e.g., the relationship between the
citizens and the state, the legal protection of the citizens against the
authorities, the relationship between citizens between themselves, etc. In hard
cases, legal decisions can be justified on the basis of a normative scheme
underlying the paradigms of law. However, in hard cases, the fit
requirement and the justification requirement may contradict one another. It
may be difficult to justify certain statutory provisions or judicial decisions
according to an interpretative theory which sets forth the goals, interests, and
principles of the applicable law. In that case, the statutory provisions or
judicial decisions can be adapted to the interpretative theory. It is also
possible to adjust or supplement the interpretative theory on the basis of the
judgments which are derived from statutes and precedents. Here, Rozemond uses Rawls’ method of
reflective equilibrium.[60] When
opposition arises between specific judgments and general principles, judgments
and principles are adjusted or supplemented until a reflective equilibrium is
arrived at in which judgments and principles fit together. This method of
reflective equilibrium is a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning;
in this way neither the abstract legal values or principles nor the concrete
facts of the case at hand are made absolute in judicial decisions, while the
normative unity of law is respected. In this way, the rule of law can be
understood as an obligation on the judiciary to systematize the law and to
bring up it to date. Judges thus are legitimised to assist and cooperate with
the legislature (and the administration).[61]
The judges further elaborate the law – being an expression of normative
principles – and bring it up to date in the light of unforeseen practical
developments. They do this within the framework of a coherent interpretation of
the law. However, we should not overemphasise this ideal of coherence, because
we may well risk making the legal system immune for change.[62]
Thus, on the one hand, the law is in need of consistency, coherence, and
rationality, on the other hand, it needs sources of controversy, ambiguity, and
openness to be able to keep pace with the developments in society. 7 Standards of rationality in the
implementation of principles Although
respect for general principles of law, which form part of the rule of law, is a
necessary condition for the legitimacy of judicial decisions, sceptics have
argued that they are not very useful standards. It is often said that these
principles, which can, to some extent, be seen as a bridge to or legal
counterpart of the norms and values of society, are not very helpful in
providing practical guidance to (legal) decision-makers like the judge. In this
context, it is argued that, in most cases principles can do little more than
offer ` considerations that must be taken into account.’ In her study, Burg
attempts to improve on this rather negative picture of the guiding capacity of
principles by identifying several standards of rationality that prescribe how
principles should be applied.[63] According to Burg, legal principles are
ideals, they are pure statements of something good to be promoted or protected.
This means that, like ideals, they can often not be fully realized and, in
actual practice, they often come in conflict with each other.[64]
Likewise, they need to be elaborated with regard to what is actually the case
and what is actually possible in the real world, i.e., the legal order.
`Principles, being ideals, are in their realization dependent on what is
actually possible and on the legal possibilities defined by other principles.’[65]
However, only the general principles with a wide significance within the legal
system which have a coherence-creating capacity have the characteristics of an
ideal.[66]
Respect for these ideals attributes to law’s legitimacy: law is measured
against the ideals it sets for itself.[67]
Therefore, judicial decisions should respect (honour) legal principles. The standards of rationality in the
implementation of principles differ according to whether one is faced with a
simple context (where only one principle is applicable or a set of principles
that all point towards the same decision) or with a complex context (where
competing principles apply).[68] In simple
contexts, one standard applies: from the set of decisions that are possible in
the situation at hand, select the one that maximizes the realization of the
applicable principle(s). The process of reasoning with principles is
distinctively different in complex contexts, which occur frequently. The
question of the guiding capacity of principles is most pressing in these cases
for it is not at all clear how principles that pull in opposite directions can
direct the decision-making process. This problem of competing principles is
`the problem of how to decide which one among all of the decisions that are
actually possible in a given situation, each representing different comparative
weighing of the competing principles, should be selected.’[69] Burg identifies three standards that
apply to cases in which conflicting principles pertain. First of all, a
judicial or legislative decision has to be an optimal decision, meaning that no
other decision would have been possible in that context that realizes more of
at least one principle while realizing no less of any other principle.[70]
Secondly, principles should be implemented in a consistent manner.[71]
This means, that in cases that are similar, the conflict between principles is
resolved in a way that realizes these principles to the same degree. In
addition, the demand of principled consistency implies that in cases that are
dissimilar, the conflict should be resolved in a way that accords with their
dissimilarity. Third, the conflict may not be resolved in a way which is
disproportionate: the price, in terms of the non-realization of some principle(s),
may not be out of any reasonable proportion to the gain achieved in terms of
the realization of one or more competing principle(s).[72]
It appears, that with these standards, we have moved beyond the rather weak
notion, that in complex contexts, principles are merely `points of view that
need to be taken into account’. Each of these conditions of rationality makes
its own different contribution to reducing the indeterminacy under conflicting
principles. 8 Principles, rules and the facts of
the case Due
respect for legal principles attributes to the legitimacy of judicial decisions
but this reference to these abstract legal principles is not enough. The
law-making institutions make rules by weighing and specifying principles. Law
is a system of rules which are the result of the weighing of principles.
