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COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT IN LABOUR LAW: THE
NETHERLANDS* Aukje
A.H. van Hoek** III
C 1 Collective labour relations: the
institutional context Collective
labour relations are shaped by the interaction between the unions, employers’
assocations and the government. In the Netherlands most unions are organized in
one of the two federations: the christian CNV and the neutral FNV (the latter
being the product of a merger between the catholic and socialist federations in
1976[1]).
There is however a separate federation for unions representing the higher-level
personnel groups. The federations are the contactpersons for both the central
employers’ organizations and the national government on general socio-economic
issues. They are not involved in direct negotiations on collective agreements,
a task which lies with the unions. The federations can issue recommendations to
the unions, but the latter are not legally or hierarchially bound by such
advice. Besides their national coordinating role, the federations play a role
in representing the employees at the national and international levels, e.g. in
the European Trade Union Confederation and the International Confederation of
Independent Unions. Membership of the federations is only open to unions. The unions are predominantly organized
along the lines of economic activity. After the Second World War and again in
the 1990s, the unions demonstrated a tendency to merge into ever larger
organisations.[2]
In 1997 the unions for the arts, information technology and the media all
merged. Another recent merger occurred in 1998 when several FNV unions
representing particular branches formed one union with over 500.000 members.[3]
Time and again, however, members of a particular profession would not feel
sufficiently represented by these unions and would create (or maintain)
separate professional unions.[4] In the late
1980s, for example, a separate union for nurses and paramedics came into
existence. The 1970s saw the appearance and rise of unions for higher-paid
employees.[5]
The formation of these unions would often be a reaction to specific incidents
or specific union politics.[6] The
predominant union politics in the 1970s was aimed at a levelling of the
differtial between the higher and lower wage groups (‘nivellering’). For that
purpose the scope of application of collective agreements was extended to
include the higher wage groups. The employees concerned objected to this. Until
then, they had not been covered by collective agreements and did not feel that
they were adequately represented by the traditional unions.[7]
As a result, the unions representing higher-level personnel flourished and a
separate federation organizing these unions was created in 1974. Since then
there have been three federations represented at the central level, the CNV,
the FNV and the Unie MHP. Other professional unions are either independent or
are members of the existing federations, the CNV or FNV. Just as the unions have reshaped their
structure in recent times, so have the employers. Since the mid-1990s, the
employers are no longer organised along political and/or religious lines, but
mainly follow economic structures.[8]
The VNO-NCW federation[9] is the major
representative of the Dutch private sector, representing the larger enterprises
in both social and economic issues. It is associated with the General Dutch
Employers’ Organisation (AWVN), which concentrates on the interests of
undertakings in their function as employers. The VNO-NCW federation is a member
of the European confederation of employers, the ‘UNICE’.[10]
Small and medium-sized enterprises are organised in MKB-Nederland[11],
entreprises active in agriculture in LTO-Nederland[12].
The three federations cooperate within the RCO: the council of central organisations
of enterprises.[13]
Membership of the federations is open to federations, branchorganisations,
local organisations and single undertakings. Their function is mainly
political.[14]
They partake in the social dialogue which takes place in the Joint Labour
Council (Stichting van de Arbeid) and the Social and Economic Council (see
below) but neither the VNO-NCW nor the MKB are themselves parties to collective
agreements. They do coordinate the negotiations, however.[15]
Collective agreements are closed by branchorganisations and/or (groups of)
enterprises.[16]
There are quite a few branchorganisations, sometimes more than one within the
same branch of industry.[17] The largest
and most influential is the FME-CWM, which since a merger in 1995 is the main
representative of the employers in the steel industry, in synthetic fibres,
electronics and the electrotechnical industry. The membership of the FME-CWM
includes multinational corporations like Philips, Stork and Corus. Employers’ organisations and the unions
work together at different levels, in different institutions. Until recently
they were fully responsible for running the labour exchange.[18]
They implemented both the general, statute-based social security and the
additional social security at branch level. They (still) operate social funds
and arbitration bodies. However, the Dutch system of labour relations does not
include participation in or influence on the judiciary. Labour conflicts are
dealt with through the ordinary (civil) courts. The highest-level organisations
of employers and employees participate in two permant institutions, the
Stichting van de Arbeid (Joint Labour Council) and the Sociaal Economische Raad
(Social and Economic Council). The SER is the central institution within a
system of sector organisations under public law. It consists of 33 members, 11
of which are appointed by the central employees’ organisations (FNV 8, CNV 2,
MHP 1), 11 represent the employers (VNO 7, MKB 3, LTO 1) and 11 members are
independent and are appointed by the ‘Crown’. The sector organisations, of
which the SER is the supervisory body, have (limited) legislative powers, e.g.
in the areas of registration, professional standard setting and labour
conditions. The latter competence, which stands in direct competition with
negotiated collective agreements, is rarely used.[19]
The SER is one of the main advisory bodies of the government and in that
capacity it deals with a wide range of social and economic issues. The Joint
Labour Council or STAR is composed of representatives of the social partners
only. It advises the government on social issues and is, inter alia, consulted
during the process of declaring collective agreements to be generally
applicable. Since both the SER and the STAR advise the government on social
issues, the tasks of these institutions overlap to a certain extent. If both
are consulted on the same issue or a similar issue, they try to avoid reaching
contradictory conclusions by informal cooperation. Twice a year, in the autumn and in the
spring, the highest-level institutions of employers and employees hold a
‘conference’ with government officials in which they discuss the economic
developments and prognoses. At this conference they try to reach an agreement
on the desired developments in the field of wages and other labour conditions.
This agreement functions as a recommendation to the unions and employers’
organisations for the next round of negotiations. 2 Collective labour relations: the
legal context 2.1 General In
the Netherlands, the legal position of the unions and the system of industrial
relations is – on the whole – based on general rules on the one hand, and
international agreements on the other. Although collective agreements and their
general applicability are covered by special statutes, the negotiating process
leading up to their conclusion has received little or no attention from the
legislature. The Constitution does not contain any articles which specifically
pertain to industrial relations. The freedom to establish trade unions, to
operate as such and be members thereof are all covered by the right of
association guaranteed in Article 8 of the Constitution.[20]
The unions as institutions are governed by the rules on associations laid down
in Articles 26 ff. of the Civil Code.[21]
The right to strike has not been the subject of any codification whatsoever and
is based on case law. This lack of constitutional protection has not hampered
the development of unions and industrial relations in the Netherlands. This in
in part the result of the Dutch system of judicial control, which diminishes
the legal effect of the Constitution considerably and favours international
conventions instead. The legislature being corrected by the courts cannot be
based on a violation of the Constitution: Article 120 of the Constitution
specifically states that the courts will not judge the constitutionality of
statutes and international conventions. The courts can set aside statutory
provisions, however, if these provisions violate treaty provisions having
direct effect within the Dutch legal system.[22]
Such generally binding treaty provisions can be found in the European Social
Charter (Article 6 section 4 on the right to strike is recognized as having
direct effect[23]),
the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Convention on
Social and Economic Rights. ILO conventions will not – as a rule –
have direct effect. Yet the norms contained therein have influenced Dutch
labour law. For several decades after the Second World War, labour conditions
were part of the general economic policy and as such a primary concern for the
central government. The government had several legal instruments to control
wages and other primary labour conditions, both in the profit and the non-profit
sectors of the economy. These instruments did not sit well with the
international obligations taken on by the Netherlands[24]
and were gradually abandonded. One of the last vestiges of this interventionist
policy was the Pay Adjustment (semi-public sector) Act[25],
which was repealed in 1995.[26] This Act
governed the wage levels of employees in organisations funded by the
government. As it severely limited the right of negotiation for employers and
unions, it was deemed to be incompatible with international law. To date, all
that remains of the powers of government to intervene in the setting of wages
is de Wage Formation Act[27]. Article 10
of this Act contains the possibility for the government to freeze wages in an
economic emergency. Article 5 ff. contain a procedure under which the Minister
of Social Affairs may create regulations similar in content and effect to
collective agreements (see below). Both powers are rarely used. 2.2 Freedom and duty to negotiate[28] Collective
agreements in Dutch law are based on the law of contract. In line with the law
on contracts in general, parties to the collective agreement, i.e. employers
and the unions, have freedom as to whether they want to negotiate and with
whom. This means that Dutch law does not contain a general obligation to
negotiate, enter into agreements and/or regularly amend them as some other
countries do (e.g. France). As collective negotiations are widely accepted in
industry, most employers will be willing to negotiate. If not, pressure can be
applied by way of industrial action, but no employer can be forced by law to
enter into negotiations. Once negotiations are commenced, however, the freedom
to choose with whom to negotiate is limited by law, albeit only marginally.
