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LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES: THE NETHERLANDS Ivo Giesen and Marco
B.M. Loos* II
A 3 I Introduction The primary aim of
this contribution is to provide the reader with an overview of the current
state of the law in the Netherlands with regard to products liability.[1] While doing so, this
part of liability law is, at least to a certain extent, contrasted with the
rules governing the liability of service providers. The main reason for this
approach is that there appears to be a growing tendency to cross the border
between these two areas within liability law, in order to learn about possible
solutions for (more or less) common problems. Whether or not this tendency is
indeed present in the Netherlands, and whether or not there is something to be
learned from developments in services liability, are questions that need to be
answered. In section 7 below, an attempt will be made to do just that. In the preceding sections, we will first
deal with the rules governing liability for defective products (section 2) and
for services (section 3), followed by a discussion on the major sources of the
law, the past and future developments and the policy issues that are at stake
(section 4). The focus in section 5 is on the institutional and procedural
environment surrounding these areas of liability law. The frequency of
settlements and litigation and other aspects relating to ‘the law in action’,
such as insurance schemes, are dealt with in section 6. 2 The basic rules governing liability
for defective products 2.1 Contract or tort, strict liability or
negligence? In the Netherlands,
products liability is usually approached from the perspective of tort law
(artt. 6:162 and/or 6:185 ff. of the Dutch Civil Code, Burgerlijk Wetboek,
hereafter referred to as BW). Contract law could in principle be invoked[2] (especially art.
7:17 BW), even in concert with tort law, but this is hardly ever the case.[3] The reason is that
usually in this type of case, there is a personal injury; whenever such is the
case, a contractual fault also constitutes a tort under general tort law.[4] Since the
contractual chain usually needs to be ‘stretched out’ to
be able to put in a products liability claim under contract law, it is both
easier and safer to make use of tort law instead of contract law. Furthermore,
art. 7:24 BW stipulates that if a good is sold by a professional to a consumer
and the defect falls under the scope of artt. 6:185 ff. BW, it is not the
seller but (solely) the producer that is liable, unless the seller knew or
should have known the defect, guaranteed the absence of the defect, or the
claim consists of material damage which cannot be claimed under the products
liability regulations because the damage is less then the minimum amount of 500
Euro.[5] Art. 6:162 BW constitutes the basis for
a claim for products liability under general tort law. This basic tort
rule is one of negligence. Under the EC directive on products liability[6] (hereafter: the
Directive), implemented in artt. 6:185 ff. BW, the basic rule, if also
applicable,[7] is (or, at least, is
thought to be) one of strict liability.[8] This has been
questioned, however, on the basis of case law of the European Court of Justice
(hereafter referred to as ECJ), which seems to have introduced an element of
fault into the Directive.[9] In general, products
liability is considered to have combined elements of both fault-based liability
and strict liability.[10] Even though art.
6:162 BW generally constitutes a negligence-based liability, the same applies
to products liability under the general tort law regime.[11] However, one’s
position in this respect also depends on the specific definition of strict
liability that one embraces.[12] 2.2 The notion of a defective product According to art.
6:186 BW (the Directive liability), a product is defective if it does not offer
the safety that a person is entitled to expect, taking into account all the
circumstances of the case at hand, in particular the presentation of the
product, the expected use of the product, and the time the product was put into
circulation. In 1989, the Dutch Supreme Court, the Hoge
Raad (hereafter referred to as HR) ruled that a product is defective under
art. 6:162 BW[13] if it does not offer
the safety a consumer/user is entitled to expect, given the circumstances of
the case.[14] In later cases, the
HR stated that the element of wrongfulness vis-ą-vis the user is present if a
product is put into circulation that causes damage when it is used in a normal
fashion and for the purpose for which it was intended.[15] In Dupont/Hermans,[16] an explicit
reference was made to the first case, and since the standard used in the case
decided in 1989 very closely resembles the Directive standard (entailing the
consumer expectation test), the HR effectively united the standard under
general tort law and that under the Directive,[17] whereas under older
case law, a form of the risk/utility test seemed to prevail.[18] In legal literature, a distinction is
made between the well-known categories of design defects, manufacturing
defects, and inadequate warnings or instructions, but in case law on products
liability, this distinction has so far been without legal consequences.[19] 2.3 The parties involved in products
liability cases In principle, there
is no limitation to who may sue (in the sense that, for instance, only buyers
of a product have an action under products liability). Injured bystanders are
allowed and able to sue under both artt. 6:162 and 6:185 BW, given the fact
that both provisions are tort provisions and that their scope, therefore, is
not limited by the requirement of a contractual relationship between the
aggrieved party and the ‘perpetrator’.
