Characteristics of International Administration in Crisis Areas: Aspects of UK Government Policy

Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, July 2006
(Response to Questionnaire IV.A)

Ralph Wilde∗

Abbreviations:

DfID Department for International Development
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
MoD Ministry of Defence
PCRU Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit
AU African Union
EU European Union
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
UN United Nations
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Websites:

FCO www.fco.gov.uk
DfID www.dfid.gov.uk
MoD www.mod.uk
Cabinet Office www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk
PCRU www.postconflict.gov.uk

∗ www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/wilde. Dr Ralph Wilde is Reader at University College London. Many thanks to Dr. Silvia Borelli for her assistance with this report.
Introduction and Methodology
This is a report covering certain aspects of United Kingdom government policy relating to ‘Characteristics of International Administration in Crisis Areas,’ topic IV.A. of the 17th International Congress on Comparative Law, to take place on 16-22 July 2006. It is a response to the questionnaire issued by the Topic Reporter, Dr. Outi Korhonen, and is structured according to the questionnaire format, covering those questions the author was able to respond to. Due to publication word restrictions, the report is only concerned with setting out descriptively the main features of official UK policy and practice in this area as it is explained publicly by the UK government; no attempt is made to go beyond this to other explanations of this policy and practice, nor does the report offer comment or analysis of what is reported.

The report is based on a variety of sources. There is no single institution responsible for UK participation in international administration missions, and accordingly, no single source for information in that regard. Accordingly, data has been collected from web-sites of governmental departments/ministries and international organisations, Parliamentary records and interviews with government diplomats from the Conflict Issues Group of the UK Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) who, according to the usual convention, spoke on the basis of comments not being attributed to them by name.¹

Moreover, UK participation in international administration missions varies greatly in the scope and kind of involvement and activities undertaken, and changes over time. No data is readily available on the number of personnel involved at any one time in a given mission, or as a whole in international missions; accordingly it is not possible to give an overall snap-shot of participation in international missions on any given date. The participation figures given for missions vary in terms of their dates because of the different sources of information for each mission.

The present report does not take into account the financial support which the UK provides to missions where it does not send personnel.

For the purposes of the present report, the notion of ‘International Administration of Crisis Areas’ has been interpreted loosely, covering not only instances where the UK either alone or under the auspices of an international organization exercises a degree of governmental authority in another State, but also instances where the UK lends support to states which require assistance in the performance of governmental functions in foreign territory.

The information contained in this report was last checked on 28 February 2006.

¹ Information from such interviews is attributed as such in footnotes referring to ‘FCO sources’.
Section 1: The facts

1.1 Is your country participating (or has it been participating) in crisis administration; if yes, where? Is there a clear policy or pattern to the participation – close to home, far away, friendly countries, countries where closest allies/other members of your regional organisation are participating?

The UK is currently involved in several international administration missions around the world. Geographical considerations are not material to the decision of participating in an international administration or peacekeeping mission. The fact that other Member countries of organizations to which the UK is a Member are willing to contribute to the efforts in a given area may be a relevant consideration, but not a decisive one2.

The principal policy (which applies to both military and civilian missions) in relation to participation consists of three main factors which are considered when deciding whether the UK wants to be involved in a specific mission and if so, to what extent:

- Security, i.e. what is the security threat posed by the crisis in question – this has to be assessed on two different levels: (a) impact of the crisis on international stability and international peace and security; (b) impact on domestic security (e.g. Afghanistan);
- Humanitarian concerns;
- Historical links between the UK and the country/area in question.

Commercial considerations were initially suggested by FCO sources as an additional potential factor; the officials concerned subsequently stated that they could not recall a recent example where such considerations had influenced a decision to participate in an international intervention, and in consequence it would not be correct to state that such considerations were taken into account, even incidentally.

Risks to UK personnel are balanced against the severity of the situation. A careful assessment of risks is carried out in order to decide the modalities and the degree of involvement and the resources. Risk assessment may vary according to whether it is civilian personnel or military personnel being deployed.3

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2 With respect to the reasons justifying the UK’s involvement in areas considered remote by the public opinion, see, e.g., the response given by the Secretary of State for Defence in the House of Commons, in relation to the possible involvement of UK forces in Zaire:

The House will rightly ask why Britain should become involved in a place far from our country and where no vital interest is engaged. It is because we are a civilized nation. We can see that people are about to die in their thousands, and we are one of the few nations on earth that has the military capability to help at least some of them. We recognize our humanitarian obligations. We take pride in our permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, but it carries with it clear duties. Some of our leading allies in NATO are willing to assist, and our place is with them.


