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IMPOSED
VERSUS UNDERGONE PUNISHMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS M.M.
Boone* V
A 2 1 Introduction A
crime often attracts a great deal of attention. So does the following trial and
conviction. After the conviction, attention drops down. Most people have no
idea how sanctions can be ended. This article deals with the question what
happens in the Netherlands to a person after conviction. More specific: what
decisions can be made on him regarding the execution of the sanction. This is a
very interesting question, for the person undergoing the sanction maybe the
most important question. That is why it has always astonished me that lawyers
put relatively little attention to it. I will focus on the decisions that can
be made on the convicted person during the execution of the sentence, the
procedures that have to be taken into account and the legal possibilities to
complain about those decisions. I will show that the judge in the Netherlands
has very little influence on the decisions that are made during the execution
of a sanction what brings uncertainty and a lack of legal protection to the
convicted person. Before starting with the main topic, an
overview of the sanctions that can be imposed according to the Dutch sanction
system for adults will be given in the second section. The third section contains an extensive
description of the situation in the Netherlands where by emphasis will be put
on the sanctions depriving or curtailing a person’s liberty. Attention will
also be paid to the Green (government) paper ‘Sanctions in perspective’ which
will be the starting point for fundamental legal changes in future. Next,
attention shifts to international and doctrinal aspects linked to the subject,
as the penal content of sanctions and the role of the judge versus the
administration. The last section is reserved for discussion. 2 Headlines of the Dutch sanction
system 2.1 The current Dutch sanction system In
the Netherlands, penal sanctions can be imposed in two ways. That is why the
Dutch sanction system is also called a two –track system or a dualistic
sanction system. If the sanction is based on retribution, one calls it a
penalty, if protecting society is its fundamental goal, one talks about a
measure. The existence of a two track-system can be explained by the fact that
the system was influenced by the classical view on punishment on the one hand
and the modern movement in penal law on the other. The classical view is based
on a portrayal of mankind as fundamentally free. Only abuse of freedom is
forbidden. The content of `abuse of freedom’ is decided by the government and
laid down in penalty clauses. Especially for the neo-classical thinkers,
punishment was not a means to a certain aim, but an aim in itself. The sanction
did serve no other aim than to punish, that will say repay the suffer that was
caused by the offender. That is why the penal code involved a high level of
legal protection. Important legal principles as the principle of guilt, the
principle of equality and legality (the rule of law) were very important. Followers of the modern movement in
penal law had a totally different portrayal of mankind. In their eyes, human
beings were miserable, dangerous and unhappy creatures. They rejected the
non-deterministic view of the (neo) classical thinkers and replaced it by a
deterministic view. All kinds of factors inevitably lead the delinquent person
to evil; personal quilt was negligible. In this view, retribution as an aim of
punishment is worthless. The most important aim of punishment according to the
modernist thinkers is protecting society by correcting or disarming offenders.
These two different visions on the role and function of penal law resulted in a
sanction system that reserves penalties for offenders who are held responsible for
their deeds and measures for those who are not.’ Even
apart from the ways sanctions can be ended, the system as it is laid down in
the current Penal Code is varied. Compared to many other countries, the judge
has a large measure of freedom and a wide range of options in determining the
type, degree and mode of penalties. The Dutch sanction system for adults
(persons of 18 years or older) distinguishes between penalties and measures and
between principal penalties and accessory penalties. In this paper, I will only
discuss principal penalties and measures. Accessory penalties are not relevant
for the topic.[1] Principal
penalties are set out in order of severity in Section 9 of the Penal Code as
follows: imprisonment, detention, community sanctions and fines. In a formal
sense, detention is still a lighter sentence than imprisonment, but the two
hardly differ in the manner of their enforcement. Detention is the only
custodial sentence for infractions and can be applied to a maximum of one year.
Community sentences were introduced in the penal code in February 2001. Till
that time only the community service order had a legal basis, educational
sentences were applied as a special condition of a suspended sentence . There is one general minimum penalty for
all offences namely one day for imprisonment and detention and five guilders
for the fine. A minimum for community sanctions is lacking. Maximum penalties
are laid down for each individual offence. Until 1994 accumulation of penalties
was strictly limited, but since that time all combinations of principal
penalties are allowed. Section 14a a-k Penal Code deals with
suspended sentences. All principal and accessory penalties can be applied
suspended, meaning that the imposed sanction or a part of it will not be
executed under certain conditions. The application of the suspended prison
sentence is limited to sentences up to a maximum of one year, prison sentences
of one to three years can be partly imposed suspended to a maximum of one
third. Until the introduction of the recent Bill on community sanctions, these
sanctions did not have a suspended variant. The legislator, however, meant that
there should not be a difference on this point with the other principal
penalties. Even so, it feels strange, because the conditions belonging to a
suspended sentence often have many similarities with community sanctions.