Dutch law contains hardly any specific conditions which parties to a collective
agreement have to fulfil. Any union may enter into negotiations and become a
party to collective agreements, the only prerequisite being that the union is
an association with full legal capacity which has been given the authority to
negotiate collective agreements in its constitution.[29]
A union does not have to be elected by the personnel it claims to represent,
nor does it have to meet any test as to its representativeness. This might lead
to tension, especially when employers choose to negotiate with minor (or even
yellow[30])
unions and thereby exclude the big national unions associated with either the
FNV or the CNV. Or conversely, to negotiate with a FNV- or CNV-union having
little support in the company involved to the detriment of a more specialist
and more representative union. This tactic of picking and choosing one’s
contractual partner is particularly rewarding in the Dutch system, since
collective agreements affect all employees of the employers who are bound by
the agreement and not only those employees who are members of a union which is
a party to the agreement.[31] Such an
agreement can even eventually bind the whole industry, by the process of
declaring it to be generally binding (see below). A striking example of this
effect occurred in January 2002, when the employers in child care entered into
a collective agreement with one union against the objections of two other
unions participating in the negotiations. The union which closed the agreement
had 85 (!) members under the 35 000 employees in the sector; the two opposing
unions 11 500 members. Still, the unions thought the Minister of Social Affairs
might declare the collective agreement to be binding on the sector as a whole.
To counter this effect, both legal scholars and policy makers have at times
suggested to introduce a test of representativeness into the Dutch system. So
far, this has been rejected. However, since the early 1980s courts have in some
instances obliged employers to accept ‘representative’ organisations as parties
to ongoing negotiations. This obligation is based on good faith and the duties
of a good employer and seems to be restricted to cases where the freedom of
negotiations is being abused. The duty of the employers is limited to negotiating
in good faith; the employers cannot be obliged to enter into an agreement. 2.3 Statutory regulation of collective
agreements and similar instruments Dutch
law does not contain a special labour code. Labour law topics are dealt with in
a myriad of legal rules. The regulation of individual labour contracts, for
example, forms part of the Civil Code, whereas safety at work and working time
are dealt with in special statutes. Even the statutory regulation of collective
agreements is to be found in several laws. The collective agreement itself is
regulated in the Collective Labour Agreements Act of 1927 (Wet CAO). This law
contains the necessary requirements as to the parties to and the contents of
collective agreements, the legal effects thereof and the legal remedies in case
of breach. Entry into force of collective agreements is regulated in Article 4
of the Wage Formation Act (Wet op de loonvorming) which contains a duty to
inform the Minister of Social Affairs of any collective agreements entered
into. No collective agreement can enter into force without such notification.
Since the law makes entry into force dependent upon the Minister sending a
receipt of notification to the parties, Dutch law is most probably in violation
of international law on this point. Another law which is relevant to the system
of collective negotiations is the Collective Labour Agreements (Declaration of
Generally Binding and Non-binding Status) Act of 1936 (Wet AVV). This law
contains the procedure to make collective agreements generally binding and
regulates the legal consequences thereof. If it is impossible to reach an
agreement between the social partners on labour conditions in a specific sector
of the economy, the Minister of Social Affairs may, upon the request of the
social partners, determine the relevant standards. These regulations have a
content and binding force which is similar to collective agreements or
generally binding collective agreements, depending on the procedure followed.[32]
In practice, this power is rarely used by the Minister. Most sectors of the
economy have a working system of collective negotiations. Even if it
occasionally proves difficult to reach an agreement, the government will not
intervene. But if for some reason a sensible system of negotiations cannot take
place, then the special procedure of the Wage Formation Act can be used. The
most recent example thereof consists of regulations pertaining to the labour
conditions of seafarers (regeling arbeidsvoorwaarden zeevaart).[33] 4 The concept of the collective
agreement in the Collective Labour Agreements Act 1927 In
Dutch law, one has to distinguish between a formal and a material concept of
‘collective agreement’. The material concept of ‘collective agreement’ is very
wide. The Collective Labour Agreements Act stipulates that a collective
agreement is an agreement between one or more employers or one or more
organisations of employers[34] and one or
more organisations of employees, which contains predominantly or exclusively
stipulations on the labour conditions to be respected in individual labour
contracts.[35]
This description of the collective agreement, stemming from the time when the
Act on collective agreements was enacted in 1927, has proved over the years not
to pose a real limitation on the powers of the social partners. The concept of
‘collective agreement’ covers both sector agreements and agreements between the
unions and a single employer. It applies to collective agreements containing
provisions on a myriad of subjects as well as to specific agreements on a
single subject only. Basically, all the elements of labour law that lend
themselves to negotiation between the unions and employers, can be the subject
of a collective agreement in the sense of the Act.[36]
However, to qualify as a collective
agreement, the contract has to fulfil certain formal requirements as well. The
parties to the contract must be organizations with full legal capacity and the
agreement has to be notified to the Ministry of Social Affairs.[37]
If the agreement lacks in these elements, it can still be legally binding, but
it will not create the special effects given to collective agreements by the
1927 Act. If the parties did not intend to create a legally binding instrument
at all, their agreement can at most be a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’. Disputes as
to the characterization of agreements between the unions and employers have
arisen mainly in the field of the restructuring of companies. Agreements
containing so-called ‘social plans’ relating to collective dismissals or
restructuring agreements are not always considered to be collective agreements
in the sense of the 1927 Act.[38] 5 The scope of application of
collective agreements The two
types of collective agreements which are prevalent in the Netherlands are the
company-agreements and the agreements covering economic sectors. The two differ
in both the parties on the side of the employer and the dominant factor
determining their application. Company-agreements are concluded by companies or
related groups of companies. The major Dutch companies, both national and
multinational (Unilever, Philips, KLM, Ahold, KBB etc.) tend to negotiate
special agreements for their Dutch enterprises and/or subsidiaries. The scope
of application of these agreements is determined to a large extent by the
parties on the employer-side (a personal criterion). The companies may have
separate agreements for higher and managing personnel and sometimes apply a
separate set of labourconditions to international personnel. Sector
agreements will contain the employment conditions for a sector of economic
activity. They are typically concluded by organisations of employers rather than
by individual employers. Sectoragreements will in general apply throughout the
Netherlands, local agreements are extremely rare.[1]
The delineation of the sector is based on agreement between the parties to the
collective agreement. A sector might be defined widely to encompass a variety
of economic activities or rather be construed narrowly. Factors that influence
the division into sectors of economy are many. The organisational setup of the
unions and employers is one. This in turn tends to follow (to a certain extent)
divisions between sectors of the economy used in public law and social security
law. The system as a whole is not static. Changes in the economic environment
may cause collective agreements of related sectors to be merged, decentralization
tendencies might cause large collective agreements to desintegrate. For further
information, see below (trends). Inbetween sectors, unions may actually compete
amongst themselves over the representation of a specific group of employees.[1]
These so-called ‘border-disputes’ on the exact delineation of neighbouring
collective agreements will be solved either by bipartite borderline commissions
or by the negotiating parties. The Minister will not intervene is such
disputes.[1] There are close to 200 sector agreements[42]
covering 4.4 million employees, or even 5 million if counting the effect of
general applicability.[43] Close to 800
company agreements cover approx. 0.8 million employees.[44]
On a total of approx. 7 million employed, this means that most employees are
covered by some sort of collective agreement. 6 The binding character of collective
agreements and their effect on the individual employment contract In
Dutch jurisprudence it is common to distinguish between the different types of
provisions which can form a collective agreement.[45]
On the one hand, a collective agreement may contain obligatory clauses which