However, rules `can never issue perfect instructions which precisely encompass
everyone’s best interests and guarantee fair play for everyone at once. People
and situations differ, and human affairs are characterized by an almost
permanent state of instability. It is therefore impossible to devise, for any
given situation, a simple rule which will apply to everyone for ever.’[73]
Rules are generalizations for the purpose of legal certainty (predictability)
and equality. This is an important purpose, but rules have a limited capacity
to serve this purpose. Law is a system of rules which are the
result of the weighing of principles. Courts can apply the rules to the facts
of the case. However, this can never be a quasi mechanical process. In the view
of Smith, judicial rules and principles are topoi, authoritative
arguments for a judicial ruling without definitive application.[74]
In clear cases, there is no reason to doubt the reasonableness of an
application in an specific case. In hard cases, there are facts and
circumstances that deviate so much from the clear cases that application of a
rule (or precedent) can no longer be considered to be based on a weighing of
interests and principles prescribed by the legislator or another authority.
Application of a rule may conflict with one or more judicial principles that
the legislator or other authority did not take into account in drawing up the
rule concerned. In such cases, the judge will have to determine to what extent
application of the rule is still reasonable and fair in the circumstances of
the case. In making these considerations, the facts have an evident importance
for judicial interpretation and legitimation: the judge does not weigh up
principles in abstracto, but principles whose validity in the specific case he
has determined. The judge formulates a new rule on the basis of principles
which can be applied in similar cases. The facts of the case play a double role
in these considerations. On the one hand, they are the data on the basis of
which which judgement is passed but, on the other hand they contribute to the
decision. Legitimate judicial decision-making is also a matter of tailoring the
rule to fit the case. What we call the ‘rule’ is not of a different order from
the cases to which the rule applies: the rule is the product of the same
evaluation that gives the facts their significance and makes it a judicial
case. Rule, facts, and decision are thus inextricably interlinked in the legal
judgment: ius in causa positum.[75] In short, reference to legal principles
attributes to legitimacy. The judge cannot `directly’ apply legal principles a
case. Law needs the intermediary of rules between principles and the facts. For
his decision to achieve (concrete) legitimacy, he must weigh and specify the
legal principles into a rule which, in its turn, must be explained to be the
rule applicable to the case at hand. Furthermore, the content of the rule and
the principles `behind’ it is partly qualified by the facts of the case at
hand. In applying and making the rule fit the facts the significance and
content of the rule becomes renewed. Principles, too, are determined in this
`dialectical’ process, a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning.[76]
So, contrary to the Atiyah’s view, it is not so that `the whole point of
principles is that they attempt to generalise, to get away from details of
facts of particular cases’, because, the reverse is of equal importance: the
meaning of principles cannot become clear except in cases with their particular
facts. The process of generalisation and the process of concretisation
complement each other.[77] Thus, legal principles are not rigid but
flexible norms which enable law to respond to the developments in society, which
attributes to its legitimacy. This goes for civil laws as well for common law
systems. According to Cotterell, the idea of a common law `as principles of law
seems more appropriate for capturing this shifting, dynamic character, if only
principles suggest flexible guidelines for legal decision-making rather than
rules that control’.[78] 9 Principles in judicial practice For