Indeed, most community sanctions were applied as a condition of a suspended
sentence during the experimental stage. As
said before, measures differ from penalties in the way that they can also be
imposed on offenders who are not hold responsible for their deeds. Neither the
application nor the severity of a measure depends on the guilt of the offender.
Financial measures are withdrawal from circulation (Sects. 36b-d PC), the
confiscation of the profits of crime (Sect. 36e PC) and compensation to the
victim (Sect. 36f PC). Measures depriving a person’s liberty are placement in a
psychiatric hospital (Sect. 37 PC), the measure of entrustment to a forensic
psychiatric hospital (TBS) and the penal centre for addicts. Emphasis will be
put on the last category. Interesting for the scope of this paper, is that
recently also suspended variants of hospital orders became possible. The disconnection with guilt, makes it
very attractive for the government to present a new sanction as a measure, even
though the sanction is actually based on reproach. Suspicions of this kind rise
for example with regard to the latest amendments of the bill on the
confiscation of profits of crime making it possible to take away also the
profits that are (possibly) made with other crimes and the recently introduced
bill on the penal centre for drug- addicts which gives the possibility to
imprison addicted persons for two years for minor offences, in order to make it
possible to treat them. 3 Imposed versus undergone punishment:
positive Dutch law 3.1 Financial penalties and measures Originally
fines were only intended for infractions and minor offences. Since the passage
of the 1983 Financial Penalties Act all offences may be sentenced with a fine.
The minimum fine for all offences is 5 guilders, the maximum can run up to a
million guilders depending on which of the six fine categories an offence or
infraction is placed in. Following the advice of the Financial Penalties
Committee, day fines were rejected on theoretical and practical grounds.
Although, the topic has regularly been discussed ever since, day fines were
never introduced in the Dutch sanction system, contrary to surrounding countries.[2]
Instead, the judge is ordered to take into account the financial position of
the offender when he imposes a fine (Sec. 24 PC). Moreover, the judge has the
possibility to impose a fine in instalments, provided that the fine exceeds the
amount of 500 guilders. If so, the judge also has to determine the amount of
each instalment and the terms in which it has to be paid (Sec. 24a PC). Section 24a is the only provision for
the judge to influence the execution of the fine. In all other aspects, the Prosecution
Service is responsible for the way financial penalties and measures are ended
(Sec. 562 CCP). Even though this is only a formal responsibility, in practice a
Department of the Ministry of Justice (Centraal Justitieel Incassobureau,
hereafter CJIB) takes care of the implementation. The little practical
interference of the Prosecution Service with the execution of financial and
other sanctions resulted in a change of law in 1999. Section 553 CCP and
Section 4 of the Bill on judicial organization still expresses the
responsibility of the Prosecution service for the execution of sanctions, but
also the (possible) lack of interference. The CJIB follows strict procedures,
which are applied too rigid sometimes, according to reports of the National
Ombudsman.[3]
As the judge, the CJIB can arrange payment in instalments or postpone payments
as long as it is under formal responsibility of the Prosecution Service
(subsection 3 of sec. 561 CCP).[4] Still, the
whole amount must be paid in two years and three months from the day that the
sentence was due to be enforced (Subsec. 4 of Sec. 561 CCP). For the scope of this article, financial
penalties become really interesting when they are not paid. In that case, the
distance between the sanction (primarily) imposed by the judge and the way it
is ended, becomes enormous. Whenever a fine is not paid or not fully paid
within the set time, a written warning is sent to the convicted person
increasing the fine automatically. After the second demand, the bailiff will be
called in and the amount will be recovered from the offender’s property.