only bind the parties to the collective agreement. On the other hand,
collective agreements are charactarized by the fact that they contain so-called
normative clauses: clauses which regulate the relationship between the
individual employee and the individual employer. Other provisions might place
obligations on – usually – the individual employer viz-à-viz the parties to the
collective agreement or third parties (social funds, other employers within the
same organisation or branch). Finally, the parties to the collective agreement
can use the collective agreement to create bipartite institutions and funds for
issues like vocational training and early retirement schemes. The Act contains
provisions on the obligations of the parties to the collective agreement as
well as on the position of the parties to the individual agreements covered by
the collective agreement. The position of third parties is based on case law,
in particular a number of decisions by the Dutch Supreme Court.[46] In general, a collective agreement is binding
upon the parties to the agreement and any member thereof. This means that the
individual employer and employee are bound by an operational agreement when
they are (become or were at the time of conclusion) members of the
organisations which are party to the agreement.[47]
Any stipulations in the individual agreement which violate the collective
agreement are void and are automatically replaced by the relevant stipulations
in the collective agreement.[48] Any lacunae
are automatically filled with the collective stipulations. In this fashion, the
individual agreement is modelled on the collective agreement. The individual
employee can (and in most cases must) rely on this remodelled individual
agreement if he wants to claim performance by the individual employer. If this
incorporation theory does not suffice in order to guarantee enforcement, the
employee can sometimes rely directly on the collective agreement itself. A good
example of this latter mechanism is to be found in a case which came before the
Supreme Court and which dealt with the probation period. According to the
relevant collective agreement any probation period had to be agreed upon in
writing, adding a formal requirement to the legal requirements in the Civil
Code. According to the Supreme Court the requirement in the collective
agreement rendered an orally agreed probation period void. Since a provision of
this kind cannot be deemed to be incorporated in the individual agreement, the
individual employee had to base the avoidance of the probation period on the
collective agreement itself. So, in principle all normative provisions in
collective agreements are deemed to become part of the individual labour
contract. It is in line with this incorporation theory that ‘horizontal’
stipulations in collective agreements are deemed to have an ‘after-effect’:
they continue to shape the individual contract even after the expiry of the
collective agreement. The after-effect lasts until the horizontal provisions
are replaced or annulled by a subsequent agreement at the individual or
collective level. Collective agreements do not bind
employees who are not members of a union, which is a party to the collective
agreement: so-called non-organized or otherwise-organized workers. However,
according to Art. 14 of the Collective Labour Agreements Act, an employer who
is bound by a collective agreement is obliged to apply the agreement to his
non- or otherwise-organized employees.[49]
Most employers fulfil this duty by agreeing with each of their employees that
the current sector agreement will apply to their contract. In this way up to 85
% of workers are covered by collective agreements even though only approx. 26 %
are members of a union.[50] The
influence of the Dutch unions far exceeds their representativeness based on membership
only. The Collective Labour Agreements (Declaration of General Binding and
Non-binding Status) Act only enhances this effect. Through the decree on general
applicability a sector agreement, or rather certain provisions thereof become
binding on anyone falling within its scope of application. The most important
effect in practice is that the collective agreement from then on also applies
to the employees of non-organized employers. But, strictly speaking, the decree
also changes the position of the other ‘players’ in the field. Those already
bound by the collective agreement itself are now bound by the decree as well.
The ‘Article 14’ employees are legally bound whereas previously they were not.[51]
And finally, the decree limits the freedom of the parties to the original
collective agreement. Both the effect of generally binding
provisions on the individual contract and the remedies for the breach thereof
are very similar to those concerning collective agreements in general. However,
such generally binding provisions do not ‘remodel’ the individual labour
contract as the collective agreement itself does. They are looked upon as
quasi-statutory provisions. This means, inter alia, that the decree on general
applicability does not have any after-effect.[52]
After expiry of the decree, the pre-existing individual contract is revived.
This causes problems of continuity, which are to some extent countered by the
judiciary using concepts from the law of contract. In 1993 the Supreme Court
dealt with supplementary wages for working overtime granted in a collective
agreement. Did the employee have a right to be supplemented even when the
collective agreement was no longer applicable and the indidividual agreement
was silent on this point? The Supreme Court decided that the answer depended on
the reasonable expectations of the parties.[53]
In 1994 the question arose whether an employee could still claim supplementary
sickness benefit from his employer after the relevant provision in the
collective agreement had ceased to apply to his individual contract. In this
case the Supreme Court used the doctrine of acquired rights: the worker had
acquired this specific right by becoming ill during the decree’s period of
application. According to the Supreme Court he retained that right even after
the expiry of the decree.[54] Though
these judgements come close to granting after-effect to generally binding
provisions, the Supreme Court has not yet reversed its official opinion. Collective agreements can be declared
generally binding only when the agreement itself already covers a significant
majority of the employers and employees in the sector.[55]
Interestingly enough, in calculating the range of the original agreement, the
Minister will take non-organized employees into account. Although strictly
speaking not bound by the collective agreement, they are deemed to be covered
by it. Since sector agreements are almost automatically declared to be
generally binding, most employees will be bound by a collective agreement in
one way or another. It is therefore of crucial importance to study in more
detail the limits posed by the law on the contents of the collective agreement
as well as its relationship to the individual contract. 7 The contents of collective
agreements, legal constraints 7.1 General In
1998 the Supreme Court dealt with the validity and effect of a clause in a
‘sociaal plan’ (a reorganisation plan, dealing with collective dismissal),
prescribing the use of an alternative dispute resolution method prior to
addressing a court in case of disagreements concerning the termination of the
labour contract.[56]
When the employer approached the Subdistrict Court[57]
with a request to dissolve a specific labour contract under Article 7: 685 of
the Civil Code (BW)[58], the
employee in question objected since there had been no prior mediation round and
asked to court to dismiss the action. The court rejected this request based on
the nullity of the provision. The Supreme Court concurred. Article 7: 685 BW
specifically grants access to the court at any time (‘te allen tijde’)
if one of the parties has compelling reasons for wanting the labour contract to
be dissolved. Any stipulation to the contrary is void. This is true of
stipulations in individual labour contracts and no less true for provisions in
collective agreements, according to the Supreme Court. The Court justifies this
decision with three arguments. The first relies on the fact that a dispute
resolution clause in a collective agreement will be incorporated into the
individual agreement under art. 9 section 1, 12 and 13 of the Collective Labour
Agreements Act. There is therefore, according to the Supreme Court, no
compelling reason to treat restrictions on the right of access to a court any
differently according to the individual or collective ‘source’. Another
argument is based on the text of art. 7: 685 BW which renders ‘any provision’
void and does not restrict itself to provisions in individual contracts. A
third and last argument is based on legislatory principles. It relies on the fact
that the law would contain a specific provision if derogation were possible by
collective agreement but not by individual agreement – proclaiming the
provision to constitute so-called ‘driekwart dwingend recht’ (law which is
“three-quarters mandatory”).[59] So,
mandatory provisions tend to have mandatory effect as regards individual and
collective contracting parties alike. An exception in favour of collective
agreements is formed by the concept of the three-quarters mandatory law: legal
provisions which can be derogated from by collective agreement but not by
individual agreement. The concept of three-quarters mandatory law creates the
possibility to adapt employment conditions to the needs of a specific industry
while safeguarding the protection of individual employees (supposing that the
unions do effectively protect the employees). Whether a provision is
three-quarters mandatory is evident from the wording of the provision itself. If a provision is not mandatory, does
this necessarily imply that it can be derogated from by collective agreement?