3 FCO sources.
## Table 1: UK participation in administration missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission/ Programme</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>UK involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1 civilian expert currently seconded to UNMIK (from FCO, but formally employed by the UN)⁴ As of March 2005, 93 civilian police officers were deployed to UNMIK³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>UK contributing military personnel⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>EUFOR (December 2004 – present)⁷</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UK contributing military personnel⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM)⁹¹⁰</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>As of 26 January 2006, 76 UK civilian police are deployed in the area¹¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (FRYOM)</td>
<td>EUFOR – Concordia Mission (March 2003 – December 2003)¹²</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UK contributing military personnel¹³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUPOL Proxima (December 2003 – December 2005)¹⁴</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>As of September 2004, the UK was contributing three retired police officers and four civilian experts to the mission¹⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) (December 2005 - present)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UK contributing police advisors¹⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴ FCO sources.
⁶ FCO sources.
⁷ See http://www.euforbih.org/.
⁸ FCO sources.
⁹ See, in general, http://www.eupm.org/. Follow-up to the UN’s International Police Task Force. Strategic objectives: police independence and accountability; the fight against organised crime and corruption; financial viability and sustainability, and institution and capacity building at management level.
¹⁰ See http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/87/8709.htm n268
¹¹ FCO sources.
¹³ FCO sources.
¹⁴ See http://www.eu-pat.org/Proxima/index.html.
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission/ Programme</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa (April 2005 – present)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Financial contribution(^{17})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Military Assistance Team (since at least 2001)</td>
<td>Based on a bilateral agreement b/w the UK and the Government of Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UK personnel involved in training of members of the armed forces(^{18})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) (2000 – present)(^{19})</td>
<td>Agreement between IMATT and Sierra Leone Government</td>
<td>British-led operation – UK military personnel involved(^{20})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commonwealth Police Training Initiative</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK personnel involved in training of police(^{21})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                  | UNAMISIL                                                | UN           | As of 26 January 2006, 1 person deployed by FCO\(^{22}\)  
|                  | UN                                                      |              | As of March 2005, 6 civilian police officers were deployed to UNAMISIL\(^{23}\) |
| East Timor       | UNOTIL (previously UNMISET)                            | UN           | Participation in police training programme\(^{24}\)  
|                  | UNOTIL (previously UNMISET)                            | UN           | Provision of legal advisers to train the East Timorese Defence Force in discipline procedures and to draft appropriate legislation\(^{25}\) |
| Afghanistan      | UNAMA                                                   | UN           | 1 military liaison\(^{26}\) |
|                  | ISAF                                                    | NATO (UN-mandated operation) | UK military personnel involved – the degree of involvement varies, since troops from different countries rotate\(^{27}\) |

\(^{17}\) See http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf.
\(^{18}\) FCO sources.
\(^{19}\) According to the IMATT (SL) website, the objective of the mission is to ‘assist with the transformation of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) into a self-sustaining, democratically accountable and affordable force in order that it can meet Sierra Leone’s defence missions and tasks and to facilitate the phased disengagement and withdrawal of IMATT (SL)’; see http://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/sierra_leone/index.htm.
\(^{20}\) On the UK contingent in IMATT (SL), see http://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/sierra_leone/uk.htm.
\(^{21}\) FCO sources.
\(^{22}\) FCO sources.
\(^{26}\) FCO sources.
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<th>Mission/ Programme</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform Programme</td>
<td>UN-mandated operation</td>
<td>UK military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK armed forces in the Southern region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UK civilian police officers and civilian experts heavily involved in Security Sector Reform Programme – policing – training of specialized police officers. According to the FCO, as of September 2004, 39 British police officers were working in the police academies in Basra and in Baghdad. An additional 62 serving officers and eight retired officers were training Iraqi police officers in Muwaqua training college in Jordan.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, Aceh Province</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) 29</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>UK civilian specialists involved. As of 8 November 2005, 11 UK civilians on the ground in charge of monitoring the implementation of the weapons decommissioning programme30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Financial support and logistical assistance to the African Union mission monitoring the ceasefire;31 as of 6 April 2005, 1 UK monitor and 1 UK planning officer working with the AU.32 Also there has also been some UK involvement in training AU forces on an ad hoc basis.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the near future, involvement in UN operation.34</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 FCO sources.
33 FCO sources.
34 FCO sources.
### 1.2 Through which international organisations is your country participating; the UN, regional organisations, the Red Cross, the international financial institutions, other? What is the volume of the participation?

**Military operations**

The UK is currently contributing military personnel to several international missions (see Table 1, above). In the context of UN-run missions, the volume of participation is relatively limited. As of 26 January 2005 the UK was contributing approximately 300 military personnel to UN-run missions. In the context of UN-mandated missions carried out under the auspices of regional organizations, the UK involvement is much more extensive. In particular, the UK is contributing military personnel to missions carried out under the auspices of NATO (e.g. ISAF in Afghanistan) and the EU (e.g. EUFOR: 1 brigade split between Bosnia and Kosovo).