Since claims under a contract of sale are rare,[20] the question of who
may sue is not frequently asked in Dutch law. Products liability, in general, only
rests on the person putting the product into circulation. This rule is accepted
under the Directive liability but also under the general tort rule.[21] Under the regime of
the Directive, the ‘producer’ is potentially liable
for the damage the product has caused, unless he proves that he did not bring
the product on the market (art. 6:185 para. 1 sub a BW). This is different
under general tort law where the plaintiff will have to prove that the producer
brought the product on the market.[22] What exactly falls
under the definition of ‘bringing the product on the
market’ has, until now, been rather vague, however.[23] Passing something on
in the chain of distribution has been used as a definition in this respect.[24] The notion of ‘producer’ is
a broad one: any party who manufactures a product, a component, or the raw
materials thereof is considered to be a producer, and can be held accountable
under tort law.[25] The same rule
applies, as far as liability under the Directive goes, to those presenting
themselves as producer by placing their name, trademark, or other
distinguishing mark on the product (art. 6:187 para. 2 BW), and to the party
that imported the product into the European Economic Area (i.e., into
the European Union, Norway, Iceland, or Liechtenstein, cf. art. 6:187 para. 3
BW). Finally, the supplier of the product will be considered to be the producer
if it cannot be determined who the producer is, unless the supplier mentions,
within a reasonable time, the identity of the person from whom he had bought
the product (art. 6:187 para. 4 BW).[26] Under general tort
law, similar rules most likely will be applied.[27] However, the
negligence standard applied to a supplier of a product who cannot be considered
to be the actual producer of the product itself is less strict.[28] The retail seller of
a product can be held liable under the contract of sale, but, for reasons
explained above, this is rare.[29] Important in this respect is that
according to general tort law, the employer/producer can also be held liable
for the wrongful acts of his employees (art. 6:170 BW); the provision is
applied equally if liability under the Directive is invoked. Liability under
art. 6:170 BW arises under the conditions that the employee acted wrongfully
(his act must constitute a tort in itself), that he was indeed a servant
working under instructions of the employer (a labour contract suffices here),
and that there was a causal connection between the tort of the employee and the
instructions provided by the employer. In order to meet the last requirement,
the instructions must have been of such a nature that they provided an
opportunity to commit the tort. The last two conditions are usually met quite
easily.[30] 2.4 The burden of proof Art. 6:188 BW clearly
states that, under the regime of the Directive, the plaintiff will have to
prove all the elements of the claim, i.e., the defect, the damage, and
the causal connection between those two. Applicability of one of the defences
under art. 6:185 under 1 BW is to be proven by the defendant.[31] In principle, the same division of the
burden of proof applies if the action is based on general tort law.[32] This certainly holds
true when one considers the element of (the existence of) damage.[33] In products
liability cases, however, a ‘reversal’ of the burden of
proof is possible (a) with regard to the ‘defect’
(the element of wrongfulness), (b) with regard to causation, and (c) with
regard to the subjective fault. As for the defect (a), the HR considers
that if a plaintiff proves that he opened a bottle, which then exploded, in a
normal fashion, that state of affairs would lead to the factual presumption
that the damage must have been caused by a defect in the bottle. The producer
may rebut this presumption.[34] On a more abstract
level, it is possible to state the rule deductible from this case as follows:
if a party proves that he used the product in a normal fashion, but an
unexpected damaging event nevertheless occurred, the product is presumed to
have been defective.[35] In the field of causation (b), a new
rule on the burden of proof has gained momentum in recent years. It basically
states that whenever a wrongful act creates or increases a certain risk of
damage and that specific risk actually materialises, the causal link has been
established, unless the wrongdoer can prove that taking preventive measures
would not have prevented the damage from occurring.[36] The HR has never
declared that rule to be applicable or not in the area of products liability,
but its scope is broad enough to encompass this field, certainly if a duty to