Are there no provisions in labour law which should be immune from collective
regulation? Especially problematic in this respect are some provisions which
place an extra obligation on the employee and/or restricts their fundamental
rights.[60]
Again, arbitration clauses are a prime example: the right of access to a court[61]
can be waived,[62]
but can it be waived collectively? Similar problems arise as to closed shop
provisions, which limit the freedom of (non-)association on the part of
individual employees[63] and
non-competition clauses, which restrict the fundamental freedom to choose one’s
occupation.[64] 7.2 Arbitration clauses The
right of access to the courts is guaranteed by both the Dutch Constitution and
international conventions which bind the Netherlands. This right can be waived,
however, for example by voluntarily submitting to arbitration. Dutch law, which
looks upon on the proces of arbitration quite favorably, does not pose any
specific requirements as to the form in which the right of access must be
waived.[65]
Arbitration clauses in general sales conditions are deemed to be binding, as
are arbitration clauses in an organisation’s articles of association. The same
favouritism towards arbitration is valid in labour disputes as well. In
general, Dutch law allows parties to a labour contract to submit their disputes
to alternative dispute resolutions methods, including arbitration.[66]
This is true even in cases based on Article 7: 685 BW. Parties have a right to
request the dissolution of the labour agreement at any time. This invalidates
any provision that prevents or delays such action but not those that simply
change the venue for such action. Arbitration[67]
can be agreed upon in a collective agreement and thus become binding on the
members of the parties thereto.[68] In practice,
collective agreements do contain such clauses.[69]
However, arbitration clauses in collective agreements cannot be declared to be
generally binding, as this would violate the requirement of voluntary
submission.[70]
7.3 Closed shop Both
national[71]
and international provisions[72] protect the
freedom of association. In its positive sense, this freedom entails the right
to form trade unions and to be a member thereof. But the freedom is
progressively thought to also protect the right not to be organised.[73]
This freedom is put at risk by closed-shop provisions: provisions in collective
agreements which – in one way or another – make union membership compulsory for
the employees of employers bound by the agreement. Therefore, the contents of
such provisions are strictly monitored by both national and international law.
Yet, not all closed-shop arrangements contravene Dutch law.[74]
Collective agreements may contain the duty to employ only workers who are
members of a union. It is however against the law to discriminate
between unions by making membership of a specific union compulsory.[75]
The Collective Labour Agreements (Declaration of Generally Binding and
Non-binding Status) Act excludes closed-shop provisions from the decree of
general applicability.[76] So the
closed-shop provision cannot bind the employer who is neither a contracting
party nor a member thereof. Even in this attenuated form, closed-shop
provisions are rare in Dutch practice. Until recently the collective agreement
for publishing and printing (‘grafische sector’) did contain such a provision;
at the moment, however, there are no such examples in existing collective
agreements. 7.4 Non-competition clauses The
prevailing stance on the non-competition clause has changed quite recently.
Before 1997, a non-competition clause had to be agreed upon in writing. This
written agreement could not only be embodied in a written agreement between the
employer and employee but also in a document containing the internal
works-rules (‘reglement’). This latter arrangement made it possible for the
employee to be bound by a non-competition clause which he did not personnaly
agree to. The employee was supposed to be protected against odious
non-competition clauses by the procedural rules on the establisment of
worksrules. It was consistent with this line of reasoning to assume that
non-competition clauses could be agreed on by way of collective agreement as
well: the provision was not considered to be strictly personal in nature, but
only meriting extra procedural guarantees. This changed when the law on labour
contracts was incorporated in the New Civil Code by law of 6 June 1996.[77]
On this occasion, the legal provision on non-competition clauses was redrafted,
eliminating the possibility to address the issue of non-competition in the
internal works-rules. According to the explanatory report to the 1996 law, this
change is meant to ensure that the employee personally agrees on any limitations
as to his future employment.[78] Since then,
it has been assumed that non-competition clauses cannot be included in
collective agreements either.[79] 8 Conflicts between collective
agreements and individual agreements: the absence of a more favourable
right-provision in Dutch law In
The Netherlands, collective agreements are a means of organizing labour as much
as a means of protecting employees against the unequal bargaining powers of the
employers. Especially in the post-war period the government kept wagelevels
under strict control. Every collective agreement was normative in the sense
that both more favourable and less favourable provisions were contra vires.
This has changed considerably: these days, collective agreements are mostly
minimum arrangements.[80] Yet, this
is based on practice, not law. If the parties to the collective agreement do not
want employers to pay higher salaries or bonuses than the ones provided for in
the collective agreement, they can simply make the collective agreement binding
in an absolute sense. It was not unusual for Dutch collective agreements to
contain provisions like “derogations from this agreement are not allowed unless
specifically provided for by the relevant provision”[81]
or even “derogations from this agreement are not allowed, not even if they are
more favorable to the employee”.[82] Nowadays
collective agreements often contain provisions which simply allow more
favourable provisions,[83] both in
general and in individual cases. But this still implies that the parties could
also have stipulated otherwise.[84] Case-law on
this issue is rare and inconclusive.[85] 9 Conflicts between collective
agreements[86]
Rendering
a sector agreement binding on all employers in the sector is (still) the
predominant way of regulating labour conditions in the Netherlands. The binding
agreements cover all those that fall within the scope of application of the
decree on general applicability, which mostly follows that of the underlying
agreement.[87]
This means, firstly, that the decree on general applicability is binding on all
employers within the relevant field, including those already bound by the
agreement itself. The statutory obligation does not replace the one adopted
voluntarily, but is added to it.[88] Secondly,
there is no automatic, de jure, exception for employers who are already bound
by another collective agreement. Problems arising from overlapping collective
agreements are dealt with through government practice, rather than legal
provisions. So there is no general rule leading to the application of the most
favourable agreement, nor one permitting application of the more specific agreement,
and also not one honouring obligations adopted voluntarily over and above those
based on legal compulsion. Any conflicts between sector agreements
and company agreements are solved through the system of exemptions. If a
company, having its own company agreement, is also a member of an organisation
of employers involved in negotiating collective agreements, this company will
make sure he is excluded from the scope of application of any sector agreement
by the parties to that agreement themselves. In that case the company is
outside the scope of application of the sector agreement and hence cannot be
covered by any decree on general applicability either. Furthermore, any
employer bound by a company agreement can request to be exempted from the decree
on general applicability during the procedure of making the decree. If they do,
the guidelines on general applicability promulgated by the Minister of social
affairs guarantee them that this exemption will be granted.[89]
The Minister will not test for equivalence between the company agreement and
the sector agreement. Neither is it a prerequisite any more that the company
agreement was closed by the same union or unions as the sector agreement, the
only condition being that the company agreement is valid and binding. If the
company agreement covers far less issues than the sector agreement, it will
still be a collective agreement meriting an exemption. The same would be true
if the level of protection of the company agreement is lower than that of the
sector agreement. Unions are supposed to take these consideration into account
when closing a company agreement. So, the Dutch system does not adhere to
a more favorable right notion to solve any conflicts between collective
agreements of different levels. Rather, through the system of exemptions
voluntary submission to a more specific agreement is favoured over a sector
agreement which is generally binding, regardless of the contents of the
agreements. However, this system depends on action being taken by the company
bound by a specific agreement. If that company fails to ask for an exemption,
it will be bound by the sector agreement after the decree on general
applicability enters into force.[90] The
situation is slightly different as far as conflicts between agreements of the
same type and level are concerned. If the scope of application of two sector
agreements overlap, the Minister will not declare them generally applicable
until the parties to the agreements have sorted out this problem. But sometimes
overlap is not caused by the respective scopes of application of the agreements
but by the mixed character of a specific company. In that case that company may
have to apply different collective agreements to its employees depending on
their function or the department in which they work. Finally, simultaneous
application of several sector agreements can also come about when parties to an
individual labour contract agree to apply one collective agreement when they
are already legally bound by another. This last situation is not very different
from the one in which the parties to the individual agreement deviate from the
provisions of the collective agreement by contract stipulation. This means that
the parties are bound by the collective agreement which applies de jure, but
courts might condone application of the chosen collective agreement if this is
more favorable to the employee.[91] 10 Future problems and trends: the
changing position of the unions The
extent to which workers organize themselves in unions is highly divergent
between the different sectors of the economy as well as between types of
employers.[92]
Traditionally, high percentages of union membership are to be found in
government and education, transport, heavy industry and construction, whereas
most service sectors show low percentages. Workers with regular jobs organise
themselves more readily than parttime, on-call or temp-workers. Blue-collar
workers and administrative personnel more so than so-called
‘knowledge-workers’, the latter often being sought after, well-paid and
relatively independent. As in other European countries, the membership rates in
the Netherlands are low and declining. At the moment 26 % of the general
workforce are members of a union, ranging from 56 % in transport by air and water
to 11 % in ICT.[93]
In sharp contrast to this low number of affiliates is the fact that 85 % of
employees are covered by the collective agreements concluded by these unions.