judicial decisions to be legitimate, i.e., authoritative and not authoritarian,
effectiveness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Furthermore,
mutual trust between the judiciary and the citizens ex ante is important
but this trust should be continuous and should be reinforced by legitimate
judicial decisions. This mutual trust ex post will attribute and renew
mutual trust ex ante for the future cases to be decided by the
judiciary. In the long run, this mutual trust between the judiciary and the
citizens cannot do without a responsive attitude of the judiciary towards the
current opinions concerning law and justice among the legal community. Principles are expressions of the values
the law serves. They are means to promote the coherence and rationality of the
law. Therefore, respect for legal principles, is a necessary condition for
legitimate judicial decisions. These principles demand among others
consistency, coherence, legal certainty, predictability, equality, and not the
least justice and objectivity. From this follows, that the fidelity of the
courts to the law means not only being faithful to the rules of law which legislative
action has brought in the statute book, but also to `those principles that form
the backbone of the law, and which have performed this same function over
centuries’.[79]
To be sure, judicial decisions often must be seen partly as commands, but
legitimacy implies respect for principles (as well). In this way, legal
principles are binding upon judges. Old principles will have to be applied to
new and unforeseen situations; and in this process they may take a shape they
had never shown before. Legal principles may be actualised by a statute, but
also by a court of law. We should add that legal principles ‘discipline’ the
judge: the judge complies with the system of the law. Judges may not interpret
the law according to their own convictions unless they find it consistent with
the structural design of the legal system as a whole, `and also with the
dominant past lines of interpretation by other judges’.[80] However, we should not forget the
passive or reactive nature of the judiciary. They decide cases one at a time,
and the will be decided largely in the order in which they arise. This means
courts often attribute to the development of the law in `an uneven,
unsystematic, often illogical way’.[81]
That does not alter the fact that especially the Supreme Court should use its
possibilities to contribute to the development of the law, e.g., by developing
as much as possible clear and specific rules and the summing up of
circumstances that are relevant for the decision. Here, the coordination of
judicial decision-making is also relevant. Judges can make agreements on how to
interpret the law in the future or a special way of access to the Supreme Court
could be created to ensure special attention to the co-ordination of judicial
decision-making.[82]
Promoting legal certainty and equality in this way, the legitimacy of the
courts will grow.[83] In public law, legal principles
especially will come to the fore, when the judiciary becomes more actively
involved in the legal protection of the citizen. From its independent position,
it can correct the possible arbitrariness of the legislator and remedy the
diminished legal certainty and equality offered by the law (or by administrative
acts), because of its enormous growth and complexity. In this context, the
Dutch courts recognised and – further – developed legal principles. First, the
judiciary, on the basis of case law, has developed legal principles with
regard to improper actions and decisions of the administration. The courts, in
cooperation with jurisprudence, have developed legal principles of justice
which offer protection to the citizen. These principles are sometimes called
principles of good administration, and comprise procedural norms but also
substantive norms.[84] The
judiciary offers the citizen extra legal protection in addition to the
protection embodied by statutory law. In a way, the diminished legal security
of statutory law is compensated by these principles of good administration,
especially when they protect the legitimate expectations of the citizen.