The UK has relatively limited involvement of military personnel in UN run-missions when compared to the heavy involvement in UN-mandated missions carried out either as part of a coalition or under the auspices of regional organizations. Various reasons for this were suggested by FCO sources. In the first place, one consideration is the degree of political influence that the UK will be able to exercise with respect to the mission as a whole, given that missions can be structured differently in this regard. For example, an *ad hoc* military ‘coalition of the willing,’ as currently in Iraq, involves greater possibilities for such influence than a peacekeeping mission.

<table>
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<th>UK involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moldova/ Ukraine</td>
<td>Moldova/Ukraine Border Control Mission</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>1 civilian⁵⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) – January 2006 - ongoing</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Financial assistance - training⁶⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Countries (mainly Eastern Europe)</td>
<td>Monitoring missions UK civilian personnel – election monitoring (no direct responsibility for organizing/carrying out elections) – border monitoring</td>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>UK civilian personnel (generally, 1 to 8 civilians in each mission)⁷⁷</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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³⁵ FCO sources.


³⁷ FCO sources.

³⁸ FCO sources. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations reports that, as of 31 December 2005, the UK was contributing 6 military observers to MONUC; 7 Military observers to UNOMIG; 69 police and 1 military observer to UNMIL; 3 soldiers to UNMIL. The largest contribution of military personnel was however to UNFICYP, with 261 troops (see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/dec2005_5.pdf).

³⁹ FCO sources.

⁴⁰ FCO sources.
under overall UN command. In the second place, the UK has particular obligations arising out of its membership of NATO and the EU. In the third place, UK troops are considered more suited for high intensity/combait operations than for the kind of operations generally carried out in the context of UN-run operations. The overarching policy in this respect is to deploy people only where it is believed that there is a comparative advantage in doing so, and where the involvement of UK military personnel may make a difference. Accordingly, the UK tends to deploy people at headquarters level in the context of UN-run missions, more than in lower level military roles.

Involvement in civilian administration/peace support missions
The UK contributes civilian personnel/experts/civilian police to administration missions carried out under the auspices of UN, EU and OSCE. In some cases the deployment of civilian police is carried out pursuant to a bilateral agreement with the receiving country.

(a) Civilian experts/specialists
UK civilian specialists are deployed to OSCE and EU missions, and carry out a wide range of roles in various fields of expertise. Their activities include: monitoring of borders (e.g. Moldova/Ukraine monitoring mission); field monitoring; human rights; rule of law; media; democratization; administration and support. Currently deployed in:

- OSCE Missions: Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, Skopje, Minsk, Moldova, Baku, Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh, Ashgabad, Bishkek;
- EU Missions: Aceh, Indonesia; Moldova/Ukraine border monitoring mission.

The volume of participation in these missions is limited (1 to 8 UK civilians involved in each mission). UK civil servant/civilian experts are seconded either directly to the governmental agencies in the country in which the programme is being carried out or to international organizations involved in the programme. Examples include the secondment of a prosecutor from the UK government Serious Fraud Office to work alongside lawyers in the Serious Crime Unit in Bosnia and a UK lawyer seconded to UNMIK’s Sensitive Information and Operations Unit.

(b) International Policing
British police officers are deployed on Peace Support Operations (PSOs) around the world in a wide range of roles. According to the FCO, the activities of British police officers in this context directly support [...] the UK’s commitment to help prevent violent conflict from emerging or re-emerging in fragile states, to resolve existing conflicts, and to build peace in post-conflict situations. Demand for expert police support is increasing against the backdrop of an increasing number of peacekeeping and policing missions.

41 FCO sources.
42 FCO sources.
43 On the UK participation to operations carried out in the context of the European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) or, in general, under the auspices of the EU: see in general http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1077042145284.
44 The present paragraph relies mainly on the information contained on the FCO website. See, in particular: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1018027636137.
45 FCO sources.
British police officers are deployed to PSOs to reform domestic police forces and help them build the respect and confidence of the local community. Less frequently, they may carry out executive policing duties. International policing missions also have an important role in the fight against organised, cross-border crime.

Activities include:

- Executive policing: the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is the only mission where executive policing is carried out;
- Training: e.g. general police duties, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, firearms and human rights;
- Monitoring and reporting: e.g. security and protection, control room operators and finance;
- Mentoring and advising: e.g. organised crime, criminal intelligence, community policing;
- Programme and project management: e.g. strategic intelligence, strategic police training.

Deployments operate in:

- UN Missions: Kosovo, Sudan, Sierra Leone;
- EU Missions: Sudan, Bosnia;
- OSCE Missions: Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro;
- ‘Bilateral’ Missions: Jordan and Iraq.