Recently, the liberal party drew attention to this phenomenon, once again
raising the issues of representativeness of the unions and the almost automatic
extension of collective agreements.[94]
In his answer, the Minister of Social Affairs stressed the fact that despite
the low affiliation rate, Dutch unions enjoy wide support within the population.
Even non-members by an overwhelming majority support the notion that unions
perform a function which is in the interest of society in general.[95]
This perception of unions as the co-guardians of the general interest was very
much inherent in the post-war system of industrial relations and is still a
part of the Dutch ‘poldermodel’,[96] though by
now it might be for the want of a better alternative.[97]
In the meantime the high percentage of ‘freeriders’ leaves the unions with few
members and sparse funding. In reaction to this, a trend is discernable to
enhance the service-providing element of union membership.[98]
Unions offer legal advice, insurance etc. in an attempt to lure more employees
into membership.[99]
It is still unusual, however, to claim special benefits for union members in
the collective agreements. 11 Future problems and trends: the
changing position of collective arrangements[100]
One
of the buzz-words of modern labour relationships if flexibilization. This term
is used to describe different phenomena,[101]
each aiming to counteract the collective character of traditional labour
relationships. In the past, workers would be employed by the undertaking in
which they performed their duties. Their labour contracts would be covered by
standard arrangements valid in the whole sector. Individual variation was rare
and not encouraged by the collective arrangements. This work pattern has
changed considerably, leaving a more fragmented picture. In the remainder of
this report, some elements of this change will be briefly discussed. 11.1 Tendering out, temp-workers and
self-employment Undertakings
tend to employ only those workers which are required for their core-activities.
Ancillary functions, like cleaning and catering, might be tendered out to
specialized undertakings. Even in the core activity, not all the manpower is
employed by the undertaking itself. Firstly, the Netherlands has a high
percentage of people working through temp-agencies. Secondly, professionals and
skilled labourers progressively want to retain or regain their independence.
They work as self-employed persons without personnel (zelfstandigen zonder
personeel). These phenomena have an effect on the structure of collective
negotiations. Catering and cleaning have become separate branches covered by
special collective agreements. The same is true for temp-workers, especially
since the Act on Flexibility and Certainty came into force on 1 January 1999.
Temp-workers are deemed to be employed by their temp-agency. After working for
the same agency for some time, they progressively become entitled to protection
with regards to dismissal, training, pensionprovisions etc. The new system,
introduced by the Actaw on Flexibility and Certainty provides a strong
incentive for the collective agreement for temp-workers. To complicate matters,
in some cases and to some issues the collective agreement of the company to
which they are posted may also apply. The whole system does not seem to have
settled yet.[102] So, tendering out and temp-work might
change the structure of collective negotiations, but they have not reduced the
reach of collective arrangements as such. This is different for the third trend
mentioned above: the increase in self-employed persons. All kinds of
specialized personnel, from nurses, in-company trainers and textwriters to
stone masons and truck drivers offer their services to more than one customer,
thus acquiring the status of self-employed. The position of this group,
especially as regards tax and social security is far from clear, their protection
against abuse sometimes weak. Recently, the FVN has created a special union for
the self-employed. This ‘union’ aims to represent and protect the interests of
those involved.[103]
Although the Collective Labour Agreements Act does not exclude the possibility
to close collective agreements on the labour conditions of self-employed,[104]
the constitution of the association does not provide for such a power.[105]
However, the union itself can be seen as a clear attempt to ‘re-organize’ this
part of the labour market. 11.2 Levels of negotiation: from sector to
undertaking and back Flexibilization
seems to call for arrangements at the lowest level: the reduction or
abolishment of nationwide wage prescriptions, agreements at company level
rather than sector agreements, agreements for narrowly defined sectors to be
favoured over those encompassing entire branches. And, in a sense, this is what
has happened in practice.[106]
However, not necessarily through the abolition of collective negotiations at
the levels of sectors and branches. A direct return to the company level has
taken place in the banking sector where the sector agreement was abolished
altogether, leaving the negotiations to the separate banks. But in two other
cases the scale of negotiations has even moved upwards. One of these cases
concerns an old stronghold of union activity: publishing, printing and the
media. This branch was covered by a set of sector agreements, one for small
offset, one for post-production, etc. Several economic and technological factors
forced both the employers and the unions to change their strategy in the field
of labour conditions and collective negotiations.[107]
This, surprisingly enough, resulted in a merger of both the relevant unions and
the employers’ organisations. The institutional merger was mirrored in the
collective negotiations: the six pre-existing collective agreements were
succeeded by a single one for the grafic media as a whole. Another example of a
revival of sector negotiations is found in information and communication
technology (ICT). This new sector of the economy has one of the lowest
affiliation rates and for a long time showed hardly any organisation tendencies
on the side of employees. At first, even the rules on workplace democracy were
largely ignored. However, in the early 1990s, the – by then properly
established – works councils asked the unions to take over negotiations
concerning labour conditions.[108]
At this moment approx. 23 % of employees in the sector are covered by
collective agreements. One of these is sectoral in character, covering mainly
sales and supplies (leaving out software development and services).[109]
Both in the grafic media and ICT, the conclusion of the sector agreement would
have failed if the unions had insisted on a highly standardized set of labour
conditions. Both sector agreements are framework agreements and leave plenty of
room for differentiation at company and/or personal level. 11.3 Framework agreements and labour conditions
‘à la carte’ As
mentioned above, in the postwar period all collective agreements were standard
arrangements allowing no derogations at all. These days, the individual
employer and employee are usually free to agree on conditions which are more
favourable to the employee.[110]
This already leads to a degree of flexibility at the personal level. But modern
collective agreements go further than that. Labour conditions ‘à la carte’
refers to a system in which the employee may choose between different sets of
labour conditions. Paid leave may be exchanged for travel expenses, reduced
weekly working time for sabbaticals or child care etc. This system can become
rather complex and does obfuscate the issue of ‘more favourable provisions’.
While the Supreme Court decided only quite recently that the question of
whether a individual agreement was more favorable than the collective agreement
had to be decided on a rule by rule basis,[111]
à la carte agreements can only be judged in their entirety. A la carte agreements provide
flexibility at the level of the individual employee. Framework agreements allow
specific agreements to be made at the company level.[112]
The company agreement might be concluded by the local union, but also by the
works council. In the latter case it will not have the same force as a
collective agreement unless it is (deemed to be) incorporated into the
collective agreement.[113]
In this process of decentralization, the relationship between the unions and
the works councils has changed considerably. Primary labourconditions are still
considered to be the prerogative of the unions, but the works councils are seen
as strategic partners rather than competitors. It is not unusual for collective
agreements to refer to the works councils for the implementation of specific
arrangements at company level.[114]
12 Conclusions Though
the legal framework has remained almost intact, the practice of labour
relations has changed considerably in the last decades. One of these changes
concerns a move away from standard setting towards the protection of employees.
The powers of the social partners in the field of personal (human) rights has
been limited, leaving it to the individual employee to waive his of her rights
to e.g. access to the courts. Collective agreements, which for years had a
standard character, now mostly contain minimum standards, allowing derogations
in favour of the individual employee. In general, a ‘reprivatization’ of labour
relations has taken place, stressing the contractual character of the
relationship. Flexibilization of this relationship is attained by the ‘à la
carte’ system of collective agreements, in which the individual employer is
offered a choice between sets of (secondary) labour conditions. These developments, however, have not
diminished the role of collective agreements. These have even increased in
coverage and number. What has changed, though, is the character of the
collective agreements. Not only do they allow more freedom to the individual,
they also more often than not have to be complemented by agreements at the
company level. The negotiations at company level are often left to the works
councils, which are progressively seen as the strategic partners of the unions
in the protection of employees. The overall effect of these changes is a
movement towards differentiation and fragmentation of labour conditions within
a certain margin. The level of negotiations which has lost most of its impact,
is coordination at the national level. Notes * With thanks to Ivo van der Helm
(Department of Labour law and social security law, University Utrecht) for his useful
comment on a earlier version of this report. ** Centre for the Enforcement of
European Law, University of Utrecht. [1]. The federation was established in
1976, the official merger took place in 1981: W. Albeda, W.J. Dercksen, F.H.
Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, Alphen a/d Rijn: Samsom, 6th revised
edition 1998, p. 54. [2]. J.P. Windmuller, C. de Galan, A.F.
van Zweden, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 6th
edition 1987, p. 268 and 280; W.J.P.M. Fase 1980 p. 12, A.A.H. van Hoek,
Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers, Den Haag: SDU 2000, p. 33; W. Albeda,
W.J. Dercksen, F.H.Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, Alphen a/d Rijn:
Samsom, 6th revised edition 1998, p. 52. [3]. The merger involved the union for
services, the union for transport, the union for the foodstuffs and nutrition
sector and the union for industry. http://www.bondgenoten.fnv.nl/start/fbg/frames/index.htm;
W. Albeda, W.J. Dercksen, F.H. Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland, Alphen
a/d Rijn: Samsom, 6th revised edition 1998, p. 52; H.L. Bakels, I.P.
Ascher-Vonk, W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer:
Kluwer, 16th edition 2000, p. 177. [4]. Examples of unions representing
specific professions are the union for nurses and assistant-nurses, the union
for the national railways’ train drivers and train conductors, the union for
pilots in civil aviation and the union for medical doctors employed under a
labour contract. Some of these professional unions are completely independent
and not affiliated with any of the three federations (FNV, CNV, higher
personnel). [5]. Stricly speaking, separate unions
for higher-level employees already had a long tradition. Political events
provided these unions with a strong growth incentive. H.L. Bakels, I.P.
Ascher-Vonk, W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer:
Kluwer, 16th edition (2000, p. 181) mention in this respect the mergers between
the main unions as well as their wage policies. [6]. A.A.H. van Hoek, Internationale
mobiliteit van werknemers, Den Haag: SDU 2000, 33-34. [7]. And of course they did not
appreciate the unions’ politics which resulted in a (relative) reduction of
their income. [8]. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition p. 182, W. Albeda, W.J. Dercksen, F.H. Tros, Arbeidsverhoudingen in
Nederland, Alphen a/d Rijn: Samsom, 6th revised edition 1998, p. 39 ff. [9]. They merged in 1997. [10]. The VNO-NCW also forms part of the
Dutch delegation to the ILO: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/links/1998/europe.htm [11]. Since 1995. [12]. Since 1995. [13]. Alongside these three federations of
entreprises in the market economy, several organisations promote the interest
of employers in health care and education and other governmental and
semi-governmental institutions. These organisations do not participate in the
social dialogue in the STAR and the SER. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition 2000, 182. [14]. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition 2000, p. 183. In addition, they offer advice to their members. [15]. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition 2000, p. 183. [16]. LTO is a party to collective
agreements. [17]. The construction sector has seven
different organisations within the one federation, in the road-haulage sector
there are two organisations of employers, each negotiating their own collective
agreement. [18]. As of 1 January 2002, the
labourexchanges have changed into ‘centers for employment and income’ which
perform functions with regards to unemployment benefit and social aid as well.
The social partners do not participate in the management of these centers. [19]. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition 2000, p. 294. [20]. Jacobs, Het recht op collectief onderhandelen
in rechtsvergelijkend en Europees perspectief, Alphen aan den Rijn/Brussel:
Samsom/H.D. Tjeenk Willink 1986, p. 95. [21]. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition p. 184-186. [22]. Art. 94 of the Constitution
stipulates that statutes will not receive application if this application
violates a generally binding provision of either a treaty or a decision of an
international organisation. Whether a treaty provisions is considered to be
general binding or not, depends primarily on the wording of the provision: can
it impose obligations without further implementation? HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986,
688 § 3.2; E. Verhulp, Vrijheid van meningsuiting van werknemers en ambtenaren,
Den Haag: SDU 1996, p. 35. [23]. HR 30 May 1986, NJ 1986, 688; Jacobs
1986, p. 154; H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk, W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het
Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th edition 2000, p. 233. [24]. K. Boonstra, The ILO and the
Netherlands, Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekerij 1996. [25]. Wet arbeidsvoorwaarden gesubsidieerde
en gepremieerde sector. [26]. Kamerstuk 22830 nr. 1, Stb. 1993, 557
and 1994, 985, Note to HR 11 December 1992, NJ 1996, 229. [27]. Wet op de loonvorming. [28]. L.M. van der Sluis, Toelating tot
CAO-onderhandelingen, Arbeidsrecht 1995/3, p. 33; J. van der Hel, Recht op
CAO-overleg, Arbeidsrecht 1999/10, p. 19-22; C.E.M. Schutte, Overzicht van het
CAO-recht, 2th edition 1998, § 2.1.2;
H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk, W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands
Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th edition, 203-204. [29]. Wet CAO Art. 1 section 1 and Art. 2. [30]. Yellow unions are unions established
at the behest of or by the employer and, as such, doubts may be raised as to
their independence. [31]. Trouw (a national newspaper), Friday
11 January 2002, p. 5. [32]. Wet op de loonvorming Artt. 5 and 6
respectively. [33]. Regeling bijdrage Stichting
Zeemanswelzijn Nederland 1998/1999, AI nr.
8989, Bijv.Stcrt. 16-04-1998, nr. 72. [34]. Associations having full legal capacity
(verenigingen met volledige rechtsbevoegdheid). [35]. Collective Labour Agreements Act 1927 (Wet CAO) Art. 1: ‘Onder
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst wordt verstaan de overeenkomst, aangegaan door
een of meer wergevers of een of meer verenigingen met volledige
rechtsbevoegdheid van werkgevers en een of meer verenigingen met volledige
rechtsbevoegdheid van werknemers, waarbij voornamelijk of uitsluitend worden
geregeld arbeidsvoorwaarden, bij arbeidsovereenkomsten in acht te nemen.’ [36]. However, collective agreements
pertaining to pension plans are covered by separate Acts, the Pensioen- en
spaarfondsenwet, 15 May 1962 Stb. 1962, 275 with subsequent changes and the Wet
betreffende verplichte deelneming in een bedrijfspensioenfonds, 17 March 1949
with subsequent changes. [37]. Collective agreements cannot as such
become effective until notification has taken place: Wage Formation Act (Wet op
de loonvorming) Art. 4. [38]. J. van der Hulst, Het sociaal plan,
Deventer: Kluwer 1999 with extensive literature. The Supreme Court has
mentioned on several occasions that social plans can amount to collective
agreements. They can be based on collective agreements, be part of collective
agreements or be collective agreements in themselves. See e.g. HR 20 March
1998, JAR 1998/127, NJ 1998/815. In HR 26 mei 2000 JAR 2000/151, the Supreme
Court decided that the rules of interpretation provided by the Court for
collective agreements are also valid for ‘social plans’. This means that
provisions in social plans, as well as those in collective agreements, must be
interpreted on the basis of their objective meaning and not according to the
meaning the parties could reasonbly have contributed to them (the latter being
the rule as regards contracts in general). [39]. The only relevant example being the
local agreements for employment in the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam
respectively. [40]. One such dispute concerned the sector
for mobile cranes: did the workers employed in this sector fall under the
agreement for the construction industry or rather the agreement for transport
workers?: see the decree on general applicability DCA nr. 7732, Bijv.Stcrt. 9
March 1993, no. 47, p. 7. Others concern(ed) the position of drivers of
security vans being used to transport money (transport or security?) and
workers in the IT-sector (specific agreement, office equipment/utilities,
assembly/metal industy?:, see A. Van Liempt & A. van Uffelen, Arbeidsverhoudingen
in ontwikkeling, het ambivalente karakter van arbeidsvoorwaarden-regelingen in
de ICT-sector, SMA 2000, p. 244-252). [41]. Such disputes do however affect the
possibility that the Minister of Social Affairs will declare the agreement to
be generally binding: Beleidsregels AVV, Stcrt 1998, nr. 240, p. 14, § 6.2.1. [42]. Counting only the general agreements which
contain all basic labourconditions and excluding special agreements on early
retirement, training etc. [43]. Arbeidsinspectie, voorjaarsrapportage
CAO-afspraken 2000, bijlage 4. [44]. Idem. [45]. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition 2000, p. 199; P.W. Kamphuisen, De collectieve en de individuele
arbeidsovereenkomst, Leiden 1956, p. 17; F. Koning, De obligatoire, diagonale
en normatieve bepalingen van de cao, SMA 1988, p. 175. [46]. HR 19 March 1976, NJ 1976, 407; HR 10
June 1983, NJ 1984, 147; HR 20 January 1987, NJ 1987, 936. On the absolute
nullity of individual stipulations which violate the collective agreements and
the position of third parties: HR 27 March 1998, JAR 1998, 99. [47]. Wet CAO Art. 9. [48]. Wet CAO Art. 12. [49]. The provision does allow the parties
to the collective agreement to agree otherwise, but this rarely occurs.