Through the development of legal principles, the administration is no longer
exclusively bound by the (statutory) law. The principle of legality remains in
full force, but in cases in which there is a conflict with the law (i.e., legal
principles), the principle of legitimacy may correct the principle of legality
in order to attain legitimate administrative decisions. Furthermore, sometimes
the law itself is reviewed for compatibility with the fundamental legal principles,
especially the principle of equality. The fundamental legal principles used by
the judiciary in this process of review are expressed in the constitution or in
international treaties.[85] The judiciary should certainly be very
cautious in reviewing enacted law, a fortiori in reviewing Acts of
Parliament. The non-elected judiciary is not democratically legitimized, but
may certainly claim to have some special expertise. Judges are disciplined by
the specificity of the cases they must decide and, as a result, their
professional experience reflects `the value of deliberative wisdom – the wisdom
that consists in a knowledge of particulars and that no general theory can
provide’.[86]
Because of their specialized legal education, judges are experts at applying
the law, and – more broadly – at making value judgements. `The authority of
judges derives in part from their epistemological competence.’[87]
As mentioned before, it is not their job to express their own moral
convictions, but to form and enforce opinions about the demand of the system of
law. In a way, they function like democratic institutions. Important decisions,
hard cases, are reasoned and public. As such, they feed expectations and breed
a common understanding of a country’s legal system. The independent judiciary
is formally not accountable to anyone, but they are certainly public. `They are
constantly in the public gaze, and subject to public criticism’.[88]
They are judged by the public and respond to it. 10 The communicative and symbolic
dimension of judicial decisions Of
course, legitimacy is the result not only of reference to (legal) values and
principles. The application of the judicial procedures instituted to produce
binding decisions itself produces legitimacy (Luhmann’s `Legitimität durch
Verfahren’). Where the same subjects participate in the proceedings within the
limits of the established rule, legitimacy is reckoned as the performance of
the system itself.[89] To that
extent far as legal procedures serve important values such as rationality,
impartiality (objectivity), fairness, and consistency, they may contribute to
the legitimacy of a decision, independently of the outcome.[90]
More generally speaking, the formal element of the law contributes to the
legitimacy of rules and institutions.[91] In this way, the deliberative nature of adjudication
can strengthen the willingness of opposing parties or groups to continue as
`members of a common enterprise even when there is no shared standard to
resolve their disputes’, as Kronman formulates it. Often, the interests and
values of the parties will be sufficiently similar to permit comparison.
However, the claims of the parties cannot always be `commensurated without
recharacterizing them in a way that alters their essential meaning for the
parties involved’. The judge must try to create common points of agreement, but
in the presence of such `tragic’ conflicts, he should try to preserve the bonds
of political fraternity.[92] In these
tragic conflicts, it is not so easy to exercise judicial power `with insight
into social values, and with suppleness of adaptation to changing social
needs’.[93]
In these kinds of conflicts, the duty of
the judge to carefully give reasons for his decisions is all the more
important. However, judges not only have to decide cases and give reasons for
their decisions, they should also educate their public about the meaning of the
law. Witteveen calls this judicial communication.[94]
In communcation practices, judges can be educators: by interacting with actors
in the field they can generate new ideas about what the law in difficult areas
should be. They should try to unite parts of the (legal) community by trying to
find a common denominator in the different, prevailing views. Therefore, they
should detect the principles behind the prevailing views. By formulating them
with convincing clarity `everybody can recognize them as the right principles
for the case at hand.’[95] Here, we should pay attention to the
symbolic dimension of law, also expressed by principles. Van Klink argues that
law is not merely a set of rules, but also a symbol for something higher. It
gives expression to one or more values which are essential for a (legal)
community. Therefore, a legal norm can be called `symbolic’ (in the positive
sense), if this norm, e.g., a law or a judicial decision, has attained an
extraordinary meaning in the legal community in which it functions.[96]
Even if they are not executed, such symbolic judicial decisions have a
fundamental importance. Furthermore, open norms which are laid down in
communicative laws enable the judiciary to adopt a responsive attitude towards
the current opinions concerning law and justice among the legal community.[97]
It goes without saying that this responsive attitude will contribute to the
legitimacy of the judiciary. 11 Conclusion Legitimacy
regards evaluative criteria for the obligation to obey the law. Besides the
concept of legality (law should be created by authoritative bodies), we need
the concept of legitimacy to explain the authority of law and the citizens’
duty of obedience to the law. Respect for legal principles reinforce the law’s
claim to legitimacy, for legal principles serve the law’s aim of justice. They
are expressions of the values the law serves and can be seen as a bridge to the
norms and values of a society. As such, they are evaluative criteria for the
law and, therefore, for the law’s claim to legitimacy. Thus,
legal principles function as essential criteria of evaluation for law-making by
the judiciary, and its legitimacy. The judiciary is bound by legal principles. Subsequently,
in this report, some topics in legal theory regarding the role of principles in
judicial decision-making were analysed, e.g., the determination of the aim of
ambiguous law, the standards of rationality in the implementation of
principles, and the relationship between principles, rules, and the facts of
the case. Finally, some aspects of judicial practice and the contribution of
judicial communication and of symbolic judicial decisions to judicial
legitimacy were discussed. Notes * Assistant professor of methodology
of tax law and legal theory at Tilburg ([email protected]). ** J. Vining, From Newton’s Sleep,
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995, p. 279. [1]. L.M. Friedmann, The Republic of
Choice. Law, Authority and Culture, Harvard University Press: Cambridge
Mass., 1994a (1990), p. 17. [2]. A.R. Bloembergen, Ubi iudicia
deficiunt incipit bellum. Het beroep van de rechter in onze volgroeide
rechtsstaat, Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1995. According to E. Blankenburg and F.