warn has been breached.[37] One should at least
be aware of the possibility that the same rule, which is in fact applied in
cases of services liability,[38] might be applied in
cases of products liability. With regard to subjective fault (c), it
should be noted that this element is still a condition for liability under
general tort law,[39] but that, on the
other hand, fault may be presumed if the wrongfulness has been established and
needs to be disproved by the defendant, thereby effectively reversing the
burden of proof.[40] To conclude, in the case of an exploding
bottle (Leebeek/Vrumona),[41] the HR has made
clear that in order to escape liability, the defendant must prove that: a) the
defect was not present prior to the marketing of the product; b) the defect
could not have been discovered at an earlier date; and c) the product was not
used in accordance with its intended use. Finally, if the defendant argues that
there was (some form of) contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
he needs to prove that statement as well.[42] 2.5 Damage recoverable in products liability
cases The Directive regime
contains a provision on the forms or types of damage that can and cannot be
claimed from a producer. According to art. 6:190 BW, the plaintiff can claim
damages in case of death or personal injury,[43] and for damage to
property other than the product itself, intended for use in a private setting
and exceeding the amount of 500 Euro. Neither damage relating to the defective
product itself or to products used in a professional setting,[44] nor pure economic
loss[45] are recoverable
under the Directive. Under general tort law, the rules on
compensation for damage are laid down in artt. 6:95-110 BW. Damage that should
be compensated for (whenever it has been determined that there is a right to
damages) includes physical and economic loss (loss suffered and profits not
gained), and other disadvantages, such as immaterial losses.[46] In principle, all
losses suffered should be fully reimbursed,[47] irrespective of the
type of injury that occurred. There are thus no specific rules limiting
compensation according to the type of injury in products liability cases. This
means that not only physical harm (personal injury) and damage to property
(either to the defective product or to other goods) is recoverable under Dutch
law, but also pure economic loss.[48] All kinds of damages that have been
recognised under Dutch law are thus also available in products liability cases,
at least if the claim is based on general tort law. This excludes punitive
damages since Dutch law does not recognise this form of damages.[49] Damages for
non-pecuniary losses (pain and suffering) are, with certain restrictions,
recoverable (art. 6:106 BW).[50] This is also
relevant for the Directive liability, since this liability regime left the
question as to the recoverability of damages for pain and suffering to the
national systems, and still does.[51] Under Dutch law,
such losses therefore are in principle recoverable. With regard to the amount of damages
that may be claimed, no such thing as a cap or limitation exists as yet in the
Netherlands.[52] The possibility
provided by the Directive (in art. 16) of instituting such a cap or limit for
products liability cases has not been followed. Art. 6:110 BW does recognise
the possibility of installing by Royal Decree a limit on the amount of damages
that can be recovered, but that possibility has not been used so far. One
should realise, however, that the court does have the discretionary power, to
limit an award in a specific case on the basis of equity and reasonableness
(see art. 6:109 BW) if it feels that granting the full amount of damages that
would normally be recoverable, would lead to unacceptable consequences, given
the nature of the liability, the legal relationship between the parties, and
their mutual financial capacities. The court can only lower the award to the
level at which insurance is or should have been available.[53] The HR has warned
lower courts to be very cautious when using this power,[54] so it has not (yet)
gained much popularity. ECJ case law also superimposes a duty on
courts to act cautiously when limiting or deducting damages. In the Veedfald-case,[55] the ECJ made clear
that, although the precise interpretation and meaning of the term ‘damages’
has been left to the national courts and legislators, the Directive does entail
the duty to secure a reasonable and full reimbursement of the damage (both
personal injury and property damage) caused by a defective product, since the
national laws may not interfere with the useful effect of the Directive. This
means that a member State may not limit the categories of recoverable
(material) damages. 2.6 Possible defences Most of the major