Collective agreements sometimes contain special benefits for organized
employees, in which case the unions will derogate from Art. 14. Such
stipulations are not welcome though, mainly for political reasons. [50]. Representativiteit van de sociale
partners in Nederland (in internationaal perspectief), Reaction of the Minister
of Social Affairs to a parliamentary question by Wilders M.P., 8 February 2001,
AV/A&M/2001/1324, p. 3. [51]. An individual agreement between an
employer who is bound by a collective agreement and an employee who is not, is
valid even if it contains provisions which violate the collective agreement.
However, the employer acts in breach of the collective agreement when entering
into such an individual agreement. [52]. HR 18 January 1980, NJ 1980, 348;
A.A.H. van Hoek, Internationale mobiliteit van werknemers, Den Haag: SDU 2000,
p. 47, C.E.M. Schutte, Overzicht van het CAO-recht, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri,
2th edition 1998, § 5.3.5. [53]. HR 2 April 1993, NJ 1994, 612. [54]. HR 28 January 1994, NJ 1994, 420. [55]. Wet AVV Art. 2. [56]. HR 25 February 1994, NJ 1994, 377. [57]. Kantonrechter: the court of first
instance in labour cases. [58]. Former Article 1639 BW. [59]. These kind of provisions are referred
to in Germany as ‘Tarifdispositives Recht’ since they are not mandatory
(dispositive) viz-à-viz collective agreements (Tarifverträge) only. [60]. The probation period and a specific
provision for temp-workers (uitzendbeding) are often mentioned in this context
as well: F.B.J. Grapperhaus & M. Jansen, De uitzendovereenkomst, Deventer:
Kluwer 1999, p. 45-47. These provisions, which do not have a human rights
aspect, will not be discussed here. [61]. European Convention of Human Rights
Art. 6, Dutch Constitution Art. 17. [62]. ECHR 27 Febraury 1980, A-35, NJ 1980,
561 (Deweer v. Belgium); R.A. Lawson, Arbitrage en artikel 6 EVRM: vrijheid in
gebondenheid, TvA 1996/4, p.157-166. [63]. E.g. Dutch Constitution Art. 8,
European Social Charter Art. 5. [64]. E.g. Dutch Constitution Art. 19
section 3, European convention of human rights Art. 4, International convention
on civil and political rights Art. 8, European Social Charter Art. 1, International
convention on economic, social and cultural rights Art. 6, ILO conventions no.
29, 105, 117, 122; Notitie Grondrecht van vrijheid van arbeidskeuze, K II
1985-1986, 19376, nrs. 1-2. [65]. HR 27 October 1967, NJ 1968, 3; HR 27
March 1992, NJ 1993, 97. [66]. HR 14 December 1975, NJ 1974, 92; HR
22 November 1985, NJ 1986, 275. [67]. Or the ‘civil law’ variety called
binding advice (‘bindend advies’). [68]. Until recently, a most elaborate one
could be found in the Collective agreement for the publishing and printing sector,
where the bipartite tribunal could even provide the employer with the
administrative permission to dismiss normally granted by the regional
labouroffice. [69]. CAO voor het grafisch bedrijf
(publishing and printing), CAO publiekstijdschrifjournalisten (journalists),
CAO Ziekenhuizen (hospitals). [70]. Wet AVV Art. 2 section 5 sub a;
Overzicht van een aantal niet algemeen verbindend verklaarde cao-bepalingen p.
8-9, bijlage bij brief aan de Sociaal Economische Raad van het Ministerie van
Sociale zaken en werkgelegenheid, dienst collectieve arbeidsvoorwaarden, d.d.
19 maart 1991, kenmerk DCA/910825. [71]. Constitution Art. 8: freedom of
association. [72]. E.g. ECHR Art. 11 and European Social
Charter Art. 5: freedom of association; ILO convention nos. 87 and 98 on freedom
of association and the right to organize respectively. [73]. See ECHR 13 August 1981 Series A no.
44, Young, James and Webster v. the UK and notably ECHR 24 June 1993 Series A
no. 264, Sigurdur A Sigurjónsson v. Iceland para. 35, with reference to Art. 11
para. 2 of the European Community Charter of
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and a Recommendation of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 24 September 1991,
containing a proposal to amend Art. 5 of the European Social Charter. [74]. H.L. Bakels, I.P. Ascher-Vonk,
W.J.P.M. Fase, Schets van het Nederlands Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, 16th
edition 2000, p. 187; C.E.M. Schutte, Overzicht van het CAO-recht, Nijmegen:
Ars Aequi Libri, 2th edition 1998, § 2.2.2. [75]. Wet CAO Art. 1, section 3. [76]. Wet AVV Art. 2, section 5 sub b. [77]. Stb. 1996, 406, with a separate
implementation act (invoeringswet) Stb. 1996, 562, in force since April 1997. [78]. Kamerstuk II 1993-1994, 23 428 nr. 3
p. 35 (explanatory report). [79]. K II 1993/1994, no. 23 438, nr. 3, p.
35; C.J. Loonstra, Het concurrentiebeding in de arbeidsovereenkomst, Den Haag:
Elsevier bedrijfsinformatie, 3th revised edition 1999, p. 51-57; F.B.J.
Grapperhaus, Concurrentiebeding en Art. 7.10 BW: het schriftelijkheidsvereiste,
Arbeidsrecht 1997/5 p. 29-32, 29-30; idem, Werknemersconcurrentie, Deventer:
Kluwer 1995, p. 212; G.J.J. Heerma van Voss, De invoering van de titel over de
arbeidsovereenkomst in het Nieuw BW, Sociaal Recht 1997/3, p. 68-73, 72;
R.Delgado & W.A. Zondag, Het concurrentiebeding in de CAO, Sociaal Recht
2001, nr.5, p. 134-139, 136; W.C.L. van der Grinten,
Arbeidsovereenkomstenrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 1999, p. 139. [80]. Compare Nota Algemeen verbindend
verklaren van cao-bepalingen (government memorandum on the general applicability
of collective agreements) K II 1993-1994, 23532, nr. 2, p. 9 and 33. [81]. Banking agreement 1998 Art. 1 § 3, AI
nr. 9020, Bijv.Stcrt. 15-06-1998, nr. 109, Betonproduktenindustrie 1998/2000
Art. 3 section 2, AI nr. 9083, Bijv.Stcrt. 13-10-1998 nr. 195; CAO Handelsvaart
tot 9000 GT 1998/1999 Art. 4 section 1 and Art. 5, AI nr. 9011, Bijv.Stcrt.