However, when recovery from the offender’s property is no option or the
prosecutor (read CJIB) does not want to consider it, detention for default
comes in sight. The judge determines the default term
when he imposes the original fine. Execution is initiated by the CJIB and
effected by the Prosecution Service. The maximum duration is six months, the
minimum one day; no more than one day default detention may be put in place of
25 guilders. In practice, however, a day default detention is usually replacing
50 – 100 guilder. The convicted person will be released when he pays the fine
during imprisonment. If he pays part of the amount still due, default detention
will be shortened proportionately. If he pays after he has undergone part of
the subsidiary detention the amount owing is reduced accordingly. All those
decisions are made by the CJIB, although formal responsibility lies with the
Prosecution Service. 3.2 Community orders Until
recently, only the community service order (CSO) had a legal basis in the Penal
Code for adults, although juveniles could be sentenced with training orders
since 1994. Since the passage of the Bill on Community Sentences in February
2001, training orders can also be imposed on adults. Until that time, they
could only be applied as a special condition of a suspended sentence or a
conditional suspension of pre-trial detention. Training orders require the
offender to learn specific behavioural skills or to be confronted with the
consequences of his criminal behaviour for the victim. Also combination orders
are a possibility under the new law. The former Bill stated that the judge
stipulated the duration of the CSO as well as the content. However, in practice
the judge only determined the number of hours. Decisions about the kind of
project the convicted person had to work on, were left to the probation
service. According to the actual Bill, the judge can stipulate the
nature of labour or the kind of educational sentence. Normally, the probation
service will decide about the content of community sentences, although, in case
of educational sentences the judge often mentions a specific one. The judge, of
course, determines the number of hours with a maximum of 240 hours for CSO and
a maximum of 480 hours for educational sentences and combination orders. Under the former Bill, CSO was also
called ‘unpaid labour to benefit the community.’ The last part of this concept
is left out in the actual Bill what makes it possible to attract more
commercial projects. Still, most CSO’s are carried out at the government or at
private organizations involved in health care, environmental protection, and
social and cultural work. Except for private projects group projects exist, meant
for those who do not fit in a private project, for example addicted persons and
persons who committed a sexual offence. The activities developed, for example,
are cutting down trees and repairing toys. Together with the 2001 Bill a
‘national menu’ on training orders is brought out.[5]
The eleven training orders on this list can be imposed as a formal sentence by
the judge. Educational sentences that are not on the national menu can still be
applied as, for instance, a special condition of a suspended sentence. This has
advantages and disadvantages but is, most of all, confusing. As with financial penalties, the
Prosecution Service is responsible for the execution of community sentences. It
can gather information about the execution of a community order by asking the
probation service (Sec. 22e PC); it can change the content of a community order
(Sec. 22f PC) and it can demand detention for default (Sec. 22g PC). Most of
the execution-tasks, however, are fulfilled by the probation service. They
decide whether a person is going to a private project or a group project; what
kind of work he has to perform; if and for what reasons he gets a warning and
if the community sentence is carried out satisfactory, or will be sent back to
the prosecutor. Complaints about one of those decisions can be lodged at a
special complaint board of the probation service (Provision on communiy
sentences, Sec. 22). Although the procedure satisfies the minimum rules of the
Council of Europe one can wonder how independent such a board is and if a
provision comparable to that prisoners have (see below) should not be
preferable. In particular, the procedure excludes complaints about the staff
members of the working and training projects while they probably take the most
important decisions and, in practice, have a lot of power.[6]
In the case that the convicted person
does not show up to the project or does not carry out the order satisfactory,
the probation service sends a notification to the prosecutor who will demand
for default detention. Under the former law a new meeting of the court was
required before the detention could be executed. Nowadays the Prosecution
Service can demand for default detention immediately after it gets the
notification that the community order failed. Under certain circumstances it is
even possible that the CJIB automatically executes the default detention,
without waiting for the order of the Prosecution Service. The convicted person
does have the opportunity to appeal within 14 days (Sec. 22g Subsec. 3) but the
appeal does not suspend the execution of the default detention. 3.3 Sentences depriving a person’s liberty 3.3.1 Execution modalities of the prison
sentence In
1953 the differentiation system was introduced in the Dutch sanction system.