Bruinsma, Dutch Legal Culture, Deventer: Kluwer 1991, p. 7, one of the
reasons is that Dutch legal culture offers many alternative and pre-court
conflict institutions. [3]. Vining 1995, p. 280. If urgent
cases, a party can resort to a speedy civil or administrative procedure
(interim injunction proceedings or
provisional relief) before the president of a district court; see Blankenburg
and Bruinsma 1991, p. 23 ff. [4]. Cf. J.M. Barendrecht, De Hoge
Raad op de hei, Deventer: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1998, and J.B.M. Vranken,
`Toeval of beleid?’, Nederlands Juristenblad, 75 (2000) no 1, p. 1 ff. [5]. A. Peczenik , `Law and Politics’,
in: L. Wintgens (ed.), Proceedings of the 4th Benelux-Scandinavian Symposium
on Legal Theory, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002. [6]. ECtHR 26 April 1995, Prager /
Oberschlick v. Austria, Series A , No. 313, p. 18, § 34. [7]. E.g. ECtHR 26 April 1979, Sunday
Times v. UK, Series A , No. 30. [8]. P. De Hert, Early
Constitutionalism and Social Control. Liberal Democracy Hesitating between
Rights Thinking and Liberty Thinking, doctoral thesis Brussels, p. 384. [9]. Cf. J.A. Jolowicz, `General
Report’, in: P. Yessiou-Faltsi (ed.), The Role of the Supreme Courts at the
National and International Level, Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas Publications,
1998, p. 36. [10]. D. Zolo, Democracy and Complexity:
A Realist Approach, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1992, pp. 127-128. [11]. J. ten Kate and P.J. van Koppen, The
Netherlands: Toward a Form of Judicial Review, in: C.N. Tate and T. Vallinder, The
Global Expansion of Judicial Power, New York: New York University Press,
1995, p. 370. [12]. Cf. H. Krabbendam/H. M. ten Napel
(eds.), Regulating Morality. A Comparison of the Role of the State in
Mastering Mores in the Netherlands and the United States, Apeldoorn:
Maklu-uitgevers, 2000. [13]. Ten Kate and Van Koppen 1995, pp.