defences with regard to the Directive liability are listed in art. 6:185 para 1
sub a to f BW, and include a) the producer did not put the product into
circulation;[56] b) the defect did
not exist at the time the product was put into circulation; c) the product was
neither produced nor spread for economic purposes, nor was it produced or
spread within the producer’s professional activity; d)
the defect is due to compliance with mandatory governmental regulations; e) the
defect could not have been discovered at the time the product was put on the
market, given the state of science and technical knowledge at that time. A last
defence, (f), applicable to manufacturers of raw materials and components only,
is that the defect was due to the design of the product of which that part
forms a component, or that the defect is due to the instructions given by the
producer of the end-product. The development risk defence is laid down in sub
e) mentioned above. The Netherlands did not opt, as was offered by the
Directive, to exclude this defence. Another important defence is probably that
the defect occurred after the product was put on the market (sub b), which
defence may especially be of interest to those ‘producers’
that only manufactured a component or the raw materials of the defective
product.[57] Contributory (or: comparative)
negligence can also be a defence, at least partially.[58] However, since under
general tort law a producer is required to count on a certain degree of
carelessness on the part of the user of a product,[59] this defence is
usually not very successful. This would then lead the claimant to use general
tort law, which ‘ in this perspective ‘
would be stricter. Mention should also be made of the limitation and extinction
periods of 3 and 10 years (art. 6:191 BW). Force majeure, an Act of God,
is usually not seen as a defence under the Directive.[60] All these rather usual defences are, in
principle, also available under art. 6:162 BW, although the limitation period
is (much) longer (5 or even 20 years, cf. art. 3:310 BW). The main role is
played, under both general tort law as the Directive, by the development risk
defence, sometimes also known as the state-of-the-art-defence (although that
refers to the standard on deciding whether there was a defect).[61] According to the
ECJ, the standard of that defence is an objective one (subjective knowledge of
a particular producer is not sufficient), and it is one that refers to the most
advanced level of knowledge available at the time the product came into
circulation.[62] 3 The basic rules governing liability
for services 3.1 Strict liability or negligence, contract
or tort? The distinction
between ‘strict liability’ and negligence based
liability is not a very fortunate one to be used in comparative law, since the
terminology is not always used in the same manner in different legal systems.[63] From a Dutch
perspective, liability for services would be considered a negligence-based
liability. However, it should be noted that where the contractual
position between the provider of a service and the client is concerned, the
client only has to prove a breach of the standard of care. According to art.
6:75 BW, if the service provider’s non-performance[64] has been
established, it is up to the provider to prove that the non-performance can not
be attributed to him. The provider will be held liable not only when he was at
fault, but also when the non-performance can be attributed to him by ‘common
opinion’. If the claim is of a tortuous nature, the client will
need to establish that the breach of the standard of care can be attributed to
the provider,[65] but it should be
noted again that attribution of the tortuous act to the provider on the basis
of ‘common opinion’ is possible under art. 6:162
para. 3 BW. Therefore, neither in a contractual nor in a tortuous setting is ‘fault’
absolutely necessary when considering whether the provider is liable. Having
said that, it should be noted that, in the ordinary course of events, the
establishment of a breach of the standard of care does also imply (at least
objectively) faulty behaviour on the part of the provider of the service.[66] The general rule on the standard of care
is embodied in art. 7:402 BW. It states that the provider of the service, in
the performance of his activities, must comply with the ‘care of a good provider’,
whereas art. 6:28 BW provides that the quality of the service has to be of ‘average
good quality’.[67] For professional providers
of services, a slightly different expression is used in practice. According to
this expression, it must be determined whether or not a reasonably skilled and
reasonably acting professional would have acted differently in the given
circumstances.[68] If the professional