As shown by Table 1, above, the volume of participation of civilian police in international policing operations is larger than that of civilian expert.
Section 2: The Legal and Institutional Framework of International Administration of Crisis Areas in the UK

2.1 Is there any new legislation enacted to enable your country’s participation? On which topic? Why?

In the United Kingdom decision-making on issues of foreign affairs and deployment of UK military personnel pertain to the so-called ‘prerogative powers of the Crown’: the executive can take action in relation to these matters without needing Parliamentary approval.48 However, Parliament exercises a degree of control on the way the executive exercise prerogative powers in the area of foreign policy and deployment of military force, both by virtue of the doctrine of Parliamentary responsibility of ministers for their policies and decisions and, perhaps more importantly, by virtue of the budgetary powers of Parliament (see below). Parliamentary scrutiny of missions involving the deployment of UK forces and civilians is relatively strict, in particular through written questions to Ministers, and the hearings of Parliamentary Select Committees.

2.2 Are there new institutional arrangements in your country to facilitate the participation? What are the legal implications of the new arrangements and of the participation?

Cabinet Sub-Committee on Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction
The Cabinet Sub-Committee is composed of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Secretary of State for International Development, the Secretary of State for Defence, and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury.

Established in Spring 2005, its mandate is

[to keep under review the strategy for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction; ensuring that the funds available, including the Global and African Conflict Prevention Pools, are adequate and coordinated with other foreign policy tools to promote the reduction of conflict and the pursuit of wider foreign policy goals; and ensuring that the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit operates effectively.49

Inter-departmental initiatives aimed at coordinating activities of the Ministries/Departments involved in administration of crisis areas
Within the UK, the three departments/ministries principally responsible for the implementation of missions and programmes involving some degree of ‘administration’ in crises areas are the FCO, the MOD, and DfID (the latter being responsible for leading the UK’s contribution to international efforts to promote sustainable development and reduce poverty). In recent years, several initiatives have been implemented aimed at ensuring that the activities of those ministries/departments in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and international assistance to

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49 See http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees/dopcpr.asp.
crisis areas are carried out in a co-ordinated manner, and that resources are employed in the most effective way. These initiatives include:

(a) Cross-Government Conflict Prevention Initiative
The cross-government conflict prevention initiative was set up in April 2001 as a new approach to tackle conflict prevention in countries, regions and across sectors. The three departments involved are DFID, FCO, and the MoD. It is a policy-coordination mechanism, aiming at coordinating the action of the relevant authorities in relation to country/region-specific or thematic issues. For example, it has helped to strengthen UN capacity, promote security sector reform and address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

According to the FCO website:

The establishment in 2001 of a government-wide joint conflict prevention initiative provides the UK with an opportunity to maximise the impact of the extensive conflict prevention work already being undertaken by the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence. The mechanism is an important step in developing a sustained commitment to addressing African conflicts based on a shared strategy and common objectives. The conflict prevention initiative also enables the UK to react more rapidly to emerging crises and to opportunities for peace building.

(b) Conflict Prevention Pools
In 2001, within the context of the Cross-Government Conflict Prevention Initiative, two ‘conflict prevention pools’ were created, namely the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool. The aim of the Pools is to integrate UK policy-making so that the three departments principally involved (FCO, DFID and MoD) can develop shared strategies for dealing with conflict and make the practical programmes they fund as effective as possible.

According to the FCO:

The UK government strongly believes that through a process of team-working across these departments (FCO, MoD and DFID), from policy formulation to programme delivery, a more strategic and cost effective approach to conflict reduction can be realised. Activities of the Pools seek to harness the expertise available within these government departments across a wide range of sectors including development, security reform, public administration, good policing and equitable justice system.

The current priority areas of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool include:

- geographical areas: Balkans; Afghanistan (the Global Conflict Prevention Pool also funds Afghan Counter Narcotics activities); Indonesia and East Timor; Sri Lanka; Iraq;
- functional strategies: United Nations (UN); Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW); Security Sector Reform (SSR).

(c) Common targets in Public Service Agreements
The objectives fixed for each department of government are made publicly available in the ‘Public Service Agreements’, which are intended to make clear to the public the goals for each department, and which set targets for government.

50 http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1017756005037
53 See http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029393906
One of the objectives for DfID in its Public Service Agreement is to ‘[i]ncrease the impact of the international system in reducing poverty, preventing conflict and responding effectively to conflict and humanitarian crises.’ The Public Service Agreements of the FCO and of the MoD list among the objectives of the two departments, respectively, the achievement of ‘[a]n international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflict’ and ‘[a]chieve success in the military tasks we undertake at home and abroad’.