373-374. [14]. Vining 1995, p. 285. [15]. A. Passerin d’Entrèves, The
Notion of the State. An Introduction to Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967, p. 141 (following, with a slight shift of emphasis, Max Weber’s
analysis of historic forms of legitimacy). [16]. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1972, p. 19. Weber’s
three pure or ideal types of legitimate power (Herrschaft), as distinct
from mere force (Macht) are traditional power, legal-rational power, and
charismatic power. [17]. A.J. Hoekema and N.F. van Maanen, Typen
van legaliteit, Deventer: Kluwer 2000, p. 45 ff label this type of legality
`formal legality’, beside which they distinguish,compensation legality, risk
collectivization legality, forum legality, cooperative legality, and
pluralistic legality. [18]. Weber 1972, pp. 349-350. [19]. Passerin d’Entrèves 1967, p. 144. [20]. Passerin d’Entrèves 1967, p. 145. [21]. Cf. N. Bobbio, Democracy and
Dictatorship, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1989, pp. 83-86,
distinguishes `at least six which can be grouped together as antithetical pairs
of the three great unifying principles, will, nature and history’. [22]. H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law
(1960), Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1989, p. 198. Ultimately, the legal
norm must be created in a way determined by the basic norm. [23]. Cf. D. Dyzenhaus, Legality and
Legitimacy, Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Herman Heller in Weimar, Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1997, p. 103. [24]. Kelsen 1989, p. 198. [25]. Kelsen 1989, p. 209. [26]. Kelsen 1989, pp. 211-212. [27]. Kelsen 1989, p. 276. [28]. Passerin d’Entrèves 1967, p. 148. [29]. E.g., Spinoza, Tractatus
theologico-politicus (transl. S. Shirly), Leiden, E.J. Brill, p. 237 ff. According to Bobbio 1989, p. 143, he sees things
ex parte populi, from the `view of the ruled in order to justify their
right not to be oppressed and the ruler’s duty to proclaim just laws’. Cf.
J.L.M. Gribnau, `La force du droit. La contribution de Spinoza à la theorie du
droit’, Revue interdisciplinaire d’études juridiques, decembre
1995/janvier 1996. [30]. Bobbio 1989, p. 88. [31]. W. Lucy, Understanding and
Explaining Adjudication, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.
140-141. [32]. Vining 1995, pp. 286-287. [33]. According L.M. Friedman, Total
Justice, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1994b (1985), p. 30, we should
not overestimate the strength and value of legitimacy as a factor in social
integration. [34]. J. Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms, Oxford: Polity Press, 1996, p. 198. However, we should take into
account, as Lucy reminds us, that even mistaken legal propositions can
sometimes have legitimate authority and thus generate obligations to obey. [35]. J. Klein Kranenberg, Authority and
Interpretation (doctoral thesis), Santiago de Chile/ Tilburg: Schoordijk
Institute, 1999. [36]. Klein Kranenberg 1999, p. 113. [37]. O. Fiss, `Objectivity and
Interpretation’, 43 Stanford Law Review (1982), p. 739. [38]. Klein Kranenberg 1999, p. 78. Cf. J.
Raz, The Authority of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. [39]. Cf. Raz 1979, p. 250 ff. Please note
that friends have an exit option, which the legislator, judges and citizens do
not have; at least to leave the legal order is not a serious possibility for
most citizens. [40]. D. Pessers, Liefde, solidariteit
en recht. Een interdisciplinair onderzoek naar het wederkerigheidsbeginsel,
(doctoral thesis) Amsterdam 1999. Pessers rather confusingly exchanges abstract
mutuality and reciprocity – more personal, equality-based, and related to the do
ut des – principle – deviating from common parlance. I do not follow her in
this respect; see A. Gewirth, The Community of Rights, Chicago: Chicago
University Press 1996, pp. 76-78. [41]. Pessers 1999, p. 246. [42]. An earlier version of this section is
to be found in J.L.M. Gribnau, `General Introduction’, in: G.T.K. Meussen
(ed.), The Principle of Equality in European Taxation, The Hague etc.: Kluwer
Law International, 1999, pp. 1-33. [43]. G. Radbruch, `Legal Philosophy’, in:
The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch and Dabin, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1950, pp. 107-111. Cf. S. Taekema, The Concept of Ideals
in Legal Theory (doctoral thesis Tilburg), Tilburg Schoordijk Instituut,
2000, p. 41 ff. [44]. R.S. Summers, Instrumentalism and
American Legal Theory, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1982, p.