is to be seen as a specialist, an even higher degree of competence may
be expected: the criterion then is whether a reasonably skilled and reasonably
acting specialist would have acted differently.[69] Dutch law does not have a system of ‘non-cumul’.[70] Therefore, a claim
against the provider of a service may be based on either tort law or, if a
contractual relation exists between the provider of a service and the aggrieved
party, on contract law. Contractual limitations of liability are normally
deemed to apply equally to tort-based claims,[71] whereas statutory
provisions aiming to protect a certain type of client (for instance, consumers)
or to protect all clients apply regardless of the basis of the claim. The
criterion to establish whether the provider has breached his standard of care
is the same:[72] did the provider of
the service act in the same manner as would a reasonably competent and
reasonably acting provider of such a service?[73] Any damage that may
be seen as the materialisation of a risk that arose as a consequence of the
breach of the standard of care is presumed to have been caused by that breach,
so that the burden of proof shifts towards the provider of the service. This is
true when liability is based on contract, as well as when it is based on tort.[74] Yet, in practice, whenever a contractual
link exists, the claim will be primarily based on contract law. The contractual
approach is favoured in practice because of the simple fact that the burden of
proof for the client is slightly better in a contractual setting, since he need
not establish that the breach of the standard of care can be attributed to the
provider of the service.[75] Therefore, in
practice, tort-based claims only appear when a contractual link between the
injured party and the provider is missing or uncertain, or as a subsidiary
cause of action. In other words, a tort-based claim usually occurs if the
person sustaining damage as a consequence of the breach of the standard of care
is not the contractual counterpart of the provider of the service, but a third
party. Liability of the provider towards such third parties depends on whether
the norm that was violated by the provider was (also) intended to defend a
third party’s interests. Relevant to this are the nature of the
interests involved, and the fact that the provider knew or should have realised
that a third party’s interests were at stake. Such
will often be the case when the provider is entrusted with the execution of a
service of public interest and/or when the third party may rely on the provider
taking his interests into account when executing the service.[76] 3.2 Special rules for particular kinds of
services General rules on the
contract for services (overeenkomst van opdracht) can be found in Book 7
(Specific contracts), Title 7 (Services), Section 1 (Services in general, artt.
7:400-7:413 BW). The rules on the overeenkomst van opdracht are of a
rather rudimentary nature, and only apply if the contract is neither a contract
for work (such as construction contracts or contracts to repair or maintain
goods), nor a contract for the storage, transportation and expedition of people
and/or goods or for the publication of books and articles, art. 7:400 para. 1
BW provides. Furthermore, art. 7:400 para. 2 BW provides that, with the
exception of a few rules on consumer protection, the rules in Section 1 only
apply when their non-applicability does not follow from a statutory provision,
the content or nature of the contract for services, a juridical act (e.g.,
another contract), or custom. The general rules on the overeenkomst van
opdracht are consequently regarded as very soft default rules.[77] Title 7 (Services) of Book 7 BW also
contains more concrete rules for some specific services. The rules on the
contract of mandate (lastgevingsovereenkomst) (Section 2, artt.
7:414-424 BW) apply whenever the provider undertakes to conclude one or more
juridical acts (e.g., a contract). Section 3 (artt. 7:425-427 BW)
on the bemiddelingsovereenkomst (contract for mediating services)
applies when the provider undertakes to assist the client in the conclusion of
one or more contracts with third parties. Section 4 (agentuurovereenkomst,
artt. 7:428-445 BW) constitutes the Dutch implementation of the EC-directive on
commercial agency.[78] Similarly, title 7A
(reisovereenkomst, artt. 7:500-513) constitutes the implementation of
the EC-directive on package travel,[79] whereas the
EC-directive on distance selling of goods and services[80] has been regulated
in Title 1, Section 9A (artt. 7:46a-46j BW). At present, a bill to implement
the e-commerce-directive[81] -
which includes rules on liability for the services of Internet access providers,
service providers, and intermediates - is being prepared.