Among the targets set to assess the progress made in the implementation of the above objectives, there is a common ‘Conflict Prevention Target,’ which cuts across the different fields of competence and is shared by DfID, MoD and FCO and intended to contribute to the fulfilment of the objectives of each of the Departments. This Target provides that the three departments should aim to achieve:

By 2007/08, improved effectiveness of UK and international support for conflict prevention, through addressing long-term structural causes of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction, where the UK can make a significant contribution, in particular Africa, Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU)

This was created by the FCO, DfID and the MoD ‘to improve the United Kingdom’s capacity to deal with post conflict stabilisation.’

Its mandate is as follows:

• to develop strategies for post conflict stabilisation, including linking military and civilian planning, and working with the wider international community;
• to plan, implement and manage the UK contribution to post conflict stabilisation, including practical civilian capabilities needed to stabilise the environment in immediate post conflict situations. In this context, one of the principal functions of the PCRU is to keep a database of civilian experts with experience in post-conflict situations ready to be deployed at short notice (e.g. engineers, technicians, IT specialists and lawyers).

Strategic Task Force on Civilian Policing

The Strategic Task Force, a cross-departmental committee of officials (FCO, MOD, Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers) was created to develop a strategy for providing civilian police to peacekeeping/crisis management operations, taking into account the particular structure of police forces within the UK. The necessity for such a strategy is dictated by the organizational structure of the police within the UK:

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Policing within the UK is undertaken by over 50 forces covering three legal jurisdictions. The forty-three forces of England and Wales are regulated by the Home Office, whilst the eight forces in Scotland are regulated by the Scottish Executive, and the Police Service of Northern Ireland by the Northern Ireland Office. Additionally the Ministry of Defence Police is an executive agency of MoD. This makes ‘recruitment’ for international missions very difficult. The FCO and DFID have a roster of police officers willing to go on missions, but while many junior officers volunteer, senior officers rarely do so. Ultimately, decisions to ‘free’ officers for international deployments are made by the UK’s Chief Constables, not the Home Secretary. The Chief Constables will give greater priority to fulfilling their obligations at home than to international deployments. Overseas police commitments are considered marginal activities in the context of the Home Office’s agenda. This amounts to a disincentive to the constabularies to volunteer police officers, especially senior ones, to international missions.59

Stephen Pattison, a civil servant in the FCO observes:

The British police officers who serve overseas are second to none in their professionalism, expertise and courage. However, we have put that operation together in a rather ad hoc fashion over the years, as the demand for policing—mostly in the context of post-conflict reconstruction—has increased vastly. In our view, that demand is not going to go away, and it may very well increase. It is incumbent on all of those involved, not just the British Government but international organisations and others, to see if we cannot do this a little better; to learn from the past and to make sure that those lessons are properly institutionalised in the way we approach policing in future. [...] The areas which we think it will look at will be precisely the role the UK should play in international policing—so it will be the range of policy issues associated with our policing deployments; whether we can improve our planning capabilities—this will always be difficult, but we are trying to move to a situation where we can plan better to forecast the demand; whether and how we can set up a rapid deployment capability. [...] We will also look at how we generate forces in the UK for international policing. As I say, we currently have a system in place which has generated a good number of serving officers for our contingents overseas; but we want to look to see whether that can be improved in any way. [...]60

Subsequently, consultations led to a new procedure agreed between MoD, FCO and the Home Office governing how requests for volunteers for service in international missions are made. However, participation of officers from their forces in the scheme remains within the discretion of the individual Chief Police Officers.61

2.3 Is there a debate about participation and its legitimacy/justifications?

See below, section 3.

2.4 Is the participation civil, military or CIMIC?

It varies as between different operations/missions (see supra, Table 1 and Section 1 in general).

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60 See: House of Lords, Select Committee on Defence (Minutes of Evidence), Examination of Witnesses (Questions 227/239), 26 January 2005, Dr Owen Greene, Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan, Mr Stephen Pattison and Mr Stephen Rimmer (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmdfence/65/50126a02.htm). On the Strategic Task Force, see also, House of Lords, Select Committee on Defence, Written Evidence, ‘Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office - Further Information Requested Following the Evidence Session on 26 January 2004’, February 2005, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmdfence/65/65we05.htm, in particular Q240.
61 On the procedures for secondment and deployment of civilian police to international missions, see http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1129038337570.
2.6 In which sectors of government/administration does your country engage; military/security, trade/commerce, educational/cultural, other? What are the priorities?

The extent and modalities of the UK involvement in a particular sector of government are dependent upon the specific circumstances of each individual location in which the UK is operating. Generally the Departments involved have different but co-ordinated priorities, depending on their mandate, in relation to the same area. The UK carries out or has in the past carried out programmes and activities covering to a different degree all of the above sectors. In general, a primary consideration when deciding the modalities and degree of UK involvement in a specific mission is that relating to the value/impact of UK involvement, i.e. the UK tends to deploy military/civilian personnel only in those sectors where it considers that contribution is likely to have a significant impact, and in those areas, sectors where the UK has a comparative advantage.