59. [45]. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously,
London: Duckworth, 1977, p. 22. [46]. Cf. L.L. Fuller, The Morality of Law,
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 200-224. [47]. Dworkin 1977, p. 40. Cf. P. Scholten,
`Rechtsbeginselen’ [1935], in: Idem, Verzamelde Geschriften, Deel I, Zwolle:
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1980, pp. 395-412. [48]. Cf. Taekema 2000, pp. 11-12, 80, who
discusses Alexy’s conceptualisation of principles as `Optimierungsgebote’
interpreted as the optimising demanded by principles of legal values, with not
only a deontological but also an axiological dimension (R. Alexy, `Rechtsregeln
und Rechtsprinzipien’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 25,
1985, p. 24). [49]. Dworkin 1977, p. 24. [50]. Cf. J.F. Glastra van Loon, `Rules and
Commands’, Mind, October 1958, pp. 514-521. [51]. R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge
(Mass.), London: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 225-275. [52]. J.L.M. Gribnau, Rechtsbetrekking en
rechtsbeginselen in het belastingrecht. Rechtstheoretische beschouwingen over
navordering, toezegging en fiscale vaststellingsovereenkomst, (doctoral
thesis), Deventer: Kluwer, 1998, pp. 83-102. [53]. Gribnau 1999, p. 23. [54]. Compare Radbruch 1950, pp. 117-118.
Effectuating principled law also depends on power to enforce it. This is the
dialectic of might and right. [55]. P. Scholten, Algemeen deel,
Zwolle:W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1931, p. 33 ff. Dworkin 1977, p. 159-168; J.
Rawls, Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. [56]. K. Rozemond, Strafvorderlijke
rechtsvinding, Amsterdam, Deventer: Gouda Quint 1998, p. 25 ff. [57]. Cf. Habermas 1996, p. 198: `An
existing law is the product of an opaque web of past decisions by the
legislature and the judiciary and it can include traditions of customary law as
well.’ [58]. Rozemond 1998, p. 41. [59]. Cf. Dworkin 1986, p. 66 ff. [60]. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971, pp.147-48. According to this method,
normative judgment-forming consists of constructing a unity in individual moral
judgments. The construction of a unity can be achieved with ethical principles.
People can form considered judgments on a series of ethical questions. They can
endeavour to order these moral judgements with the aid of ethical principles. As
a method of interpretation, constructivism is an elaboration of this method of
reflective equilibrium; Rozemond 1998, p. 58 ff. [61]. Cf. J.G. Sauveplanne, Codified and
Judge Made Law. The Role of Courts and Legislators in Civil and Common Law
Systems, Amsterdam etc.: KNAW 1982, p. 120: `A system of law [civil
as well as common law systems] must be created and developed by the interaction
between legislature and judiciary. It must exist both of statute law and judge
made law. The life of a code depends on its judicial interpretation.’ [62]. W. van der Burg, `Reflective
Equilibrium as a Dynamic Process’ in: W. van der Burg, T. van Willegenburg
(eds.), Reflective Equilibrium, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. [63]. E. Burg, The Model of Principles.The
Quest for Rationality in the Implementation of Conflicting Principles,
Amsterdam, 2000. [64]. Burg 2000, p. 98 ff. Cf. Taekema
2000, p. 172, who discusses the important role of conflict in the shaping of
ideals. [65]. R. Alexy, `Zum Begriff des
Rechtsprinzips’, Rechtstheorie, Beiheft 1, 1979, p. 81 (transl. Burg). [66]. Burg 2000, p. 13: `To the extent that
the positive law is ultimately justifiable under a small number of compatible
general principle, it is coherent in principle.’ Cf. Dworkin 1986. [67]. J. Vining, The Authoritative and the
Authoritarian, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986, 193. [68]. Burg 2000, p. 88. [69]. Burg 2000, p. 113. [70]. This requirement of optimization
refers to what is also known as `Pareto-optimality; Burg 2000, p. 141 ff. [71]. This requirement of consistency is an
attempt to elaborate in more detail Dworkin’s idea of integrity in law. Of
course, the `truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never reaching,
consistency’; O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1881, p. 36. [72]. The case law of the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR 23 July 1968, Belgian languages, Series A, No. 6, p. 34, s.