The contract for work is still regulated in Book 7A (artt. 7A:1639-1651 BW),
which means that the old BW of 1838 is still in force for these contracts. A
bill to modernise the law on this type of services[82] was sent to
Parliament in 1993,[83] but has not yet come
into force. Finally, in Book 8 of the Civil Code, transportation law has been
codified, mainly based on international treaties such as CMR.[84] The most interesting regulation is that
of the contract for medical services (behandelingsovereenkomst),
regulated in Title 7, Section 5 (artt. 7:446-468). Medical services include,
among other things, the services of physicians, hospitals, and those of
dentists.[85] The contract for
medical services is conceived as a species of the general contract for
services, which implies that the general rules of Title 7, Section 1, apply
unless they are being derogated from in Section 5.[86] The contract for
medical services is defined as a contract between a professional provider of
medical services and a client regarding the provision of medical services to ‘the
person of the client or that of somebody else’.[87] The person to whom
the services are to be provided - who, therefore, need not be
the client - is referred to as the patient. Section 5 attributes
rights to the patient and, to some extent, also to the client; the obligation
to remunerate the services rests solely with the client.[88] With regard to the specific details of
this regulation, some articles are worth mentioning. Firstly, art. 7:448 BW
requires the provider of a medical service to inform - if requested, in
writing - the patient of the research to be undertaken, the
treatment that is proposed, and the developments regarding the diagnosis, the
treatment, and the medical condition of the patient. Furthermore, the provider
needs the patient’s consent for a treatment
(art. 7:450 BW). This provision is intended to lead to informed consent
for any treatment.[89] Art. 7:451 BW requires
the provider of the service to keep records; according to art. 7:456 BW, the
patient is entitled to review these records, unless a third party’s
privacy is at stake. A therapeutic exception to the right to review the records
does not exist.[90] Art. 7:460 BW states
that a provider of medical services may only terminate the contract for
important reasons. Rather spectacular is the so-called ‘central liability’ of
the hospital on whose premises the medical services are being performed. Art.
7:462 BW provides that the hospital - or any institution
which is equal to a hospital under paragraph 2 - that is not the
contractual counterpart of the patient, is, nevertheless, liable for breach of
contract as if it were a party to that contract. In practice, this means that
the patient may always sue the hospital, and need not be bothered with the
question whether the person that actually performed the service is employed by
the hospital (in which case the hospital is the contractual counterpart) or
that that person operated on the basis of an independent contract with the
hospital (in which case the contract was concluded with that person himself).
Art. 7:463 BW provides that neither the provider of the service, nor the
hospital that is liable under art. 7:462 BW may limit or exclude liability. Finally,
art. 7:468 BW states that the parties may not derogate to the detriment of the
patient from the rules on the contract for medical services, nor from some of
the provisions of Section 1. 3.3 Liability for services seems to be
pursuing an independent course˙ At the time of the
codifications of the 19th and 20th century, services were
fundamentally less important than they are at present. It was felt that there
was no need for specific regulation in this area. Long term contracts, which
form an important subcategory among service contracts, have only started to
emerge in the course of the 20th century, especially since the end of World War
II. The national codifications, therefore, contain hardly any provisions
regarding such contracts. Consequentially, each time a new service contract was
developed, rules were ‘invented’ on an ad hoc basis,
while the legislator, courts and legal literature were usually blind to similar
developments in other services. As a consequence, neither at the national nor
at the European level does a common and coherent framework for services exist.[91] Nevertheless, services, and subsequently
the law(s) of services, have become ever more important. Nowadays, at least in
Dutch law, liability for services seems to be of greater importance than
products liability,[92] and is at the centre
of legal practice and doctrine. The number of cases in which professional
providers of traditional services are being held liable for failure to perform
the service (correctly) or for failure to inform, warn, or advice the client or
patient has significantly risen over the years.[93] Breach of a duty to
inform appears to have become an almost independent source of liability for
providers of services. Breach of the standard of care is usually hard to prove for
a client or patient, but the courts tend to distribute the burden of proof
differently when duties to inform are supposedly breached. Since the
professional is charged with a duty to substantiate his claim (by supplying
information on all the factual aspects of the claim) that he has given the
information to which the client or patient was entitled, it has become easier
for the plaintiff to prove his claim.[94] It should be noted, however, that the
notion of ‘services’ is not a fixed one. Art.