A number of missions are currently characterized by a particular emphasis on Security Sector Reform (SSR), including strengthening of the justice system and rule of law.62

2.7 Is the participation effected directly through governmental actors or how much is outsourced (to NGOs, private security, export or other organisations/companies etc.)?

Some of the Departments use contractors, either as advisors/consultants or on the ground (e.g. relating to governance and human rights). In particular, DfID outsources a relevant portion of its activities to NGOs and private contractors. The MoD does not seem to outsource any of its activities.

The FCO does not generally outsource its activities. Recently, due mainly to limited availability of resources, it has outsourced some activities in the field of police monitoring and training (as well as some security for personnel) in Iraq to a private security company (Armour Group). Other instances of outsourcing relate to analysis, consulting (academic/practitioners).63

2.8 What are the legal precepts for the financing of international administration in crisis areas?

Most of the operations relating to conflict prevention and reduction are funded through the budget of the Conflict Prevention Pools created in 2001 (see supra). The Pools have a unique funding arrangement specifically approved by Parliament for conflict prevention and reduction. Activity and expenditure under the Conflict prevention pools is undertaken jointly by the FCO, MoD and DfID. Initially each department put in funds from their own budget, with the Treasury providing additional resources. Currently the Pools bid for money directly to the Treasury alongside their parent departments in each Governmental Spending Round. The annual budget has to be voted by Parliament, and is then allocated jointly by the relevant departments to fund different operations/programmes.

63 FCO sources.
The Pools also finance peacekeeping and other operations, which are funded annually by Parliament in accordance with expenditure forecasts. The peacekeeping element of the Global Pool funds FCO, MOD and DfID contributions to peace support activity. It is split into two parts: assessed and non-assessed, and budgets are set at the beginning of each financial year. The assessed element meets the cost of the obligatory UK contribution to international organisations’ peace support activities. The non-assessed element funds voluntary contributions to peace support activities. This includes the cost of sending UK troops or civilian personnel to participate in UN peacekeeping missions and the cost of the UK representation in operations carried out under the auspices of other international organizations.

For 2004/05 the allocation for the Africa Pool was £60 m (rising to £67.5 m by 2007/08) and for the Global Pool was £74 m.64

Alongside the resources provided by the budget of the Conflict Prevention pools, each Department allocates to operation in crisis areas a portion of its regular budget, requested each year through the normal budget procedures.

Finally, major (military) operations in crisis areas (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq) are funded through *ad hoc* bids to the Treasury submitted by the Ministry of Defence (the extraordinary budget has to be voted by Parliament)

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64 Figures relating to programme costs not administration (source: FCO website).
Section 3: The Bases of Legitimacy for the International Administration of Crisis Areas

3.1 Are the international administrations of crisis areas generally viewed as legitimate under international law in your country? What is viewed as the basis of their legitimacy; e.g. the authority of the UN, (implied) consent, the right to self-determination/democratic government of peoples, other? Is there a debate among legal scientists? Are the international administrative efforts viewed as adhering to the principles of good governance?

Insofar as people are aware of its existence, and hold a view, participation in international administration of crisis areas is generally seen as legitimate. In the past, the attention devoted by the general public to the question of the legitimacy of specific missions involving a degree of administration has been relatively limited. Within the UK, the debate about legitimacy issues under international law generally concerns not the administration of crisis areas per se, but the legality/legitimacy of the intervention which has preceded the international administration mission (e.g. Kosovo/Afghanistan/Iraq). With respect to Iraq, for example, even if the intervention in itself was considered not to be legitimate by some, the general view is now that the UK cannot terminate its presence there until the situation improves. However, as a result of the public debate on the UK intervention in Iraq, there has been an increase in the general public awareness of UK involvement in administration missions carried out in other parts of the world, and a higher degree of public scrutiny also in relation to other administration projects. More often, however, the debate concerns the role of the UK and the modalities of its participation in a specific mission and not the legitimacy of the mission itself. Further there is generally close scrutiny on the way resources are being used. In some instances there has been public pressure for a more robust involvement of the UK (e.g., Darfur).

Within the academic community, although there is some debate in general terms as to whether or not it is legal to intervene in particular situations, this is not limited to UK intervention, but is discussed generally. Further, once administration has come into being, the writing seems to take for granted that States can legitimately participate in such administration (in particular where the mission is seen as being carried out under the auspices or with the authorization/mandate of the United Nations), and the focus is on what form that participation should take as a matter of good governance, rather than concentrating on whether participation can be justified as a matter of international law.