From that time on, prisoners were divided up between different institutions
regarding their personal characteristics as age, gender and length of prison
sentence. This meant a huge change with the latter situation considering the
fact that until that time most prison sentences were executed in solitary
confinement. A big issue that was raised during the parliamentary debates on
the 1953 Act was who had to decide on the place where the sentence had to be
executed: the judge or the administration. The minister at that time stated
that the severity of the prison sentence depended on the duration of it and
therefore had to be decided by the judge. On the contrary, the place where the
sanction was executed should be in favour of the rehabilitation of the offender
(according to Sec. 26 former Prison Bill) and could better be decided by the
administration. As said before, the formal responsibility of the Prosecution
Service for all judicial sentences is laid down in Section 4 of the Judicial
Organisation Act and Section 553 of the CCP. As with financial penalties,
however, the practical influence of the Prosecution Service on the execution of
prison sentences is minimal. This situation is recently formalized, as
explained above. In fact, the departmental services decides on the placement of
prisoners, their transfer, sentence breaks and leaves. In 1999 a new Prison
Bill came into force, the Penitentiary Principles Bill (PPB), changing
authorities again. In the early days, officers of the departmental services
went to the prison to gather information and talk to the prisoner. Then they
gave their advice to a selection committee that made the decision. Nowadays,
those officers, called selectors, no longer go to the prisons themselves, but
take decisions based on the written advice of the prison administration. Also
the judge and prosecutor are allowed to give some advice, although they almost
never do. The result of recent changes is that prison-administration in certain
aspects became more powerful in relation to the Department of Justice. The
prisoners, however, became more dependent on the officers working in prison. Not only procedures, but also selection
criteria changed under the new law. Age and duration were abolished. Besides
gender, security and special care became the most important selection criteria.
There are five levels of security, each connected with a certain type of
prison. Under normal circumstances, prisoners will be selected for a normal
security prison after pre-trial detention. Prisoners who are not in custody at
the time of their conviction and prisoners in the last 18 months of their
detention can be selected for a limited security prison where they enjoy a
sentence break every four weeks. Prisoners who are sentenced for more than six
months can serve their last six weeks to six months in a minimal security
prison where they work outside prison during the day and have the weekends off.
An even more open execution modality is the ‘penitentiary programme’,
introduced in the new Penitentiary Principles Act in 1999. Those programs can
start a year before the date of early release and aim a smooth transition from
prison to free society. Prisoners no longer spend time in prison, but work or
follow educational activities during the day and stay home in the evenings and at
night. Electronic monitoring is almost ever used to control the prisoner in the
first phase of the penitentiary programme; among inmates this programme is
therefore less popular than the minimal security prison. The opposite of the penitentiary programme,
is the maximal security prison which is meant for prisoners who are alleged to
have attempted to escape or would form a serious danger for society if they
did. To the Dutch standard, the regime is unprecedentedly strict and the
Commission for the Prevention of Torture from the Council of Europe criticized
it in several of her reports.[7] Besides
security, special care is the most important external selection criterion. Some
prisons, or departments of prisons, have special centre for vulnerable groups. For
example, special regimes exist for detainees who are addicted or suffer from
mental diseases, for mothers with children and young adults who are mentally
immature. Also the Penitentiary Hospital and Selection Department have regimes
based on this criterion. Altogether, the regimes based on security and special
care form part of the external differentiation. The Department of Justice
decides on external destinations of prisons; selection for one of those regimes
follows the procedure described above. Besides external differentiation,
internal differentiation exists; inside the prisons or departments of prisons
with an external destination, the prison management can reserve certain blocks
or programmes for specific groups. At least, every prison has a special care
department for mentally disturbed inmates and persons who committed or are
accused of sexual offences. In
recent research, we also came across ‘standard-plus departments’ where
prisoners have some privileges as study facilities and extra visit; special
blocks for inmates who fulfil certain popular jobs and all kinds of internal
labour and rehabilitation programmes.[8]
The prison manager instead of officers of the Department of Justice decides
about internal placements. Compared to the external procedure, the internal one
is less sophisticated; selection criteria are not really worked out or change
rapidly and due to failing automation systems, information inside prison flows
with difficulty. The differences between external and
internal differentiation, also result in different complaint procedures. A
general complaint procedure exists for complaints about decisions made by the
prison manager including internal placements. Every prison has a complaint