7:400 BW defines the overeenkomst van opdracht (contract for services)
as any contract in which a party undertakes to execute work outside of a labour
contract, and not constituting the creation of a good of a physical nature, nor
the storage, transport, or expedition of people and/or goods or the publication
of books and articles.[95] Yet, others are of
the opinion that ‘services’ should be perceived
as an overarching term that covers both intellectual services and services that
would traditionally be considered contracts for work.[96] This broader, more
modern notion of services would then, for instance, include construction
(building) law.[97] 4 Sources of the law, developments in
the law and policy issues 4.1 The major sources of law Products liability is based on the
articles laid down in the Dutch Civil Code, especially on art. 6:162 BW, but
since that is a very general rule, intended to cover the whole of tort law,
case law is without a doubt at least as important as, if not more important
than the statutory rule. All particularities of products liability are created
and used in case law. The creation of a European products liability law has not
really altered this, although those rules (artt. 6:185-193 BW) have given the
courts something on which to base their decisions, sometimes even if the
European regime is not directly applicable. With the implementation of Book 7, Title
7, Section 1 (Services in general), the basic rule for services liability may
also be found in the Dutch Civil Code (in art. 7:401 BW). However, as was the
case before the introduction of this Section, the core of services liability is
to be found in case law. A minor exception is to be made for the commercial
agency contracts (Section 4, artt. 7:428-445 BW, which form the Dutch
implementation of the EC-directive on commercial agency)[98] and travel contracts
(title 7A, artt. 7:500-513 BW, which form the implementation of the
EC-directive on package travel).[99] More substantively regulated is the
contract for medical services, which has been regulated in Book 7, Title 7,
Section 5 (artt. 7:446-468 BW).[100] This does, however,
not mean that case law has become any less important in this area than it is in
other areas. Case law has made these statutory rules
on liability for products and services ‘fit for purpose’ in
the sense that these rules have been worked out into the detailed level needed
in practise by courts, most notably the HR. Academic authority does not seem to
have any direct impact on the development of these more detailed rules.
Doctrinal works are hardly ever cited by the HR or by the lower courts.
However, they are likely to have an indirect impact, since doctrinal views are
discussed rather thoroughly in the conclusions of the Advocate-General,
who delivers an advice in a specific case to be dealt with by the HR. The
conclusions of the Advocate-General often have a persuasive influence on both
the HR’s decision and on the interpretation thereof in legal
practice and science, especially if the HR follows the Advocate-General’s
view. 4.2 Developments and trends in the (recent)
past General tort law on products
liability has not yet gone (and probably will not go) so far as to
introduce a strict liability instead of a negligence liability outside the area
of application of the European Directive, but liability has tended to become
more strict than under the normal negligence standard as used in other areas of
tort law in the last few decades. In the area of general tort law, there are no
specific statutory rules for particular groups of plaintiffs, such as, for
example, rules aimed at protecting consumers. However, if one of the parties to
the action is a consumer, this could influence the strictness of the negligence
standard as applied by the court in the specific circumstances. In any case, it
seems that in products liability, more is expected of a producer, even though
the same negligence standard is used. An example of this trend can be found in
the case of Koolhaas/Rockwool. The HR decided that when the producer of
a certain fabric changes the structure of the fabric, he must not only inform
the buyers of that fabric, who use the fabric to make certain goods, but also
the buyers of those goods.[101] Another example of
the tendency towards a stricter standard regards the proving of a claim. In
that respect, the plaintiff receives help from the courts. How far this helping
hand reaches (whether it constitutes a complete reversal of the burden of proof -
and if so, with regard to what elements of the claim - or only constitutes
a limited rule on the use of presumptions) has not yet been made totally clear
by the HR,[102] and the literature
is divided on the subject.[103] However, what is
clear is that at least some of the relevant facts need to be proved by the
defendant, and that fact in itself already makes liability stricter.[104] An example in this
respect concerns the question as to the time the defect occurred. According to
the Directive, the producer is required to prove that the product was not yet
defective at the time it was put on the market. Under general tort law, the
client used to have to prove that the defect existed before the product was put
on the market. However, nowadays, even under general tort law, the producer is
required to prove that the product was not defective when it was put on the
market.[105] These developments should be contrasted with the path taken by liability based on the Directive. This form of liability seems to have moved towards a (more) fault orientated liability, leaving some of its strict liability features behind. |