In this regard, UK-based scholars are particularly active in relation to issues of good governance in international administration of territory, and have written extensively on general issues of legitimacy and good governance in relation to the international administration of Kosovo, the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Coalition Provisional Authority and subsequent developments in Iraq. Projects dealing, from different perspectives, with issues of good governance, accountability and respect for human rights in the context of international administration of crisis areas are being carried out or have been carried out in recent years in a number of UK academic institutions. The UK academic community assesses adherence of international administration to principles of good governance on a case-by-case basis. There has been some criticism by UK-based academics of administration in Iraq, in particular under the CPA, and also of administration in Bosnia in relation to the lack of democratic accountability.

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and lack of mechanisms to ensure that the High Representative and other organs of international administration respect fundamental human rights.

3.2 Is your country advocating a model (a general policy, a code or draft rules) of international administration within its relevant international organisations (the UN, the EU, other regional organisations)? If yes, what kind of a model? Is it advocating the introduction of a system of checks and balances short of a general model; e.g. the set-up of ombudspersons?

The UK is not advocating any single model of international administration, or ‘blueprint for intervention’ as such. However, the UK is engaged in developing standardized guidelines in relation to specific sectors and it is engaged in trying to develop good practice which can be disseminated within international organizations and between different organizations.66 Within the UN, the UK is a strong supporter of the concept of UN integrated missions, and is pushing for further improvements in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s Integrated Mission Planning Process.67 In particular, the UK has been advocating a co-ordinated UN approach to operational planning in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions (UN, regional organizations, private sector, etc.) involved in administration of crisis areas.68

3.3 What is the role of the advancement of the following public goods in your country’s efforts:
- Keeping of international peace and security;
- Human rights and democracy-building;
- Rule of Law / International rule of law / suppressing international crime;
- Sustainable development / Environmental concerns;
- Good governance and the Anti-fraud and corruption fight;
- Freedom of trade and investment.

What other general goals are there?

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66 FCO sources.

[...] UN peacekeeping needs to be set within an overall strategy for consolidating and sustaining peace, including peace-building, humanitarian and development activities. I mentioned better co-ordination both within and outside the UN. One way of achieving this would be to implement fully the concept of the Integrated Mission Task Force. Peacekeeping should be integrated into the whole post-conflict recovery process including disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and economic development. That means all agencies of the UN working together and with the International Financial Institutions, regional and non-governmental organisations. The UN needs to develop further its partnerships with regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Regional organisations have unique and complementary rapid deployment capabilities, training capacity, civilian police expertise, transport and medical facilities. Why create this at the UN level when it is already available within a region? Mandating a regional organisation to undertake a peacekeeping mission does not undermine UN supremacy. A regional mission would be operating under a UN mandate. What counts is who can best deliver an effective peacekeeping mission rapidly, efficiently and successfully.
The criteria adopted in relation to the involvement of the UK in peace-keeping/peace support operations and administration of crises areas (outlined above, Q1.2) parallel the UK’s international priorities as set out in the FCO Strategy. Considerations relating to these priorities are crucial not only in determining the merit of the involvement of the UK in a specific mission/programme but also in shaping the activities carried out directly by UK personnel or financed by the UK within a given target area.

Among the eight strategic priorities set out by the FCO in relation to the UK’s international policy in the next decade, some are directly relevant to decisions concerning the merits and the modalities of UK involvement in administration/peacekeeping missions abroad.

The UK’s commitment to objectives such as international peace and security, human rights and democracy-building, the rule of law/international rule of law emerges clearly from some of the priorities set out by the FCO Strategy. In particular, one such priority concerns ‘[a]n international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts’. In this context, the FCO Strategy underlines the need for collective action and increased co-ordination among states, international organizations and non-state actors (in particular NGOs), and specifies that ‘[t]here is a particular need to strengthen collective approaches to security so that we are able to respond to new threats, promote international law, secure common interests, and meet humanitarian needs’. Specific aims relevant to the UK approach to international administration are, in this context:

- strengthening the ability of the international community to agree on timely action against threats to international peace and security;
- strengthening the capacity of the UN, the EU and NATO to conduct effective stabilisation and humanitarian operations, including post-conflict reconstruction;
- maintaining the vigour of the NATO alliance and further develop its new role.

Two other priorities are also relevant with respect to shaping the UK’s policies relating to peacekeeping and administration missions, namely those relating to ‘the protection of the UK from illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other international crime’ and ‘a world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction’.


70 FCO sources.

71 The eight strategic priorities are: (a) a world safer from global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; (b) protection of the UK from illegal immigration, drug trafficking and other international crime; (c) an international system based on the rule of law, which is better able to resolve disputes and prevent conflicts; (d) an effective EU in a secure neighbourhood; (e) promotion of UK economic interests in an open and expanding global economy; (f) sustainable development, underpinned by democracy, good governance and human rights; (g) security of UK and global energy supplies; (h) security and good governance of the UK’s Overseas Territories (see FCO Strategy, above).