10, offers an interesting analogy. As regards Art. 14 ECHR, the Court also uses
the requirement of objective and reasonable justification, which requirement is
met if the following two conditions are fulfilled: a. a legitimate aim of
government policy is pursued; b. there is reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. [73]. Plato, Statesman, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1995, pp. 58-59. Plato speaks of legislation but the
same goes for rules. [74]. C.E. Smith, Feit en rechtsnorm.
Een methodologisch onderzoek naar de betekenis van feiten voor de rechtsvinding
en legitimatie van het rechtsoordeel, (doctoral thesis Leiden) Maastricht:
Shaker Publishers, 1998, p.40 ff. [75]. Smith 1998, p. 149. [76]. Already in the natural law tradition,
it was clear that judicial decisions carried the judge beyond the point where
he could regard himself as simply applying a principle or rule or even as
deducing conclusions from it. The decision is shaped, but never fully
determined, by a principle or rule. See J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, pp. 254 ff. [77]. P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory
in English Law, London: Stevens & Sons, 1987, pp. 26-27. [78]. R. Cotterell, The Politics of
Jurisprudence. A Critical Introduction to Philosophy, London etc.:
Butterworths, 1989, p. 23. [79]. T. Koopmans, `Retrospectivity
Reconsidered’, in: T. Koopmans, Juridische stippelwerk, Deventer:
Kluwer, 1991, p. 303. [80]. R. Dworkin, The Moral Reading and the
Majoritarian Premise, in: R. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law. The Moral Reading of
the American Constitution, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1996, p. 10. [81]. Roger B. Dworkin, The Role of the
Law in Bioethical Decision Making, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press 1996, p. 9. [82]. M. Köhne, Coördinatie van
rechtspraak (doctoral thesis Tilburg), The Hague: Boom Juridische
Uitgevers, 2001. [83]. Cf. J.M. Barendrecht, Recht als
model van rechtvaardigheid. Beschouwingen over vage en scherpe normen, over
binding aan het recht en over rechtsvorming (doctoral thesis Tilburg),
Deventer: Kluwer, 1992. [84]. E.g., D. Oliver, `Common Values in
Public and Private Law and the Public/Private Divide’, Public Law
[1997], p. 631. [85]. However, the judiciary adopts a
reserved attitude in this matter. The legislator, after all, has the primacy in
shaping public policy and therefore has `a certain margin of appreciation’. Cf.
R.H. Happé, `The Netherlands’, in: G.T.K. Meussen (ed.), The Principle of
Equality in European Taxation, Kluwer Law International, The Hague etc.,
1999, pp.125-155. [86]. A.T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer.
Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, Cambridge, Mass., London, Harvard
University Press, 1993, p. 319. [87]. G.F. Gaus, Justificatory
Liberalism. An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996, p. 276. [88]. J. Raz, `The Politics of the Rule of
Law’, in: J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law
and Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 374. [89]. N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory
of Law, London etc. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 199 ff. Cf. M.J.C.
Vile, Constitution and the Separation of Powers, Indianapolis: Liberty
Press, 1998 (1967), p. 381: procedures may be seen as the institutional
expression of the value patterns of particular societies. [90]. D. Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of
Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 194 ff. See also R.S.
Summers, `Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes. A Plea for "Process
Values"’, Cornell Law Review 60 (1974) 1, p. 1-52. [91]. Friedmann 1994a, p. 10. [92]. Kronman 1993, pp. 340-341. Compare
Habermas’ integretative force of legitimacy. [93]. B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process, New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 1949 p. 94. [94]. W. Witteveen, De ontdekking van de
rechtsoverdracht, in: B. van Klink and E.-J. Broers, De rechter als
rechtsvormer, The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2001, 271-288. [95]. Witteveen 2001, p. 286. [96]. B. van Klink, De wet als symbool.
Over de wettelijke communicatie en de Wet Gelijke behandeling van mannen en
vrouwen bij arbeid, Deventer: 1998, p. 441. [97]. Van Klink 1998, pp.101 ff, 443. Cite as: J.L.M. Gribnau, Legitimacy of the Judiciary, vol 6.4 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, (December 2002), <http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-3.html> |
||||||||
|
|
||||||||
|