20-05-1998, nr. 94. [82]. Homecare agreement (CAO Thuiszorg)
2000/2001 Art. 3, AI nr. 9310, Bijv.Stcrt. 20-01-2000, nr. 14. [83]. E.g. CAO Tentoonstellingsbedrijven 2000/2001
Art. 3 section 6, AI nr. 9570, Bijv.Stcrt. 07-06-2000, nr. 107; CAO
Dagbladjournalisten 2001 Art. 6 section 3, AI nr. 9556, Bijv. Stcrt.
08-05-2001, nr. 88; CAO Schoenherstellersbedrijf 2001 Art. 16, AI nr. 9563,
Bijv.Stcrt. 31-05-2001, nr. 103; CAO voor de Nederlandse Video
Detaillistenbranche 2001/2003 Art. 6 section 1, AI nr. 9568, Bijv.Stcrt.
06-06-2001 nr. 106; CAO Horecabedrijf 2001/2002 Art. 2 section 7, AI nr. 9565,
Bijv.Stcrt. 01-06-2001, nr. 104. [84]. Article 1:3 section 2 of the
collective agreement for health-care workers working with the disabled
stipulates that derogations are allowed if foreseen or condoned by the
provision that is being derogated from (AI nr. 9569, Bijv.Stcrt. 06-06-2001,
nr. 106). [85]. HR 14 januari 2000, NJ 2000, 273;
Pres.Rb. Utrecht 15 september 1994, JAR 1994, 198. [86]. A.A.H. van Hoek, Internationale
mobiliteit van werknemers, Den Haag: SDU 2000, p. 48-56. [87]. The decree can narrow down the scope
of applicaton of the collective agreement, but it may not widen it: Wet AVV
Art. 2. [88]. On the complications arising from
this ‘double binding’, see J. van de Hel, De spanning tussen algemeen
verbindend verklaard CAO-bepalingen en de CAO, ArbeidsRecht 2001/4, p. 16-19. [89]. Toetsingskader algemeen verbindend
verklaring cao-bepalingen (AVV), Staatscourant 1998, nr. 240, p. 14. [90]. Compare Rechtbank Utrecht (District
Courtof Utrecht, sitting on appeal) 6 March 1996, JAR 1996, 72. [91]. Based on the assumption that a more
favourable provision will not violate the terms of the collective agreement
which applies de jure. [92]. Representativiteit van de sociale
partners in Nederland (in international perspectief), Reaction of the Minister
of social affair to parliamentary question by Wilders M.P., 8 February 2001,
AV/A&M/2001/1324, Bijlage I. [93]. Representativiteit van de sociale
partners in Nederland (in international perspectief), Reaction of the Minister
of Social Affairs to a parliamentary question by Wilders M.P., 8 February 2001,
AV/A&M/2001/1324, p. 5. [94]. Comp. G. Zalm, Opleggen van c.a.o.’s
soms strijdig met regeringsbeleid – betekenis en toekomst van de algemeen
verbindend verklaring, Stcrt 1991, nr. 248, p. 4 en 9; idem Mythen, paradoxen
en taboes in de economische politiek, inaugural lecture VU 1990; K.Schilstra
& E Smit, Drie scenario’s voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA
1996, p. 117-118. [95]. Up to 80 %!: Representativiteit van
de sociale partners in Nederland (in international perspectief), Reaction of
the Minister of social affair to parliamentary question by Wilders M.P., 8
February 2001, AV/A&M/2001/1324, p. 3; Comp. A.G. Nagelkerke & T.C.J.M
.Wilthagen, Op weg naar een institutioneel mozaïek: de Nederlandse
arbeidsverhoudingen aan het begin van de 21e eeuw, SMA 2000, p. 162. [96]. As the Dutch model of consultation
and industrial relations is called. [97]. K.Schilstra & E Smit, Drie
scenario’s voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA 1996, p. 117; A.G. Nagelkerke & T.C.J.M .Wilthagen, Op
weg naar een institutioneel mozaïek: de Nederlandse arbeidsverhoudingen aan het
begin van de 21e eeuw, SMA 2000, p. 156, 162 and 164. [98]. A.G. Nagelkerke & T.C.J.M
.Wilthagen, Op weg naar een institutioneel mozaïek: de Nederlandse
arbeidsverhoudingen aan het begin van de 21e eeuw, SMA 2000, p. 163. [99]. K. Schilstra & E. Smit, Drie
scenario’s voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA 1996, p. 125. [100]. A.G. Nagelkerke & T.C.J.M
.Wilthagen, Op weg naar een institutioneel mozaïek: de Nederlandse
arbeidsverhoudingen aan het begin van de 21e eeuw, SMA 2000, p.
156-165; P. Leisink & H. Leisink, Modernisering van de grafimedia-CAO in de
jaren negentig, SMA 2000, p. 197-207; M.J.S.M. van der Meer, De modernisering
van de arbeidsverhoudingen in de bouwnijverheid, SMA 2001, p. 164-173; A. van
Liempt & A. van Uffelen, arbeidsverhoudingen in ontwikkeling: het
ambivalente karakter van arbeidsvoorwaarden-regelingen in de ICT-sector, SMA
2000, p. 244-252. [101]. Comp. L. Delsen & J. Visser,
Flexibilisering van de arbeid via de CAO’s, SMA 1999, p. 296-305. [102]. F.B.J. Grapperhaus & M. Jansen, De
uitzendovereenkomst, Deventer: Kluwer 1999, p. 125-162; C.J. Loonstra, Uitzend-
of inleen-CAO. De loonverhoudingsnorm van art. 8 WAADI, Ondernemingsrecht 1999,
p. 69-73. [103]. Self-employed in the construction
sector are allowed to join the FNV-union for the construction sector (but not
the CNV-union): M.J.S.M. van der Meer, De modernisering van de arbeidsverhoudingen
in de bouw, SMA 2001, p. 168. [104]. Wet CAO Art. 1, section 2: ‘Zij kan ook
betreffen aannemingen van werk en overeenkomsten tot het verrichten van enkele
diensten’: A collective agreement may also concern contracting and/or the
provision of services. [105]. Deeds of incorporation, 26 June 1999. [106]. For the decentralization of the
negotiations as to the labour conditions of civil servants, see C. Vrins,
Decentralisatie van het arbeidsvoorwaardenoverleg, Openbaar Bestuur 1993/5, p.
16-18. For the abolishment of national guidelines, see e.g. K. Schilstra &
E. Smit, Drie scenario’s voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA 1996,
p. 116. [107]. P. Leisink & H. Leisink, Modernisering
van de grafimedia-CAO in de jaren negentig, SMA 2000, p. 197-207. [108]. A. van Liempt & A. van Uffelen,
arbeidsverhoudingen in ontwikkeling: het ambivalente karakter van
arbeidsvoorwaarden-regelingen in de ICT-sector, SMA 2000, p. 249; K.Schilstra
& E Smit, Drie scenario’s voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA
1996, p. 119-120. [109]. A. van Liempt & A. van Uffelen,
arbeidsverhoudingen in ontwikkeling: het ambivalente karakter van
arbeidsvoorwaarden-regelingen in de ICT-sector, SMA 2000, p. 250. [110]. K. Schilstra & E. Smit, Drie
scenario’s voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA 1996, p. 121. [111]. HR 14 January 2000, NJ 2000, 273. [112]. Framework agreements will contain the
limits to this agreement. In a so-called layered agreement, some issues are
dealt with in their entirety in the sector agreement, while others are left to
be decided at the company level: K. Schilstra & E. Smit, Drie scenario’s
voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA 1996, p. 121. [113]. B. Van Bon, De lading kan omgevlagd,
het incorporeren van ondernemingsovereenkomsten in CAO’s, Sociaal Recht 1999,
p. 244-250; A. Stege, De ondernemingsovereenkomst, de CAO en de individuele
arbeidsovereenkomst, Sociaal Recht 1999, p. 250-256. [114]. K. Schilstra & E. Smit, Drie
scenario’s voor de belangenbehartiging van werknemers, SMA 1996, p. 122-123. Cite as: Aukje A.H. van Hoek, Collective Agreements and Individual Contracts of Employment in Labour Law: The Netherlands, vol 6.4 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW, (December 2002), <http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-15.html> |
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