committee made up of members of the Supervision Board. This Supervision Board
includes representatives of different social fields, such as a lawyer, a
doctor, a university professor or a housewife. It is preferable that a judge
chairs the complaint meetings (Sec. 18 Subsec. 2), but that is not obliged. After
a decision is made by the complaint committee, both the prisoner and the prison
manager can appeal at the Appeal Committee of the Council for the Enforcement
of Criminal Law and Youth Protection which is made up of persons from different
disciplines, but chaired by a judge. There is also a specific complaint
procedure for selection decisions made by the Selector. First, the detainee can
object to the decision at the selector himself. If he does not agree with the
decision on his objection either, he can appeal at the Appeal Committee of the
Council for the Enforcement of Criminal Law and Youth Protection. 3.3.2 Early release or conditional release? Since
1915 prisoners have been eligible for conditional sentencing after serving
two-third of their sentence. In the sixties and seventies, the importance of
the conditional release as a rehabilitative instrument decreased. On the one
hand, this was due to the fact that less persons than before were eligible for
conditional release because of the decrease in long prison sentences. On the
other hand, more authoritarian and compulsory methods of helping people became
very unpopular during those days among probation officers and other social
workers. Conditional release was no longer seen as a bonus for good behaviour
in prison or as an instrument of rehabilitation and for that reason it became
very difficult for prison authorities to refuse parole.[9]
In 1976 prisoners got the possibility to appeal against a refusal at the
special penitentiary division of the Arnhem Court of Appeal. The case law was
very critical on the Prison and Probation Administration’s release policies and
as a result the percentage of parole refusals fell from 11 percent in 1975 to 1
percent by 1986. So conditional release had evolved from
a privilege almost to an automatic right. This situation was formalized in new
legislation; on January 1, 1987 a Bill came into force, which introduced
automatic release. Prisoners serving a sentence up to one year are released
after they served 6 months and one third of their term. Prisoners sentenced to
a prison term of more than one year, must be released after they served two
third of it. There are some exceptions to the rule of automatic release (Sec 15
a-d PC). First, automatic release can be refused if the prisoner is serving his
sentence in a mental hospital because of mental illness and continuation of
treatment is necessary. Second, if the prisoner is convicted for a crime for
which pre-trial detention would be allowed after the detention started to be
carried out; Third, if it became clear that the prisoner seriously misbehaved
in an other way during detention; Lastly, if the prisoner escaped or tried to
escape. Decisions about refusing or postponing early release are made by the
penitentiary division of the Arnhem Court of Appeal, on request of the public
prosecutor attached to the court that imposed the prison sentence. However,
requests are hardly ever submitted and even more rarely complied with. In a
case of 2 May 2001, the prosecutor asked to postpone the early release two
years, because the detainee had seriously threatened the mayor of Nunspeet and
had backed out of the prison sentence for several months. The judge, however,
postponed parole for only a month arguing that since only one other request was
submitted in the last two years, policy in this matter was totally unclear to
him.[10] In 1995 a proposal was submitted to
introduce the conditional release again for certain groups of detainees after
they served half of their sentence. However, this proposal has been withdrawn
by the Minister of Justice arguing that the same objections could be reached by
the than initiated penitentiary program. In the latest green paper on penal
sanctions, Sanctions in Perspective, the conditional release reappears.
This time the suggestion is made to introduce the conditional release next to
the penitentiary programme. 3.3.3 Execution modalities of measures depriving
a person’s liberty According
to the Dutch law, criminal liability can be either wholly or partially excluded
when offenders are suffering from a defective development of or diseased
disorder of mental faculties while committing the crime. But, if the crime is
threatened with a prison term of four years or more, or if mentioned in Section
37a PC the judge can impose compulsory treatment. In that case, he needs advice
from the special observation hospital of the Ministry of Justice (Pieter
Baan Centrum) or from at least two behavioural experts, one of whom must be
a psychiatrist. In the case of diminished responsibility, the judge can impose
both a custodial sentence and compulsory treatment. Then, the Penal Code
demands that the prison sentence is executed before the compulsory treatment
(in a forensic psychiatric hospital, TBS). Due to a shortage of cells in the
forensic psychiatric hospitals in recent years, offenders had to stay in prison
even after the right to keep them there had been expired. As a result, Dutch
government had to pay huge compensations. Incidentally, TBS does not have to be
implemented in a custodial setting; the judge can also impose TBS with
conditions. Although the law gives some examples of possible conditions (Sec.
38a PC), the judge is free to determine specific conditions as long as there is
a relation with the behaviour of the offender.[11]
Formally, the Prosecution Service is responsible for the implementation of
conditions, but as with community orders and penitentiary programmes the
Probation Service sees on the fulfilment of these conditions in practice.