72 FCO Strategy, p. 34.

73 Ibid.
Eradicating international terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the domestic security of the United Kingdom and its citizens are two major inter-related objectives of UK foreign policy and they inform the UK’s approach to international administration missions. With respect to the protection of the UK from threats to its domestic security, the FCO strategy specifies that specific aims of UK action are, inter alia:

- developing effective, cross-Government policies to tackle underlying problems in other countries which can encourage international crime, including conflict and poverty;
- helping to establish the rule of law in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

With respect to the priority relating to the eradication of international terrorism and to weapons of mass destruction, the Strategy notes that:

> The UK, its citizens and its interests worldwide will remain a target for global terrorist networks, their sympathisers and other terrorist groups. The FCO will contribute to the overall UK effort to minimise the threat through international co-operation. This will include addressing the problem of states that offer support to terrorists, or failed states that provide them refuge. Eradicating terrorism is a longer term aim. It will involve working to change conditions which can push people towards political extremism, such as bad government, regional conflict and environmental degradation.

In this context, the specific aims of UK international policy include:

- helping to resolve the key regional disputes that might create incentives for terrorism and proliferation, or lead to use of WMD;
- maintaining the UK’s commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq;
- strengthening UK, EU and international approaches to dealing in advance with the problems of governmental collapse;
- strengthening the capacity of key states to deal with terrorism and proliferation, including through disposal or protection of WMD materials, security sector reform, and stronger legal systems;
- helping to make the UK and UK interests overseas a more difficult and resilient target, and strengthening international cooperation on civil emergency planning.

Further, one of the key objectives of the UK is to support ‘sustainable development, underpinned by democracy, good governance and human rights’. In this respect, the FCO Strategy notes that:

> The UK cannot be secure or prosperous in isolation from the rest of the world. For our security and prosperity to be lasting, we shall need to support the equivalent aspirations of the peoples of the developing world, including the most vulnerable in Africa. That means promoting democratic values, human rights and good government, and working for progress towards poverty reduction and sustainable development in all parts of the world. [...] It will be a priority to meet the Millennium Development Goals and the commitments made at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.

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74 Ibid., p. 31.
75 Ibid., p. 33.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 31.
78 Ibid., p. 32.
79 Ibid., p. 39.
80 Ibid.
In this context, the specific aims of the FCO include:

- developing more effective UK, EU and international responses to prevent and resolve conflict and assist with post conflict reconstruction;
- strengthening the 1951 Refugee Convention through better burdensharing arrangements and improved protection of refugees and internally displaced people at source;
- [...] promoting the universal implementation of international human rights and humanitarian standards;
- strengthening international action against AIDS, malaria and other epidemic diseases;
- developing innovative and effective partnerships on these issues with NGOs, the private sector and other non-state actors.\(^{81}\)

\(^{81}\) Ibid.
Section 4: Transfer of Technical and Administrative Expertise, Development, Eradication of Poverty

4.1 Is the diplomatic representation of your country in the crisis areas also in charge of advancing the participation of your nationals in re-building etc. projects?

UK embassies generally have commercial teams which deal with national companies and aim at advancing the involvement of UK companies in the national market. This aspect of the diplomatic activities becomes very limited in relation to crisis areas (there being generally no commercial team), and promoting UK companies is not a priority. In particular with respect to the actual use of UK money in the context of re-building/development aid no priority is accorded to UK companies. Moreover, DfID has a policy to use local companies where possible.

4.2 Is there transfer of professionals (e.g. legal professionals) or transfer of technology to help to build up a post-crisis society?

Yes (e.g. DFID ‘lends’ experts to the government of a number of countries; the PCRU maintains a database of civilian specialists ready to be ‘deployed’ in crisis areas).

4.3 How do you view the importance of the export opportunities / the transfer of expertise to your country?

It is not a material consideration when deciding whether or not to carry out a mission in a target country.

4.4 How is the participation in your country linked to its development policies and other international commitments in the eradication of poverty?

This is considered to be a very important driving factor. All the Ministries/Departments involved are very focused on the poverty-eradication agenda. Military involvement is almost invariably followed or, where possible, accompanied by programmes aiming at fostering development in the target country. Most of these programmes are carried out by DfID, but other departments are also peripherally involved.


82 FCO sources.
83 FCO sources. The ‘Procurement’ section of the DfID website (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/procurement/), states that ‘[f]rom 1 April 2001, all UK development assistance has been fully untied, which allows suppliers from anywhere in the world to bid for DfID contracts’
84 FCO sources.