Theoretically, the conditions can even be very similar to the kind of projects
that are implemented as community orders and penitentiary programmes. Contrary to the prison sentence, the
term of compulsory treatment is not fixed. Only in cases where no violence was
involved, the measure of compulsory treatment can be imposed to a maximum of
two years with a possibility of prolongation for two years on request of the
Prosecution Officer. If violence was involved, the length of the measure is
indeterminate. At first, the judge imposes the measure for two years, but the
Prosecution Officer can ask for a prolongation every two years. If the safety
of others or the general safety of persons or goods demands so, the judge can
extend the measure one or two years (Sec 38e lid 2 PC). For that, he needs a
recommendation from the head of the hospital and, if the measure exceeds a
period of six years, the reports from two independent mental health experts.[12]
The compulsory treatment can also be ended conditionally (Sec. 38g PC), but
only if the TBS is extended with one year and has a maximum of three years. The
same rules are applicable as for the TBS with conditions (Sec. 38 and 38a PC). The Netherlands has eight TBS hospitals.
Four of them are runned by the state while the others are particularly owned.
There have always been slight differences in population and treatment
techniques between the hospitals. Those differences were taken into account by
the Meijers Institute that was responsible for the selection of the patients for
the diverse hospitals. As a result of the shortage of bed space, the selection
procedure recently changed. Yet, the patients are divided between the different
institutes without selection, while the Meijers Institute became a regular
TBS-hospital. 4 International standards There
are many international instruments regarding the imposition and implementation
of punishments. Not only do the human right conventions dedicate specific
sections to sentencing, both the United Nations and the Council of Europe
formulated standard minimum rules for the implementation of both custodial and
non-custodial sentences. However, none of those rules give clear guidance on
the central questions of this paper: How should responsibilities between the
judge and the administration be divided if decisions on the (further)
implementation of sanctions are taken and what other procedural safeguards have
to be taken into account? For one aspect of the first issue, some
answer can be found in Section 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
According to Subsection 1a, (only) the decision on criminal incarceration has
to be taken by a court. In the Netherlands, neither the decision on default
detention in the case of unpaid fines or community orders that were carried in
an unacceptable way nor the decision to put a person back in jail because he
did not carry out his penitentiary programme satisfactory is taken by a judge.
An interesting question is therefore whether these decisions should be seen as
‘incarceration after a conviction by a competent court’ (Section 5 Subsection
1a) or as ‘the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with
the lawful order of a court in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation
described by law’ (Section 5, Subsection 1b). In the Benham-case, the European
Court made clear that the decision on default detention for unpaid fines, can
be classified under Subsection b.[13]
In my opinion however, this situation differs from the other two. Since, if a
community order or penitentiary programmes is not carried out satisfactory,
detention is not applied to secure the fulfilment of an obligation in the
future. Then, the European Court decided in the Engel-case, the measure is
situated in a punitive context and falls under the scope of Subsection a.[14] 5 Doctrinal issues Some
important doctrinal issues are related to the situation described above. In
this section I will deal with three of them: First, the role the judge has in
the execution of sanctions; Second, closely related to the first, the question
what one considers to be the penal content of a sanction; Thirdly, the
weakening connection between the judicial modality of a sanction and its
content. With the introduction of the former
Penitentiary Bill, the Beginselenwet Gevangeniswezen, in 1953 a debate was
going on between the Minister of Justice and the Members of Parliament about
the question who was going to decide on the institute where a prisoner had to
carry out his prison sentence: the judge or the administration. This Bill initiated
the Differentiation Principle meaning that prisoners would be distributed over
different kinds of prisons depending on different criteria, for example,
gender, age and duration of the prison sentence. The original enactment stated
that the judge would decide on the length of the prison sentence while the
administration would decide in which prison the sentence had to be carried out
based on an investigation of the offender. Members of Parliament did not agree
with this proposal. Although Section 553 PPC stated that the Prosecution
Service was responsible for the execution of sanctions, it did not state that
the decision on the institute where the prison sentence had to be served
belonged to their task. On the contrary, the place where the prison sentence
had to be served could contribute as much to the severity of it as the length
of the prison sentence, the reason why the judge should decide on it.[15]
The Minister of Justice responded that the Differentiation System was not meant
to create differences in severity of sentences, but to make it possible to
carry out the prison sentence in groups by placing people together who had
similar characteristics.[16] In the end,
the parties agreed on a possibility of appeal against the selection decision by
the Prison Administration at the Appeal Committee of the Central Council for
the Enforcement of Criminal Law. The issue of the division of powers is
closely related to that of the penal content of penalties. To solve the first
issue, one has to know what one considers the penal content of a sentence.
Again, the former Minister of Justice was very clear on this topic. During the
parliamentary debate on the 1953 Bill, the Members of Parliament were wondering
if a far reaching differentiation system would not weaken the punitive
character of prison sentences. The Minister did not agree: `The essence of the
prison sentence’, he said, ‘is the loss of freedom, the freedom to go where
ever one wants and to participate in the community like one chooses. This
essence cannot be lost by a more human and social way of carrying out the
prison sentence.’[17] History repeats in the case of community
orders. As said before, according to the former Bill the judge had to decide on
both the number of hours and the nature of the CSO. The Supreme Court, however,
agreed on leaving the last decision to the probation service.[18]
According to the actual Bill, the judge can stipulate the nature of
labour or the kind of educational sentence. In my opinion, this means that the
nature of the work or educational sentence cannot be regarded as a part of the
penal content of a community order. Consequently, the number of hours imposed
by the judge should be implemented by the probation officer according to
rehabilitative aims. Thinking along the same lines, Ashworth argues that, as
with imprisonment, ‘community service orders are made as punishment not for
punishment.’[19]
However, there are different opinions on
this matter in actual Dutch literature. Balkema, for example, states that the
nature of labour should also be seen as a punitive element of a CSO.[20]
Others mentioned the confrontation of the offender with the consequences of his
deeds,[21]
shame[22]
and stigmatisation, due to the greater visibility compared to custodial
sentences. These opinions do not seem to be based on a clear concept of
punishment. For example, no difference is made between desired and undesired
effects of penalties, a distinction that has always been made for prison
sentences. Moreover, if all these characteristics belong to the penal content
of community sentences, does not the rule of law force us to lay them down in
legislation, or, at least, let the judge decide about the precise content of
the sentence? The
final doctrinal issue I want to raise is that of the fading connection between
the judicial modality of a sanction and its content. Since it is possible that
the same activities have to be carried out in both the context of a community
order and the last stage of a custodial sentence (penitentiary programme), one
can wonder what is still the difference between imprisonment and sanctions
curtailing a person’s liberty. In a formal opinion one reduces this
distinction to a merely procedural difference: imprisonment is what is defined
as such in the law. Bleichrodt tries to give a material definition of
imprisonment. In his opinion, imprisonment distinguishes from other sanctions
because it makes it impossible for a person to live his regular life.[23]
In my thesis, I defend a gradual opinion: there is no need to create a
clear doctrinal distinction between custodial sanctions and non-custodial
sanctions, besides the rather clear judicial borders that are given by the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.[24]
In the light of the legal protection of convicted persons, it is more important
that the judge is involved when the penal content of a sanction dramatically
changes. In Dutch literature there is much consensus on this matter according
to penitentiary programs. The judge should decide about both the application
and the discontinuation of a penitentiary program. In my opinion, penitentiary
programs could be integrated with the minimal security prison. Than, two other
grades of curtailing a person’s liberty are left: community sentences and the
normal security prison. In my opinion, it should always be the judge who
decides on alterations to these modalities. 6 Discussion As
in other countries, the number of execution modalities of sanctions increased
dramatically in the Netherlands during the last two decades. Although research
does not always clearly demonstrate, we have to suppose that this development
is in favour of the rehabilitation possibilities of offenders and, at least, of
a more human way of carrying out sanctions. However, more variation in
execution modalities did not go hand in hand with a higher level of legal
protection for convicted offenders. More variation also leads to more
uncertainty and less equality and legality. The decision to apply or end more
open variants of sanctions curtailing a person’s liberty is most often left to
an administrative authority instead of a judiciary one. One of the consequences
is that only those persons are selected for special programmes and sanction
modalities who have good opportunities to succeed. Rehablilitative goals and
the urge for legal protection could become more balanced again by appointing a
special judge to take or supervise all decisions on the implementation of
sanctions. ‘Execution judges’ are established in, for example, Germany and
France.[25]
For the Netherlands one could think about specialized judges appointed to the
district courts with the possibility of appeal at the penitentiary division of
the Arnhem Court of Appeal.[26] Notes * Lecturer at the Pompe Institute,
University of Utrecht. [1]. Tak en Van Kalmthout paid attention
to accessory penalties in their Sanction-Systems in the member-states of the
Council of Europe, 1988, part two, p. 668-670. [2]. J. Simonis, Is ons strafrecht
gebaat bij de invoering van een dagboetestelsel? DD 31 (2001), afl. 5,
p. 476-494. [3]. P.A.M. Mevis, hoofdlijnen van het
strafrechtelijk sanctiestelsel, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1997 (second
edition) p. 148. [4]. Mevis criticizes sec. 28 Richtlijn
Executiebeleid Boetevonnissen stating undeserved that the CJIB is
responsible for payment arrangements,
P.A.M. Mevis, Hoofdlijnen van het strafrechtelijk sanctiestelsel, W.E.J.
Tjeenk Willink, Deventer 1997, p. 149. [5]. Some training orders that can be
found on the national menu are: social skills order, budget order and a special
training for offender of sexual crimes. [6]. See chapter 6 of my thesis on
community sanctions: M. Boone, Recht voor commuun gestraften, Gouda Quint,
Deventer 2000. [7]. CPT/inf (98)15 (Nederland); CPT/inf
(93)15 (Nederland). [8]. M. Boone, Differentiatie en
Selectie onder de Penititentiaire Beginselenwet, in: M. Boone en G. de Jonge
(red), De Penitentiaire Beginselenwet in werking, Gouda Quint Deventer, 2001. [9]. P.J. Tak, Sentencing and Punishment
in The Netherlands, in: M. Tonry and R.S.
Frase, Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries, p. 164-165. [10]. Hof Arnhem 2 mei 2001, Nieuwsbrief
Strafrecht nr. 7, p. 247. [11]. Cleiren/Nijboer 2000(T&C Sr), art
38b Sr, note 3 and 4. [12]. Peter Bal and Frans Koenraadt,
Criminal law and mentally ill offenders in comparative perspective, Psychology,
Crime & Law, Vol. 6, p 239. [13]. EHRM 10 juni 1996, Reports J&D,
1996-III no 10 (Benham). [14]. EHRM 8 juni 1967, NJ 1978, 223,
Series A, vol. 22 (Engel), note 69. [15]. Kamerstukken II 1949/50, 1189, nr. 4,
p. 16. [16]. Kamerstukken II 1950/51, 1189, nr. 5,
p. 22. [17]. Kamerstukken II 1950/51, 1189, nr. 5,
p. 22. [18]. Hoge Raad 20 oktober 1992, NJ 1993,
154. [19]. A.Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal
Justice (1992), p. 268. [20]. J.P. Balkema, Alternatieve Sancties
in plaats van en tijdens de detentie, Justitiële Verkenningen, 1993, nr.
9 p. 84.. [21]. G.J. Ploeg en A. P.G. de Beer, De
inpassing van de taakstraf, Justitiële Verkenningen, 1993, nr. 9. p. 17
e.v. [22]. C. Kelk, De zeer grote wenselijkheid
van een gespecialiseerde sanctierechter, Sancties, 1994, afl. 4, p. 230. [23]. F.W. Bleichrodt, Onder Voorwaarde,
Een onderzoek naar de voorwaardelijke veroordeling en andere voorwaardelijke
modaliteiten, Deventer, Gouda Quint, 1996, p. 241. [24]. HRM 10 March 1972, Series A, vol. 12
(De Wilde, Ooms en Veryp) EHRM 8 June 1976, Series A, vol. 22 (Engel); EHRM 6
November 1980, Series A vol. 39 (Guzzardi); EHRM 28 mei 1985, Series A, vol 93
(Ashingdane); EHRM 28 November 1988, Series A, vol. 144 (Nielsen). [25]. Deutekom, F. van, De franse
executierechter, Sancties, 1993, p. 288-289; F. van Deutekom, Der
Vollzugsrichter in den Niederlanden und Deutschland in rechgsvergleichender
Sicht, Zeitschrift for Strafvollzug und Straffälligenhilfe, 1992, p. 217-223. [26]. C. Kelk, De zeer grote wenselijkheid
van een gespecialiseerde sanctierechter, Sancties, 1994, afl. 4, p. 230. Cite as: M.M. Boone, Imposed versus Undergone Punishment in the Netherlands, vol 6.4 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, (December 2002), <http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-27.html> |
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